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A. Or.
5030

A

LECTURE

ON THE

VEDÁNTA,

EMBRACING THE TEXT OF THE

VEDÁNTA-SÁRA.

Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P.

ALLAHABAD:
PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS.
Rev. Jos. WARREN, *Superintendent.*
1851.

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A. or. 5030

Lecture
(Vedanta)

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
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PREFACE.

THIS lecture is a sequel to those on the Nyáya Philosophy delivered in the session of 1848, and to that on the Sánkhya Philosophy, delivered in 1849, to the senior pupils in the English Department of the Benares College, "with the view of introducing them to the Philosophical terminology current among their learned fellow-countrymen the pandits."

Of the text-book here employed, an English translation was published by Dr. Roer, in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for 1845. The advantage of referring to this version has not been neglected; but a much more lucid style of exposition being required for the class of youths for whom the present version was prepared, no scruple has been felt in departing from the phraseology, &c., of any who have written before on the Vedánta, wherever such departure appeared advisable.

That this exposition of the most abstruse of the Hindú systems should be faultless, is very far from probable. In bringing it—as it now stands—before the senior English students, and the class of pandits, in the Benares College, who have for some time been studying English, the intention includes its being submitted to a searching criticism, so that any errors entertained in regard to the system, by Europeans, may have the better chance of being discovered and rectified.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
30th April, 1851.

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A LECTURE

ON THE

VEDÁNTA.

No. 1.—[The term Vedánta, as remarked by Mr. Colebrooke (Essay, v. I. p. 326), signifies "the end and scope of the Vedas." The compendium in which this doctrine is usually first studied, and which will form the text of the following observations, is that by SADÁNANDA—the *Vedánta-sára*—or "Kernel of the Vedánta." A commentary on it, by RÁMATÍRTHA, is called the *Vidwan-mano-ranjiní*—the "Rejoicer of the mind of the Learned." The compendium commences thus :—]

॥ नमो गणेशाय ॥

अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दमवाङ्मनसगोचरम् ।
आत्मानमखिलाधारमाश्रये ऽभीष्टसिद्धये ॥
अर्थतो ऽप्यद्वयानन्दानतीतद्वैतभानतः ।
गुरूनाराध्य वेदान्तसारं वक्ष्ये यथामति ॥

No. 2.—Salutation to Gaṇeśa!

a. For the accomplishment of what is desired I take refuge with the Indivisible [that consists of] existence, knowledge, and joy,—no object fitted for the organ of voice [—see No. 51—to declare], nor for the mind [to comprehend]—*Soul*—the substratum of all.

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b. Having reverenced my preceptor ADWAYÁNANDA, who is significantly so too named [—the name signifying "undivided joy"] —because the notion of duality is [in his case] destroyed—I shall, according to my understanding of it, declare the Kernel of the Vedánta.

c. [In this exordium the whole doctrine of the Vedánta is summed up. According to that doctrine there is but *one* thing—one reality—viz. Soul, or *Brahman*—i. e. the Vast one—who consists of "existence, knowledge, and joy,"—and of nothing else.

When a man gets rid of the notion that there is any thing besides this one solitary reality, he of course regards himself as this reality:—according to the Vedánta, he then *knows* himself to be "undivided joy," like the preceptor of our author—see No. 18.]

वेदान्तो नाम उपनिषत्प्रमाणं तदुपकारीणि शारीरिकादीनिच।

No. 3.—[But what is meant by the term] Vedánta? [By this is meant] the evidence [of there being nothing but Brahman] constituted by the Upanishads, and [by the same term are denoted] such works ancillary thereto as the Śárírika Aphorisms.

a. [The word *upanishad*, from the root *shad* 'to destroy,' is employed to denote, in the first instance, that knowledge of Brahman as the only existent, which knowledge is held to annihilate all else. By the same term, Upanishad, the aggregate of the sections of the Veda which treat of such knowledge is, by a trope (*upachárát*), designated also. These sections of the Veda are regarded as containing all the evidence on which this dogma rests—such other works on the subject as the Aphorisms of BÁDARÁYAṆA being subservient and explanatory, but adding nothing new. The term *upanishat-pramáṇa* may be rendered, optionally, the evidence of the dogma, or the evidence contained in the scriptural treatises. This 'evidence' (*pramáṇa*—'instrument in the production of right notion'*—) is called *vedánta*, as being that the providing of which is the 'end or scope of the Veda'].

* प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणम् ॥ वेद° परि° ॥

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अस्य वेदान्तप्रकरणत्वात् तदीयैरेवानुबन्धैस्तद्वत्त्वसिद्धेर्न ते पृथग् आलोचनीयाः।

No. 4.—Since, in consequence of this work's being concerned about the Vedánta, it is clear that this has the same moving considerations *(anubandha)* as that has, these do not require to be considered as if they were something different [from what the readers of the Vedánta are accustomed to].

a. [The author, as the commentator remarks, was here assailed by the following doubt—"An arrangement that belongs to a science is known to those only who are versed in the science, and not to those who are *desirous of becoming versed* in it:—how, then, shall these, who at present do not know what is the object-matter of the science, enter upon it?" In consequence of this apprehension, that some one, on his attention's being requested to the present volume, might be unacquainted with the established distribution of the matter, the author "proceeds to exhibit concisely the arrangement (not of his own work, which, in the way of arrangement, presents nothing new, but the arrangement) merely which belongs to the science itself"].

तत्रानुबन्धो नाम अधिकारिविषयसम्बन्धप्रयोजनानि।

No. 5.—In that [i. e. in the Vedánta—what are] the moving considerations? [They are] (1) the competent person *(adhikárin)*, (2) the object-matter *(vishaya)*, (3) the relation *(sambandha)*, and (4) the purpose *(prayojana)*.

a. ["In that"—as the commentator tells us, means "in the Vedánta." The distribution here exhibited is not peculiar to the Vedánta;—the statement of (1) "what it is all about"—(2) what relation to the object-matter the book bears—and (3) what is the use of attending to the matter at all—being an advisable statement in the case of any science whatsoever. As Mr. F. W. Newman remarks, (in his Lectures on Logic—p. 3):—"The first point of importance towards getting a clear view of any science,

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is, to have accurately described its object-matter* and its purpose." In the present instance, however, the first question is—"Who is competent to enter on the study?" To this our author replies as follows].

अधिकारी तु विधिवदधीतवेदवेदाङ्गत्वेनापाततोऽधिगताखिल वेदार्थोऽस्मिन् जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा काम्यनिषिद्धवर्ज्जनपुरःसरं नित्यनैमित्तिकप्रायश्चित्तोपासनानुष्ठानेन निर्गतनिखिलकल्मष तया नितान्तनिर्म्मलस्वान्तः साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नः प्रमाता।

No. 6.—But [who is] the competent person? [He is] that well-regulated person who, by the perusal, as prescribed, of the Vedas and their dependent sciences, has attained to a rough notion of the sense of the whole Veda:—who, by renouncing, in this or in a former life, things desirable and things forbidden; and by observance of the constant and of the occasional ceremonies, of penances, and of devotions, being freed from all sin, is thoroughly purified in his heart:—and who is possessed of the quaternion of requisites [see No. 9].

a. [What is meant here by "things desirable," &c., the author proceeds to state].

काम्यानि स्वर्गादीष्टसाधनानि ज्योतिष्टोमादीनि। निषिद्धानि नरकाद्यनिष्टसाधनानि ब्रह्महत्यादीनि। नित्यान्यकरणे प्रत्यवा यसाधनानि सन्ध्यावन्दनादीनि। नैमित्तिकानि पुत्रजन्माद्यनु बन्धीनि जातेष्ट्यादीनि। प्रायश्चित्तानि पापक्षयमात्रसाधनानि चान्द्रायणादीनि। उपासनानि सगुणब्रह्मविषयमानसव्यापार

* This is usually called the *subject*-matter; but, since *vishaya* is so frequently rendered "object," we shall follow Mr. Newman. Sir William Hamilton (—Reid's Works, p. 97—) says "In philosophical language, it were to be wished "ed that the word *subject* should be reserved for the *subject of inhesion*—the "*materia in qua*; and the term *object* exclusively applied to the *subject of ope*-"*ration*—the *materia circa quam*. If this be not done, the grand distinction "of *subjective* and *objective*, in philosophy, is confounded."

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रूपाणि शाण्डिल्यविद्यादीनि। एतेषां नित्यादीनां बुद्धिशुद्धिः परं प्रयोजनम्। उपासनानान्तु तदेकाग्र्यं परं प्रयोजनम्।

No. 7.—'Things desirable?' These are the means, such as the *jyotishṭoman* sacrifice, of obtaining things desired—such as heaven.

a. 'Things forbidden?' These, such as the killing of a Bráhman, are what lead to things undesired—such as hell.

b. 'Constant ceremonies?' These, such as the morning and evening prayers, &c., are those which, in their omission [under any circumstances] are causes of sin.

c. 'Occasional ceremonies?' These, such as the *játeshṭi*, are those contingent on some occasion, such as the birth of a son, [and not obligatory, for example, on one to whom a child has not been born].

d. 'Penances?' These, such as the *chándráyaṇa*, are what cause [not the acquisition of anything positive, but] merely the removal of sin.

e. 'Devotions?' These, such as [are inculcated in] the doctrine of the saint ŚÁṆḌILYA, consist of mental operations whose object [—see No. 25—] is Brahman with [—and not, as we shall have to regard the Absolute in the last result, as devoid of] qualities.

f. Of these [three sets] of which the 'constant ceremonies' are the first, the chief purpose is the purification of the intellect; but of the 'devotions' the chief purpose is the concentration of it.

g. [In regard to these ceremonies, &c., with the particulars of which we are not at present concerned, some authorities are next quoted].

तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेनेत्यादिश्रुतेः। तप सा कल्मषं हन्ति विद्ययामृतमश्नुते इत्यादिस्मृतेश्च। नित्यनैमित्ति

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कयोरुपासनानाच्चावान्तरफलं पितृलोकसत्यलोकप्राप्तौ कर्म्मणा पितृलोको विद्यया देवलोक इति श्रुतेः।

No. 8.—[The positions above laid down are deduced] from such scriptural texts as this, that "Him do the Bráhmans seek to know by means of sacrifices [performed] in conformity with [the directions of] the Veda:"—and [they are deduced also] from such regulations as this, that "By austerities one destroys sin:—by knowledge one obtains the water of immortality."

a. The result attendant on the constant and the occasional ceremonies, and on devotions, is the attaining to the abode of the progenitors and of the celestials—[and this is deduced] from the text that "The abode of the progenitors is [to be attained to] by works, and the abode of the gods by knowledge."

b. [The 'quaternion of requisites' necessary for the 'competent person'—see No. 6.—is next explained].

साधनानि नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक इहामुत्रफलभोगविरागश्चमदादिसम्पन्मुमुक्षुत्वानि।

No. 9.—'Requisites?' These are (1) the discrimination of the eternal substance from the transient; (2) disregard of the enjoyment of the fruits of here and hereafter; (3) the possession of tranquillity and self-restraint; and (4) desire of liberation.

a. [These four are next severally to be explained].

नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकस्तावत्। ब्रह्मैव नित्यं वस्तु ततोऽन्यदखिलम नित्यमिति विवेचनम्।

No. 10.—'Discrimination of the eternal substance from the transient?'—This is the discerning that God is the eternal substance, and that all else is non-eternal.

ऐहिकानां स्रक्चन्दनविषयभोगानां कर्म्मजन्यतया ऽनित्यत्ववदा

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मुष्मिकाणामप्यस्मृतादिविषयभोगानामनित्यतया तेभ्यो नितरां विरतिरिहामुत्रफलभोगविरागः।

No. 11.—'Disregard of the enjoyment of the fruits of here and hereafter' is the entire neglect of them, because of the fact that the enjoyments of the things of hereafter, also, such as the water of immortality, are un-eternal, just as the enjoyments of the things of the present, such as garlands and unguents, are un-eternal, because they are produced by works.

a. [That which is produced by works must have had a beginning, and that which had a beginning is not eternal, and is held to be liable to destruction].

शमदमादयस्तु शमदमोपरतितितिक्षासमाधानश्रद्धाः। शमस्तावत् श्रवणादिव्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो मनसो निग्रहः। दमो बाह्यविषयेन्द्रियाणां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो निवर्त्तनं। निवर्त्तितानामेषां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्य उपरमणमुपरतिः। अथवा विहितानां कर्म्मणां विधिना परित्यागः। तितिक्षा शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वसहिष्णुता। निगृहीतस्य मनसः श्रवणादौ तदनुगुणविषयेच समाधिः समाधानं। गुरुवेदान्तवाक्येषु विश्वासः श्रद्धा।

No. 12.—But 'Tranquillity, Self-restraint,' &c? These are (1) Tranquillity, (2) self-restraint, (3) quiescence, (4) endurance, (5) contemplation, and (6) faith.

a. 'Tranquillity' itself? This is the restraining of [the "internal organ"] the mind from objects different from the hearing, &c. [about the Lord:—see No. 25].

b. 'Self-Restraint?' This is the restraining of the *external* organs from objects different therefrom. [See No. 12, *a.*]

c. 'Quiescence' is the inaction of the organs thus [No. 12, *b.*] restrained from objects different therefrom. Or—it is the aban-

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donment, according to the injunction [given to Bráhmans on reaching a certain period of life], of works enjoined [on Bráhmans otherwise circumstanced].

d. 'Endurance?' This is the sustaining of such pairs as cold and heat [—with indiffcrence alike for the pain or pleasure they may tend to produce].

e. 'Contemplation' *(samádhána)* is the intentness of the mind restrained [from all else] on the hearing, &c. [concerning the Lord—see No 12, *a.*], or on kindred objects [by which the contemplation of the Lord is facilitated].

f. 'Faith' *(śraddhá)* is belief in the assertions of the spiritual guide and of the Vedánta.

मुमुक्षुत्वं मोक्षेच्छा। एवंभूतः प्रमाता अधिकारी।

No. 13.—'Desire of liberation?' This is the wish to be liberated.

a. Such a well-regulated person [as the man who possesses the qualifications enumerated in No. 6, and explained in the paragraphs following it] is a competent person [to engage in the study of the Vedánta].

b. [Authorities in support of this are next cited.]

शान्तो दान्त इति श्रुतेः। उक्तञ्च प्रशान्तचित्ताय जितेन्द्रियाय प्रक्षीणदोषाय यथोक्तकारिणे। गुणान्विताय्यनुमताय सर्व्वदा प्रदेयमेतत्सततं मुमुक्षवे।

No. 14.—[That such is the character of a fit enquirer may be inferred] from the scriptural text beginning "Tranquil and self-restrained, &c." And it has been said, "To him who is tranquil in mind, who has his organs in subjection, whose sins have disappeared, who acts according to the commandments, who is possessed of good qualities, docile, ever desiring liberation—this [doctrine of the Vedánta] is always proper to be imparted."

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a. [The question as to who is competent to enter upon the study of the Vedánta having been thus determined, the second question—of the four started in No. 5.—as to the 'object-matter' of the Vedánta—falls to be considered].

विषयो जीवब्रह्मैक्यं शुद्धचैतन्यं प्रमेयं तत्रैव वेदान्तानां तात्पर्य्यात्।

No. 15.—The 'Object-matter' *(vishaya)?* This is the fact—to be known for certain—that the soul and God are one; for this is the drift of all Vedánta treatises—[and consequently of the one in hand].

a. [The third question—of the four started in No. 5,—as to the correlation—next falls to be considered].

सम्बन्धश्चैक्यप्रमेयस्य तत्प्रतिपादकोपनिषत्प्रमाणस्य च बोध्यबोधकभावलक्षणः।

No. 16.—The 'relation' *(sambandha)?* This, between the identity [of soul and God—see No. 15.—]which is to be known as certain, and the evidence thereof contained in the scriptural treatises which ascertain it, is that of the information [communicated] and the informer.

a. [This relation, which must evidently be the same in the case of every book which gives information on any subject, is specified in order to prevent a quibbler from arguing that, as no relation between the two is stated, there is therefore no relation between them at all—in which case the discussion would be aimless.

b. The fourth question—of the four stated in No. 5—as to the purpose—the "cui bono?"—next falls to be considered].

प्रयोजनन्तु तदैक्यप्रमेयगताज्ञाननिवृत्तिस्तत्स्वरूपानन्दावाप्तिश्च।

No. 17.—But 'the end,' *(prayojana,)* [which, by its desirable-

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ness, should move one to enter upon the enquiry at all]? This is the cessation of the *ignorance* which invades this identity that is to be known [of soul and God—see No. 15—], and the attainment [by soul, thereon,] of that bliss which is His essence—[see No. 2].

a. [Authorities, in support of the assertion that this end can be thus attained, are next cited].

तरति शोकमात्मविदिति श्रुतेः। ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवतीति श्रुतेश्च।

No. 18.—[That it is possible, by means of knowledge, to escape from the bondage of mundane existence, may be inferred] from the scriptural text, that "He who knows what Soul is, gets beyond grief;"—and from the text, that "He who knows God *(brahman)*, becomes God."

अयमधिकारी जन्ममरणादिसंसारानलसन्तप्तो दीप्तशिरा जल राशिमिवोपहारपाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठं गुरुमुपसृत्य तमनुस रति। समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठमिति श्रुतेः। स गुरुः परम कृपयाध्यारोपापवादन्यायेनैनमुपदिशति। तस्मै स विद्वानुप पन्नाय प्राहेत्यादिश्रुतेः।

No. 19.—This qualified person [—No. 13—], being burned by the fire of this world in the shape of birth, death, and the like, as one whose head is heated [by the sun's rays—takes refuge] in a body of water, having approached, with tribute in his hands, a teacher who knows the Vedas, and who is intent on God, follows him—[or becomes his disciple]:—for [there is] the scriptural text—"with fuel in his hands [as an offering, the enquirer approaches] him who knows the Vedas and is intent on God, &c."

a. The teacher with the greatest kindness, instructs him by the method of the 'refutation of the erroneous imputation;' [as

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might be inferred] from such texts as the one beginning "To him, when he had approached, the learned man thus spoke, &c."

b. [What is meant by the 'erroneous imputation' and its 'refutation' has next to be considered:—and first of the 'erroneous imputation'].

असर्पभूतरज्जौ सर्पारोपवत् वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपोऽध्यारोपः। वस्तु सच्चिदानन्दाद्वयं ब्रह्म। अज्ञानादिसकलजडसमूहोऽवस्तु।

No. 20.—'Erroneous imputation,' *(adhyáropa)* is the allegation that the Unreal is the Real [see No 10]—like the judgment, in respect of a rope which is no serpent, that it is a serpent.

a. 'The Real?' This *(vastu)* is God [consisting—see No. 2.—of] existence, knowledge, and happiness—[the One] without a second.

b. 'The Unreal' *(avastu)* is the whole aggregate of the senseless—beginning with ignorance.

c. [As the right understanding of this point is the key—if there be any—to the whole system, particular attention is here desirable. The definition of this technical term 'ignorance' here follows].

अज्ञानन्तु सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं भावरूपं ज्ञानविरोधि यत्किञ्चिदिति वदन्ति।

No. 21.—But ignorance? They [the Vedántins] declare that this is a somewhat that is not to be called positively either entity or non-entity*—not a mere negation, [but] the opponent of knowledge,—consisting of the three fetters.

a. [According to the Naiyáyikas, *ajnána* is merely the non-ex-

* Conf. Plato's ὂν και μη ὂν, as opposed to the ὄντως ὂν, in Sir Wm. Hamilton's note on Reid's works, p. 262.

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istence, or negation, *(abhâva)*, of *jnâna*. To deny this, the writer calls it *bhâva*—implying that it is not *abhâva*.

b. That there *is* such a thing as Ignorance, the author next undertakes to prove by an appeal to human consciousness and to scripture].

अहमज्ञ इत्याद्यनुभवात्। देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढामित्यादिश्रुतेश्च।

No. 22.—[That there is such a thing as Ignorance may be deduced] from the judgment [forced upon the consciousness of every man] that "I am ignorant;"—and from such scriptural texts as the one beginning with—"The power of the divine soul clothed* with its qualities," &c.

a. [Before going further, let us consider the way in which the conception of 'Ignorance' may have come to occupy the place which it occupies in the system under examination.

b. Sir G. C. Haughton, in his reply to Col. Vans Kennedy's strictures on Mr. Colebrooke's Essay—(London As. Jour. vol. xviii, p. 217,) —after quoting from different writers to show in what diverse fashion different persons have endeavoured to represent their notion of the Vedánta doctrine, remarks as follows:—"It "must be indeed clear, from all that has been said, that such a "system, if it be even perfectly comprehensible, cannot be repre-"sented by language, but must be inferred by the mind from "the principles,"—and so on. Let us collect, then, into one view the pre-requisites for that mental inference which, according to Sir G. Haughton, each one must make for himself who is to comprehend the system.

c. Suppose that God, omnipresent—omniscient—and omnipo-

* The Divine life, as alone the finite mind can conceive it, is self-forming, self-representing will, clothed, to the mortal eye, with multitudinous sensuous forms, flowing through me and through the whole immeasurable universe."
Fichte's System—in Lewes's History of Philosophy, Vol. IV. p. 164.

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tent—exists. Suppose, further, that, at some time or other, God exists and nothing else does. Suppose in the next place, as held long in Europe and still in India, that nothing is made out of nothing *(ex nihilo nihil fit;—)* and suppose, finally, that God wills to make a world. Being omnipotent, He *can* make it. The dogma "ex nihilo nihil fit" being, by the hypothesis, an axiom, it follows that God, being able to make a world, can make it without making it out of *nothing*. The world so made must then consist of what previously existed,—i. e. of God. Now—what do we understand by a world? Let it be an aggregate of souls with limited capacities—and of what these souls (rightly or wrongly) regard as objects—the special or intermediate causes of various modes of intelligence. Taking this to be what is meant by a world, how is God to form it out of Himself? God is omniscient—and, in virtue of his omnipresence, his omniscience is everywhere. Where is the room for a *limited* intelligence? Viewing the matter (if that were strictly possible) *a priori*, one would incline to say, "nowhere." But the Vedántin, before he had got this length, was too painfully affected by the conviction, forced upon him, as on the rest of us, by a consciousness which will take no denial, that there *are* limited intelligences. "I am ignorant"—says the thinker quoted in the text; and if he is *wrong* in saying so, then his ignorance is established just as well as if he were right in saying so. Holding, then, that the soul *is* God, and confronted with the inevitable fact that the soul does *not* spontaneously *recognise* itself as God—there was nothing for it but to make the fact itself do duty as its own cause—to say that the soul does not know itself to be God just because it does not know it—i. e., because it is ignorant,—i. e., because it is obstructed by *Ignorance (ajnána)*.

d. At this point let us suppose that our speculator stopped; but that a disciple took up the matter and tried to make something more palpably definite out of the indefinite term *Ignorance*. Were it not—he argues—for this *ajnána*, of which my teacher speaks, the soul would know itself to be God—there would be

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nothing but God—there would be no world. It is this *ajnána*, then, that *makes* the world; and, this being the case, it ought to have a name suggestive of the fact. Let it be called *prakriti*, the name by which the Sánkhyas (—see Lecture on the Sánkhya,—Nos. 4 and 6,—) speak of their unconscious maker of worlds. Good, says another; but recollect that this *prakriti* or 'energy' can be nothing else than the power of the All-powerful—for we can admit the substantial existence of God alone;—so that the *ajnána* which you have shown to be entitled to the name of *prakriti*, will be even more accurately denoted by the word *śakti*, God's 'power,'—by an exertion of which alone the fact can be accounted for, that souls which are God *do not know* that they are so. The reasoning is accepted, and the term *śakti* is enrolled among the synonymes of *ajnána*. Lastly comes the mythologist. You declare—says he—that this world would not even appear to be real were it not for *ignorance*. Its apparent reality, then, is an *illusion*—and for the word *ajnána* you had better substitute the more expressive term *máyá*—'deceit, illusion, jugglery.' The addition of this to the list of synonymes being acquiesced in, the mythologist furnishes his *Máyá* with all the requisites of a goddess, and she takes her seat in his pantheon as the wife of Brahmá. Such we may conceive to be the genesis of *máyá*—that conception which Mr. Colebrooke (Essays, Vol. I. p. 377) takes "to be no tenet of the original *Vedántin* philosophy,"—but which, to our mind, appears (as we have explained) to be, nevertheless, in such a way involved in the conception of *ajnána*, when once treated as *something external to the mind*, that it quite naturally became evolved in the later writings of the Vedántins.

e. The mental, or subjective, state of ignorance having thus projected itself (—see No. 35—) outwards, and being then treated as something *objective*, we are reminded of the correspondence between this view and that of Fichte, (quoted at No. 92 of our Lecture on the Sánkhya philosophy), which is as follows:—

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"To use the language of Fichte"—says a writer in Brande's Dictionary—"the ego is absolute, and posits itself; it is a pure activity. As its activity, however, has certain indefinable limits, when it experiences this limitation of its activity it also posits a non-ego, and so originates the objective world. The ego, therefore, cannot posit itself without at the same time *projecting* a non-ego, which, consequently, is in so far the mere creation of the ego."

So—according to the Vedánta—the soul (being God) is absolute—not requiring that some other agency should originate it—but simply positing itself, or laying down the position or proposition "Here I am." It meets with what Fichte calls "certain indefinable limits." The Vedántí gives these limits a name. They are, in his opinion, the limits which confine that *knowledge* which in the soul would otherwise be omniscience. The limitation of knowledge he designates Ignorance; and, as Fichte holds the objective world to be what the ego projects, in the objectifying of its own limitations, when it attains its indefinable limits, so the Vedántí holds the objective world to be that which the soul projects, in the objectifying of its own limitations as regards knowledge. The limitations of what would otherwise be omniscience, being thus objectified, or regarded as something external, they are then spoken of as the *trammels* of the soul, and are spoken of collectively under the name of the subjective state then regarded as caused by them—that is to say, the objective limitations are spoken of under the name of Ignorance, just as the subjective state is.

f. Ignorance *(ajnána)* thus viewed objectively, and the trammels *(guṇa)* of Ignorance, are not to be understood as different but as the same. The word *guṇa*, "a cord," means something "fettering the soul" (—to employ the expression of Mr. Colebrooke—Essays, vol. I. p. 249—) and Ignorance is the "threefold cord" or "triple chain" (—see our Lecture on the Sánkhya

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Nos. 49 and 96—), that binds all save God—who is therefore spoken of as *nirguṇa* "the unfettered"—the unlimited. As the word *guṇa* means also a quality, and familiarly a good quality, it must be recollected in what technical sense the term *guṇa* is employed when God is spoken of as *nirguṇa*.

g. On the subject of Ignorance, thus viewed objectively let us now hear our text-book further.]

इदमज्ञानं समष्ट्यभिप्रायेणैकमनेकमिति च व्यवह्रियते। तथाहि। यथा वृक्षाणां समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण वनमित्येकत्वव्यपदेशः यथा वा जलानां समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण जलाशय इति तथा नानात्वेन प्रतिभासमानजीवगताज्ञानानां समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण तदेकत्वव्यपदेशः।

No. 23.—This Ignorance is treated as one or as many accordingly as it is regarded collectively or distributively. That is to say—as of trees, when regarded as a collection, the singular denomination is "forest,"—or, as of waters, when regarded as a collection, it [i. e. the singular denomination] is "a piece of water,"—so the ignorances, attached to souls and apparently multitudinous, receive, when regarded as a collection, the singular denomination thereof—[i. e. the name of 'Ignorance'—in the singular.]

अजामेकामित्यादिश्रुतेः।

No. 24.—[That it is proper to speak of Ignorance—see No. 23. —as *one*, may be deduced] from such scriptural texts [as that which speaks of it] as "The unborn—the single," &c.

इयं समष्टिरुत्कृष्टोपाधितया विशुद्धसत्त्वप्रधाना। एतदुपहितं चैतन्यं सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वनियन्तृत्वादिगुणकं सदसद्व्यक्तमन्तर्यामी जगत्कारणमीश्वर इति व्यपदिश्यते।

No. 25.—This aggregation [of Ignorance—No. 23—], since it

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is the abode of [One who is] its Superior, has chiefly pure Goodness in it [and very little—not more than He chooses—of the other two fetters—Passion and Darkness—see Lecture on the Sánkhya § 49—]. Intellect *(chaitanya)* of which this is the abode [or body] being possessed of such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and superintendence over all, imperceptible, all-pervading, Maker of the world, is called the Lord [*íśwara.*]

[How the Lord is inferred to be omniscient, he next states.]

सकलाज्ञानावभासकत्वादस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं । यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविदिति श्रुतेः ।

No. 26.—His omniscience [may be inferred] from the fact that he is the enlightener of all [that would else be unenlightened] Ignorance; [and it may be learned authoritatively] from such scriptural texts as "who is omniscient—who knoweth all."

अस्येयं समष्टिरखिलकारणत्वात् कारणशरीरं । आनन्दप्रचुरत्वात् कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाच्चानन्दमयः कोशः । सर्वोपरमत्वात् सुषुप्तिः । अत एव स्थूलसूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चलयस्थानमितिचोच्यते ।

No. 27.—This His aggregation [of Ignorance,] since it is the cause of all [No. 25,] is His body—causing [whatever else appears.] Since there is in it a plenitude of happiness, and it [i. e. this body of the Deity] envelopes all as the cocoon [of the silk-worm does its tenant,] it is this that is called the sheath of happiness [in which the soul first rests.] This [body of the deity] is [nothing different from] profound sleep, for it is into this that every soul [in profound sleep] subsides. Hence it is called the place of the dissolution of both the gross and the subtile worlds.

[That is to say—when a man falls into a profound sleep, the external world and the world of dreams both cease to exist for him—and then his position is held to be that described above.]

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यथा वनस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण दृष्ट्वा इत्यनेकत्वव्यपदेशः यथा वा जलाशयस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण जलानीति तथा ऽज्ञानस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण तदनेकत्वव्यपदेशः।

No. 28.—As [the collection of objects called] a wood, when regarded distributively, takes the plural denomination "trees,"—or as a body of water, when regarded distributively, takes that of "waters,"—so Ignorance [No. 23,] when regarded distributively, receives the plural name thereof—[i. e. the name of Ignorances—in the plural.]

इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते इत्यादिश्रुतेः।

No. 29.—[That Ignorance can be rightly spoken of in the plural—No. 28,—may be deduced] from such scriptural texts as "Indra [i. e., by synecdoche, God] by his powers [No. 36,] appears manifold."

[Why Ignorance is treated of collectively and distributively, is next stated.]

अत्र समस्तव्यस्तव्यापित्वेन समष्टित्वव्यष्टित्वव्यपदेशः।

No. 30.—Here [i. e. in regard to Ignorance,] there is the name of collection and distribution according as it belongs to the collective [cause—No. 25,—] or to the distributive [separate productions—No. 31.]

इयं व्यष्टिर्निकृष्टोपाधितया मलिनसत्त्वप्रधाना। एतदुपहितं चैतन्यमज्ञत्वानीश्वरत्वादिगुणकं प्राज्ञ इत्युच्यते। एकाज्ञानावभासकत्वादस्य प्राज्ञत्वं। असदृष्टोपाधितया ऽनतिप्रकाशकत्वं।

No. 31.—This distributed aspect [of Ignorance—No. 28,—] since it is the abode of its Inferior [—e. g. of the human soul,

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which it subdues,] has chiefly impure goodness in it [—it not being in the power of the resident to eject the impurities, as it is in the power of the Superior—see No. 25.]

Thought [or soul] located in this, having such qualities as want of knowledge and want of power, [—being the soul of mundane beings—] is called 'the very defective intelligence' *(prájna.)*

The smallness of its intelligence [may be inferred] from the fact that it is the illuminator of [but] a single Ignorance [i. e. of an individual—unlike that which,—see No. 26,—is the enlightener of all—];—it has not the power of enlightening much because its abode [—as abovementioned] is not clear [—being tainted by Passion and Darkness.]

अस्यापीयमहङ्कारादिकारणत्वात् कारणशरीरं। आनन्दप्रचुरत्वादेवानन्दमयः कोशः। सर्वोपरमत्वात् सुषुप्तिः। अत एव स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते। तदानीमेतावीश्वरप्राज्ञौ चैतन्यप्रदीप्ताभिरतिसूक्ष्माभिरज्ञानवृत्तिभिरानन्दमनुभवतः।

No. 32.—Since it [viz. Ignorance regarded distributively—No. 31,—] is the cause of the conceit of individuality and the like, it also [—as well as the aggregate spoken of in No. 27,—] is [spoken of as] a body that causes. Since there is in it a plenitude of happiness, it [also] is called the sheath of happiness. It [also] is [nothing different from] profound sleep, for it is in this that all ceases to do aught. Hence it [also] is called the place of the dissolution of both the gross and the subtile body. At that time [i. e. during profound sleep] the two, the Lord and the individual intelligence, enjoy blessedness by means of the very subtile modifications of Ignorance [these modifications being] illuminated by intellect, [—for, in the absence of the light of intellect, nothing would be experienced at all.]

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[That such is the case the author offers the following evidence to prove.]

आनन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञ इति श्रुतेः। सुखमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिद वेदिषमित्यत्थितस्य परामर्शानुपपत्तेश्च।

No. 33.—[That this—see No. 32,—is the case, is to be inferred] from the scriptural text "The individual intelligence enjoys bliss [during profound sleep] being [then] more peculiarly that intelligence [which, unfettered altogether, is joy simply:]—and [it may be inferred] from the fact that [on any other supposition] there would be no such reminiscence as that of one risen [from sleep—who says] "I slept pleasantly,—I knew nothing."

[According to European notions, the person so speaking refers back, to the time when he was unconscious, the pleasant feeling of refreshment which he becomes conscious of on awaking.]

अनयोर्व्यष्टिसमष्ट्योर्वनवृक्षयोरिव जलाशयजलयोरिवचाभेदः। एतदुपहितयोरीश्वरप्राज्ञयोरपि वनवृक्षावच्छिन्नाकाशयोरिव जलाशयजलगतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशयोरिवचाभेदः। एष सर्वेश्वर इत्यादि श्रुतेः। वनवृक्षतदवच्छिन्नाकाशयोर्जलजलाशयतद्गतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशयोर्वा आधारभूतानुपहिताकाशवदनयोरज्ञानतदुपहितचैतन्ययोराधारभूतं यदनुपहितं चैतन्यं तत्तुरीयमित्युच्यते। शिवं शान्तं अद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते इत्यादि श्रुतेः।

No. 34.—Of these two—[namely Ignorance regarded in the two points of view—see No. 30,—i. e.] regarded collectively and distributively there is no difference, as there is none between a forest and [its] trees or between a body of water and [its] waters. And there is likewise no difference between the Lord and the individual soul affected by these [two kinds of really identical Ignorance] as there is none between the ethereal space that is

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occupied by the forest and by the trees [that constitute the forest,] or between the ethereal expanse that is reflected in the whole body of water and in the [separate] waters thereof:—[as may be inferred] from such texts as "This [individual intelligence] is [none other than] the omniscient," &c.

As there is for the forest and its trees and for the ethereal space occupied by these, or for the body of water and its waters and for the ethereal expanse that is reflected therein, an absolute expanse in which these [particular expanses] are located—[so likewise reason compels us to assume] for these two, viz.—the [collective and distributed] Ignorance and the two [Lordly and individual] intelligences to which they pertain, an absolute intelligence which is their basis. This is called "the Fourth"—[and this assertion is made] because of such texts as this—viz. "They regard him as blessed, tranquil, without duality, the fourth."

[There are four conditions of the soul, viz. (1) waking, (2) dreaming, (3) dreamless sleep, and (4) that which is here called "the fourth."]

इदमेव तुरीयं शुद्धचैतन्यं अज्ञानादि तदुपहितचैतन्याभ्यां तन्नाय: पिण्डवदविविक्तं सन्महावाक्यवाच्यं। विविक्तं सल्लक्ष्य मित्युच्यते।

No. 35.—This—and just this—the "Fourth" [No. 34,]—pure intelligence, where not discriminated apart from Ignorance, &c. and the intelligence located therein, like [the fire and the iron viewed indiscriminately in] an ignited iron ball, is what is the express meaning of [the term 'Thou' in] the great sentence [in which the teacher first addresses the pupil—viz.—"That art thou" —meaning "Thou art Brahma"]. Where [on the other hand] discriminated [from Ignorance and intelligence located therein] it is called the meaning indicated.

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[To explain:—people say "the hot iron burns the hand," but, though they expressly assert here that the iron, being heated, burns the hand, yet they mean—if they mean rightly—that the *heat* located in the iron burns the hand. This therefore is the meaning *indicated*, though not expressly asserted—see the *Sáhitya Darpaṇa* § 13. *a*. In like manner, in the 'great sentence' "That art thou," the speaker makes the express assertion that "thou"—i. e. the combination of ignorance and intelligence constituting the person addressed—art "That"—i. e. that absolute intelligence;—but, in so saying, he *means* (—or, in the phraseology of the text, he says *by indication*,—) "Thou *apart* from the ignorance that now envelopes thee, art That."]

अस्याज्ञानस्यावरणविक्षेपनामकं शक्तिद्वयमस्ति। आवरणशक्तिस्तावद्घनोऽपि मेघोऽनेकयोजनायतमादित्यमण्डलमवलोकयितृनयनपथपिधायकतया यथाच्छादयतीव तथाऽज्ञानं परिच्छिन्नमप्यात्मानमपरिच्छिन्नमसंसारिणमवलोकयितृबुद्धिपिधायकतयाच्छादयतीव तादृशं सामर्थ्यं।

No. 36.—Of this Ignorance there are two powers—envelopment *(ávaraṇa)* and projection *(vikshepa)*. As for the enveloping power:—as even a small cloud, by obstructing the path of the eye of the spectator, hides the sun's disc which extends over many leagues, such also is the power of Ignorance, which, though finite, by obstructing the mind of the observer, hides as it were the soul which is infinite and not subject to worldly vicissitude.

तदुक्तं घनच्छन्नदृष्टिर्घनच्छन्नमर्कं यथा निष्प्रभं मन्यते चाति मूढः। तथा बद्ध्वन्मन्यति यो मूढदृष्टेः स नित्योपलब्धिस्वरूपोऽहमात्मा इत्यादि।

No. 37.—Thus it is said, [in Hastámalaka's Eulogium]—"As the very stupid man, whose eye is covered by a cloud, thinks that

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the sun is covered by a cloud and void of radiance, so likewise that [Soul] which, in the sight of the stupid, is as it were bound [—'cabined, cribbed, confined,'—] that, in the shape of the eternal understanding, am I myself."

अनयावृतस्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखित्वदुःखित्वादिसंसारभावनापि भवति यथा स्वाज्ञानावृतायां रज्ज्वां सर्पत्वसम्भावना।

No. 38.—In respect of the soul covered with this—[No. 36—] there arises the impression that it is liable to mundane vicissitude—that it is an agent, a patient, happy, grieved, and so forth; [—See Lecture on the Sánkhya—No. 43—]; as in the case of a rope, concealed by ignorance in regard to its character, [there arises] the impression that it is a snake.

विक्षेपशक्तिस्तु यथा रज्ज्वज्ञानं स्वावृतरज्जौ स्वशक्त्या सर्पादिकमुद्भावयति एवमज्ञानमपि स्वावृतात्मनि स्वशक्त्या आकाशादिप्रपञ्चमुद्भावयति तादृशं सामर्थ्यं। तदुक्तं विक्षेपशक्तिर्लिङ्गादि ब्रह्माण्डान्तं जगत्सृजेदिति।

No. 39.—But the projective power?—As ignorance of [the fact that a certain rope is] a rope produces, by its own power, on the rope enveloped by it, [the appearance of] a snake or the like, so [this projective] Ignorance, by its own power, raises up, on the soul enveloped by it, [the appearance of] a world—ether, &c.; —[and thus the thinker mistakes *himself* for a mere mortal, as he mistook the rope for a snake]. Such is this power.

Thus it is said, "The projective power can create [every thing], beginning with the subtile body, [see No. 44], and ending with the whole external universe."

[This projective power may be illustrated by the habit of a jaundiced eye, which projects its own yellow hue on a sheet of white paper].

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शक्तिद्वयवदज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यं स्वप्रधानतया निमित्तं स्वोपाधि-प्रधानतया उपादानञ्च भवति। यथा लूता तन्तुकार्य्यं प्रति स्व-प्रधानतया निमित्तं स्वशरीरप्रधानतयोपादानञ्च भवति।

No. 40.—Intellect *(chaitanya)* [i. e. Knowledge or Deity] located in Ignorance with its two powers [No. 36], is, in its own right, the instrumental cause; and in virtue of what it is located in [viz. Ignorance] the substantial cause [of all]—as the spider is personally the instrument, and, in virtue of its own body [in which the soul of the spider resides], the substance, in regard to that product [which we call] its thread.

[According to this view, God, regarded as Soul or pure spirit, is the instumental cause but not the substantial cause (—i. e., here, the material cause—) of the world. He is the substantial cause in virtue only of *that wherewith he hath invested himself*—which some people call 'matter,' and regard as really existing, and which the Vedántins prefer calling 'ignorance'—denying its right to be regarded as really existing—see No. 20. *b*.]

तमःप्रधानविक्षेपशक्तिमदज्ञानोपहितचैतन्यादाकाशं आकाशा-द्वायुर्वायोरग्निरग्नेरापः अद्भ्यः पृथिवीचोत्पद्यते। तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः इत्यादि श्रुतेः।

No. 41.—From Intellect immersed in Ignorance with the Projective power in which [out of the three constituents of Ignorance—see No. 25—] darkness prevails, there arises the Ether:—from the Ether, Air; from Air, Fire; from Fire, Water; and from Water, Earth. [This may be inferred] from such texts of Scripture as this, that "From that [Intellect which has been spoken of] from this same soul was the Ether produced, &c."

तेषु जाड्याधिक्यदर्शनात्तमःप्राधान्यं तत्कारणस्य। तदानीं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि कारणगुणक्रमेण तेष्वाकाशादिषूत्पद्यन्ते। इमान्येव सूक्ष्मभूतानि तन्मात्राण्यपञ्चीकृतानिचोच्यन्ते।

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No. 42.—That there is the prevalence of darkness [see No. 41] in the [special Ignorance which is the] cause of these [five Elements—may be inferred] from the excess of senselessness observed in them [—the Elements being unenlightened by intellect which they quite obscure].

a. Then [—although darkness is the chief ingredient in the cause of these, yet as it is not the sole one—therefore] Purity, Foulness, and Darkness are produced in these [elemental products of the cause in question—see No. 46. *a.*—viz. the] Ether, &c., in the degree in which they exist in the cause [—for, according to the Hindús, the qualities existing in any product are just those that existed in that of which it is the product].

b. It is these same [five] that are called also the 'subtile elements' *(súkshma-bhúta)*, the 'that merely' *(tan-mátra)*, and the 'not [yet] made into the [gross] five' *(a-panchíkrita)* [by intermixture—see No. 68—].

एतेभ्यः सूक्ष्मशरीराणि स्थूलभूतानिचोत्पद्यन्ते ।

No. 43.—From these [subtile elements—No. 42—] are produced the subtile bodies [No. 44] and the gross elements, [No. 68].

सूक्ष्मशरीराणि सप्तदशावयवानि लिङ्गशरीराणिच।

No. 44.—Subtile bodies? These are the 'bodies whereby [the individuated soul] is recognised' *(linga-śaríra)*, consisting of the seventeen portions [No. 45].

अवयवास्तु ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं बुद्धिमनसी कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं वायुपञ्चकञ्चेति ।

No. 45.—But the portions? These are the set of five intellectual organs, Understanding and Mind, the set of five organs of action, and the set of five [vital] airs [or involuntary bodily functions].

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a. [These 'portions' that make up the 'subtile body' are now to be described in their order].

ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणाख्यानि। एतान्याकाशादीनां सात्त्विकांशेभ्यो व्यस्तेभ्यः पृथक् क्रमेणोत्पद्यन्ते।

No. 46.—The intellectual organs are those called the hearing, the touch, the sight, the taste, and the smell.

a. These are produced from the separate *pure* particles of the Ether, &c. [No. 41] severally in their order.

[That is to say, the organ of hearing is produced from pure etherial particles, that of feeling from pure aerial particles, and so sight from light, taste from water, and smell from earth. Compare the *Tarka-Sangraha*—p. 6].

बुद्धिर्नाम निश्चयात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिः। मनो नाम सङ्कल्पविकल्पात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिः। अनयोरेव चिन्ताहङ्कारयोरन्तर्भावः। अनुसन्धानात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिश्चित्तं। अभिमानात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिरहङ्कारः।

No. 47.—Understanding *(buddhi)* is that condition of the internal instrument *(—antahkarana—*the 'inner man'—) which consists in assurance.

a. Opining *(manas)* is that condition of the inner man which consists in judging or doubting.

b. In these two [conditions] thinking and self-consciousness are included [—thought being a matter of understanding, and self-consciousness one of opinion].

c. Thinking is that condition of the inner man which consists in seeking about.

d. Self-consciousness is that condition of the inner man which

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consists in the conceit [that "it is *I* who affirm—opine—doubt, &c." See Lecture on the Sánkhya—No. 17—].

एते पुनराकाशादिगतसात्त्विकांशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्य उत्पद्यन्ते। तेषां प्रकाशात्मकत्वात् सात्त्विकांशकार्य्यत्वं।

No. 48.—These again [—No. 47—] are produced [—not like the senses—see No. 46—from the particles of one separate element severally, but] from the mingled pure particles belonging to the Ether, &c.

a. That they are formed from the *pure (sáttwika)* particles [is evident] from their consisting of enlightenment.

[See Sánkhya Lecture—Nos. 50 and 39].

इयं बुद्धिर्ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सहिता सती विज्ञानमयकोशो भवति।

No. 49.—This understanding, being associated with the intellectual organs, is the 'intelligent sheath' *(vijnánamaya-kosha)* [of the soul].

[The soul, viewed as being individuated or divided off—which, however, the Vedántin does not admit that it ever in reality *is*,—from the Absolute—the indivisible essential Joy-thought—, is treated as if it were deposited in a succession of sheaths enveloping one another like the coats of an onion. The first, or innermost, of these integuments is the one just described. The outmost sheath is our body of flesh and blood. The intermediate ones will be described in their order].

अयं कर्त्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाभिमानित्वेन इहलोकपरलोकगामी व्यवहारिको जीव इत्युच्यते।

No. 50.—This [—i. e. the soul in its 'intelligent sheath'—No. 49—] practically regarded [—for in strict truth there is no dif-

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ference in soul at one time and any other time—] haunting this world or the other world [which it is doomed to do] through its having the conceit that it is an agent and a patient [see Sánkhya Lecture §17] is called the 'inferior soul' *(jíva)*.

a. [The 'subtile body' consists of more than one sheath. Here follows the account of the second one].

मनस्तु कर्म्मेन्द्रियैः सहितं सन्मनोमयकोशो भवति।

No. 51.—But the mind, being associated with the organs of action, becomes the 'mental sheath' *(manomaya-kosha)*.

[The soul *(jíva)* was divided off, from the Absolute, first by the conceit of its own individuality. It is removed a step further from the tranquil joy of deity by its betaking itself to the operations of opining and doubting—the operations of the mind or the judgment—see No. 47. *a*.]

कर्म्मेन्द्रियाणि वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि।

No. 52.—The organs of action [No. 45] are the voice, the hands, the feet, the organ of excretion, and that of generation—[See Lecture on the Sánkhya—No. 29].

एतानि पुनराकाशादीनां रजोंऽशेभ्यो व्यस्तेभ्यः पृथक् क्रमेणोत्पद्यन्ते।

No. 53.—These [organs of action—No. 52—] again, severally in their order, are produced from [not the pure—see No. 46. *a*, but from] the foul [or urgent and energetic] particles of the Ether, &c. separately.

[Compare No. 46, and Sánkhya Lecture §51].

वायवः प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमानाः। प्राणो नाम प्रागगमनवान् नासाग्रस्थानवर्त्ती। अपानो नाम अवाग्गमनवान् पाय्वादि-

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स्थानवर्त्ती । व्यानो नाम विश्वगगमनवानखिलशरीरवर्त्ती । उदानः कण्ठस्थानीयः ऊर्द्ध्वगमनवानुत्क्रमणवायुः । समानः शरीरमध्यगो ऽशितपीतान्नादिसमीकरणकरः ॥ समीकरणन्तु परिपाककरणं रसरुधिरशुक्रपुरीषादिकरणं ।

No. 54.—The [vital] airs? These [No. 45] are respiration, flatulence, circulation, pulsation of the throat and head, and assimilation.

a. That called respiration is that which goes forward—having its place in the forepart of the nose [—or being the breath of one's nostrils].

b. That called flatulence, which goes downwards, has its place in the lower intestine, &c.

c. That called circulation, which goes every-where, is found in the whole body.

d. That called pulsation of the throat and head, having its place in the throat, is the ascending air that goes upwards.

e. That called assimilation, moving in the middle of the body, assimilates the food that is eaten or drunk. But assimilating means digesting—the making of juices, blood, semen, excrement, &c.

केचित्तु नागकूर्म्मकरदेवदत्तधनञ्जयाख्याःपञ्चान्ये वायवः सन्तीत्याहुः । तत्र नाग उद्गिरणकरः । कूर्म्मो निमीलनादिकरः । कृकरः क्षुधाकरः । देवदत्तो जृम्भणकरः । धनञ्जयः पोषणकरः । एतेषां प्राणादिष्वन्तर्भावात् प्राणादयः पञ्चैवेति केचित् ।

No. 55.—But some say there are five other airs [besides those mentioned under No. 54] called [in slang language] the snake, the tortoise, the partridge, the conch of Arjuna, and the god of

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fire. Among these—the snake produces retching; the tortoise produces winking, &c.; the partridge produces hunger; the conch of Arjuna produces yawning; the god of fire fattens.

a. Some say that there are only five—that of respiration, &c. [No. 54]—because these [other varieties] are included under respiration, &c. [being merely modifications of them].

b. [The question of the 'vital airs,' being a question of physiology, is one that we are not here particularly concerned with].

इदं प्राणादिपञ्चकं आकाशादिगतरजोंऽशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्य उत्पद्यते।

No. 56.—This set of five—respiration, &c. [No. 54] is produced [not from the separate—see No. 53—but] from the mingled foul [or energetic] particles [No. 53] that belong to the Ether, &c.

इदं प्राणादिपञ्चकं कर्मेन्द्रियसहितं सत् प्राणमयः कोशो भवति।

No. 57.—This set of five—respiration, &c. [No. 54] associated with the organs of action becomes the 'vital sheath' *(pránamaya-kosha)*.

अस्य क्रियात्मकत्वेन रजोंऽशकार्य्यत्वं।

No. 58.—That this [set of five—No. 54—] is a product of the foul [or energetic] particles [No. 56] [is evident] from the fact that it consists of action.

[Compare No. 48, and Sánkhya Lecture, No. 51].

एतेषु कोशेषु मध्ये विज्ञानमयो ज्ञानशक्तिमान् कर्तृरूपः। मनोमय इच्छाशक्तिमान् करणरूपः। प्राणमयः क्रियाशक्तिमान् कार्य्यरूपः। योग्यत्वादेवमेवमेतेषां विभाग इति वर्णयन्ति।

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No. 59.—Among these sheaths the intelligent sheath [No. 49], having the faculty of knowledge, is of the nature of an agent. The 'mental sheath' [No. 51], having the faculty of volition, is of the nature of an instrument. The vital sheath [No. 57], which has the faculty of action, is of the nature of a product [of the union of the two former].

a. They say that such is the division of these [three sheaths], for there is a fitness [in their mutual relations thus regarded].

एतत्कोशत्रयं मिलितं सत् सूक्ष्मशरीरमित्युच्यते ।

No. 60.—This triad of sheaths [No. 59], being united, is called the 'subtile body' *(súkshma-śaríra)*.

अत्रापि अखिलसूक्ष्मशरीरं एकबुद्धिविषयतया वनवज्जलाशयवद्वा समष्टिः अनेकबुद्धिविषयतया वृक्षवज्जलवद्वा व्यष्टिश्च भवति ।

No. 61.—Here also [as in the cases referred to in No. 34 and elsewhere], the totality of the subtile bodies, by being the locus of the one [collective] intelligence [No. 62], is [—or may be regarded as—] collective—like the forest or like the mass of waters [see No. 34]; and, by its being the locus of more than one intelligence, it is [—or may be regarded as—] distributive—like the trees [which constitute the forest] or like the waters [which constitute the mass of waters].

एतत्समष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं सूत्रात्मा हिरण्यगर्भः प्राण इतिचोच्यते सर्वानुस्यूतत्वात् ज्ञानक्रियाशक्त्युपहितत्वाच्च ।

No. 62.—Intellect located in this collective totality [of 'subtile bodies'—No. 61—], is called 'Soul-thread' *(sútrátman)* because it is passed like a thread through all, and [it is called] the 'embryo of light' *(hiraṇyagarbha)* because it is the superintendent of [that sheath—see No. 49—wherein resides] the power of

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knowledge, and [it is called] 'life' *(prâṇa)*, because it is the superintendent of [that sheath—see No. 57—wherein resides] the power of action.

अस्यैषा समष्टिः स्थूलप्रपञ्चापेक्षया सूक्ष्मत्वात्सूक्ष्मशरीरम् । विज्ञानमयादिकोशत्रयं । जाग्रद्वासनामयत्वात् स्वप्नः । अत एव स्थूलप्रपञ्चलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते ।

No. 63.—This collective totality [of the subtile bodies], from its being subtile in comparison with the totality of the gross [see No. 76], is called the subtile body of him [Hiraṇyagarbha—No. 62]. This triad of the sheaths [–Hiraṇyagarbha's subtile body–] formed of knowledge, &c. [see No. 59], as it is made up of the continuance of our waking thoughts [without the presence of the objects that gave rise to them] is [what we call] 'dream;' and therefore [it is called] the place [or scene] of the dissolution of the totality of the gross [—for then the sight of trees and rivers, and the sounds of voices, &c., are present to us, without the actual things called trees, &c. being present at all. To the dreamer the whole external world is as it were not—and, in the opinion of the Vedántin, to the dreamer it really *is* not].

एतद्व्यष्त्युपहितं चैतन्यं तैजसो भवति तेजोमयान्तः करणोपहितत्वात् ।

No. 64.—Intellect located in the distributive arrangement of this [aggregate of subtile bodies] is [called] 'the resplendent' *(taijasa)*, because it is located in that inner man which is formed of illumination—[light being the type of knowledge].

अस्यापीयं व्यष्टिः स्थूलशरीरापेक्षया सूक्ष्मत्वात् सूक्ष्मशरीरं । विज्ञानमयादिकोशत्रयं । जाग्रद्वासनामयत्वात् स्वप्नः । अत एव स्थूलशरीरलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते ।

No. 65.—This distributive totality [of the subtile bodies] of

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him [i. e. of 'the Resplendent'—see No. 64], from its being subtile in comparison with the gross body, is also [—as well as that spoken of in No. 63—], called the subtile body. It [also] is the triad of sheaths formed of intelligence, &c. [see No. 59]; and as it is made up of the continuance of our waking thoughts [in the absence of the objects that gave rise to them] it [also] is [what we call] dream; and for that reason it [also, as well as the collective aggregate—see No. 63—] is called the scene of the dissolution of the totality of the gross.

एतौ सूत्रात्मतैजसौ तदानीं सूक्ष्माभिर्मनोवृत्तिभिः सूक्ष्मविषयाननुभवतः। प्रविविक्तभुक् तैजस इत्यादिश्रुतेः।

No. 66.—Those two, the 'Soul-thread' [No. 62] and the 'Resplendent,' [No. 64] then [i. e. at the time of one's dreaming—No. 65—] by means of the subtile modifications of the mind, perceive the subtile objects, [—the soul when awake, on the other hand, perceiving the gross ones.]

a. [This may be inferred] from such texts as the one beginning "The Resplendent, the enjoyer of the subtile," &c.

b. [But where is the difference between the collective totality and the distributive totality? He goes on to mention that there is really none.]

अत्रापि समष्टिव्यष्ट्योरुपहितसूत्रात्मतैजसयोश्च वनवृक्षवत्तद्वच्छिन्नाकाशवच्च जलाशयजलवत्तद्गतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्चाभेदः। एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरोत्पत्तिः।

No. 67.—Here also [as at Nos. 34, 61, &c.] there is no difference between the collective totality and the distributive totality [of subtile bodies], nor between the 'Soul-thread' and the 'Resplendent' located therein [i. e. in these severally—see Nos. 62,

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and 64,] just as [there is no difference] between a forest and its trees nor between the spaces designated [and occupied] by these [i. e. by the forest and by the trees,] and [just as there is no difference] between a body of water and its [constituent] waters, nor between the sky reflected therein [i. e. reflected in the body of waters and reflected in the separate portions of the water.]

a. Thus is the production of the subtile body.

स्थूलभूतानि पञ्चीकृतानि। पञ्चीकरणन्तु आकाशादिपञ्चखेकैकं द्विधा समं विभज्य तेषु दशसु भागेषु प्राथमिकान् पञ्चभागान् प्रत्येकं चतुर्द्धा समं विभज्य तेषां चतुर्णां भागानां स्वस्वद्वितीय-भागं परित्यज्य भागान्तरेषु संयोजनं।

No. 68.—[What then are] the 'gross elements' *(sthúla-bhútáni)?* They are what have been made [to possess the qualities of the] five.

a. But [what is meant by] 'making [to possess the qualities of the] five'? [It is this.] Having [first] divided each of the five [subtile elements—No. 41—] Ether, &c. bipartitely and equally [i. e. into two equal parts]; having [next] divided severally into four equal parts the five first portions out of those ten portions; the uniting of those four portions—after having abandoned the second portion [of the bipartite division,] with the other portions [of the other elements]—this is [what is called] the making [one to possess the various qualities of the] five.

b. [Thus a measure—say of eight parts—of any of the gross elements is held to consist of four parts of the subtile element which it bears the name of, and one part of each of the other subtile elements. Hence, while the subtile elements are the substrata severally of a single quality—as Ether of sound, Water of savour, and so on—the gross elements exhibit the qualities blended,—

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Earth, for example, exhibiting all the five qualities that the five senses take cognizance of].

अस्याप्रमाण्यं नाशङ्कनीयम्। त्रिवृत्करणश्रुतेः पञ्चीकरणस्याप्युपलक्षणत्वात्। पञ्चानां पञ्चात्मकत्वे समानेऽपि वैशिष्ट्यात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः सम्भवति। तदानीमाकाशे शब्दोऽभिव्यज्यते। वायौ शब्दस्पर्शौ। अग्नौ शब्दस्पर्शरूपाणि। अप्सु शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसाः। पृथिव्यां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः।

No. 69.—And the doubt is not to be entertained that there is no proof of this [i. e. of the fact which is asserted under No. 68, *a.*,] because, by the text which speaks [expressly] of the combination by threes, [which no follower of the Vedas will question] the combination by fives also [which we here assert] is *indicated* [—conf. No. 35.] Although the five [gross elements, constituted in the way explained in No. 68, *a.* and *b.*] are alike in respect that each is made up of all the five, yet the name of Ether is appropriate to one, and of another [as the name of Earth or Air] to another, according to the maxim [conveyed in the 22nd Aph. 3rd ch. 2nd Lecture of BÁDARÁYAṆA] viz.—"But, as they differ [in having each a large portion of one subtile element and a comparatively small portion of the others—see No. 68. *b.*—] the one is called this [—e. g. Ether,] and the other is called that [e. g. Earth or Air, &c."] Then, in the Ether [the quality of] sound is manifested; in Air, sound and tangibility; in Fire, sound, tangibility, and colour; in the Waters, sound, tangibility, colour, and savour; in Earth, sound, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour.

एतेभ्यः पञ्चीकृतेभ्यो भूर्भुवः स्वर्महर्जनस्तपः सत्यमित्येतन्नामकानामुपर्य्युपरि विद्यमानानां अतलवितलसुतलरसातलतलातलम-

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ह्यातलपातालनामकानामधोऽधोविद्यमानानां लोकानां ब्रह्माण्डस्य तदन्तर्गतचतुर्विधस्थूलशरीराणामन्नपानादीनाञ्चोत्पत्तिर्भवति।

No. 70.—From these gross elements [No. 68,] arise the worlds that are one above the other—viz. those [heavens] called *Bhúr, Bhuvar, Swar, Mahar, Janar, Tapar,* and *Satya;* and those that are one beneath the other—viz. those [hells] called *Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasátala, Talátala, Mahátala,* and *Pátála;* and [from the same gross elements arise] the egg of Brahman [this vaulted world] with the four kinds of gross bodies [No. 71,] contained in it, and their food and drink, &c.

[The topography, &c. of the heavens and hells, being a matter of mythology, we are not here concerned with.]

शरीराणि जरायुजाण्डजस्वेदजोद्भिज्जाख्यानि। जरायुजानि जरायुभ्यो जातानि मनुष्यपश्वादीनि। अण्डजानि अण्डेभ्यो जातानि यूकमशकादीनि। उद्भिज्जानि भूमिमुद्भिद्य जातानि स्वतादृच्चादीनि।

No. 71.—Bodies are those called [severally] viviparous, oviparous, equivocally generated, and germinating. The viviparous are those that are produced from a womb—as men and the like. The oviparous are those that are produced from an egg—as birds, snakes, &c.; the equivocally generated are those produced from sweat [or hot moisture]—as lice, gnats, &c.; the germinating are those produced by springing from the earth—as creepers, trees, &c.

अत्रापि चतुर्विधस्थूलशरीरं एकानेकबुद्धिविषयतया वनवज्जलाशयवद्वा समष्टिः वृक्षवज्जलवद्वा व्यष्टिरपि भवति। एतत्

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समष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं वैश्वानरो विराडिति चोच्यते सर्व्वनराभिमानित्वात् विविधं राजमानत्वाच्च। अस्येषा समष्टिः स्थूलशरीरमन्नविकारित्वादन्नमयकोशः स्थूलभोगायतनत्वाज्जाग्रदित्युच्यते।

No. 72.—Here too [as in the other cases already mentioned, where an aggregate may be viewed either collectively as one thing, or distributively as many things], the gross bodies of the four descriptions [specified in No. 71], since they may be the object of cognizance as one or many, are [viewable as] either a collection—as a forest or a mass of water,—or a distributive aggregate—as the trees, or as the waters [that make up the forest and the mass of water]. Intellect located in the collective aggregate thereof, is called, as well as by other names, the 'Spirit of Humanity' *(vaiśwánara)* and the 'Ruler of the various' *(virát)*,—because it arrogates to itself that it is all mankind, and because it rules over the various kinds [of structures specified in No. 71]. This collective aggregate thereof is the gross body [of the Deity]; and since it is a modification of the food [out of which the gross bodies of animals and vegetables are formed], it is called the nutrimentitious sheath *(annamaya-kosha)*; and as it is the scene of the experience of the gross [i. e. of the material objects, whether of a pleasing or an annoying description, which are held—see No. 63—not to exist at all during sleep] it is called 'the awake' [or the waking world, in contradistinction to the world of dreams.]

एतद्व्यष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं विश्व इत्युच्यते सूक्ष्मशरीरमपरित्यज्य स्थूलशरीरादिप्रवेष्टृत्वात्। अस्याप्येषा स्थूलशरीरमन्नविकारित्वादिहेतोरन्नमयकोशः स्थूलभोगायतनत्वाज्जाग्रदित्युच्यते।

No. 73.—Intellect located in the distributive aggregate thereof [—No. 71—] is called the 'Pervader' *(viśwa)*, because, without

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abandoning the subtile body [No. 60,] it enters into [all] the gross bodies, &c. This distributive aggregate thereof also [—as well as the collective aggregate—see No. 72—] is the gross body [of the Pervader;] and since it is a modification of the food [out of which the gross bodies of animals and vegetables are formed,] it is called the 'nutrimentitious sheath;' and as it is the scene of the experience of the gross [objects whether pleasing or annoying,] it [also] is called 'the awake'—[see No. 72.]

तदानीमेतौ विश्ववैश्वानरौ दिग्वातार्कप्रचेतोऽश्विभिः क्रमान्नियच्छितेन श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियपञ्चकेन क्रमाच्छब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धान् । अग्नीन्द्रोपेन्द्रयमप्रजापतिभिः क्रमान्नियच्छितेन वागादीन्द्रियपञ्चकेन क्रमादुचनादानगमनविसर्गानन्दान्। चन्द्रचतुर्मुखशङ्करा-च्युतैः क्रमान्नियच्छितेन मनोबुद्ध्यहङ्कारचित्ताख्येनान्तरिन्द्रियचतुष्केण क्रमात्सङ्कल्पनिश्चयाहङ्कार्थ्यचैत्तांश्च सर्वानेतान् स्थूलविषयाननुभवतः। जागरितस्थानो बहिः प्राज्ञ इत्यादिश्रुतेः।

No. 74.—Then [—i. e. during the state that we call the waking state, see Nos. 72 and 73—] these two, the intellect of the aggregate distributively [No. 73] and the intellect of the aggregate collectively [No. 72,] take cognizance of sounds, feelings, colours, savours, and odours by means respectively of the five organs [of sense], whereof the hearing is the first, which are presided over, in their order [—see Sánkhya Lecture §56—] by the Sky, the Wind, the Sun, the regent of the waters, and the twin physicians of the gods:—and [further—these same intelligences are concerned about] uttering, taking, going, evacuating, and enjoying, by means respectively of the five organs [of action] whereof the voice is the first, which are presided over in their order by Fire, Indra, Upendra, Yama, and Prajápati;—and [lastly—they are concerned about] judging, determining, feeling self-conscious-

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ness, and cogitating, by means respectively of the four internal faculties called opining, understanding, consciousness, and thinking, [—see No. 47,] which are presided over in their order by the Moon, Brahmá, Śiva and Vishṇu;—[thus do these two come to be concerned with] all these gross objects [—gross as compared with the more subtile fabric of dreams—see No. 32. And—that this is the case may be inferred] from the text beginning "The soul, in its waking state, outside," &c.

[With the mythological reasons for the assignment of the several provinces of cognition or of action to the several superintendents here mentioned, we are not at present concerned.]

अत्राप्ययोः स्थूलव्यष्टिसमष्ट्योस्तदुपहितयोर्विश्ववैश्वानरयोर्वन-
हृक्षवत्तदवच्छिन्नाकाशवच्च जलाशयजलवत्तद्गतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्च
वा पूर्ववदभेदः।

No. 75.—Here too, as before, [i. e. as in the other cases already mentioned where an aggregate may be viewed either collectively as one thing or distributively as many things], there is no difference between the distributive aggregate and the collective aggregate of the gross, and between the 'Pervader' and the 'Spirit of Humanity' located in these, as [there is none] between the forest and its trees, and between the space designated [and occupied] by these severally, and [as there is none] between a body of water and its [constituent] waters, and between the sky as reflected in [the one and the other of] these severally.

एवं पञ्चीकृतपञ्चभूतेभ्यः स्थूलप्रपञ्चोत्पत्तिः।

No. 76.—Thus does the gross [or material] world arise out of the five elements [rendered gross by being] intermingled [in the way set forth under No. 68].

एषां स्थूलसूक्ष्मकारणशरीरप्रपञ्चानां समष्टिरेको महान् प्रपञ्चो
भवति। यथावान्तरजलाशयानां समष्टिरेको महान् जला-

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श्चय: तदुपहितं चैतन्यं विश्ववैश्वानरादीश्वरपर्य्यन्तं चैतन्यमपि अवान्तरवनावच्छिन्नाकाशवदवान्तरजलाशयगतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्च एकमेव।

No. 77.—The collective aggregate of these worlds—the gross [No. 76] the subtile [No. 66] and the causal [No. 26], is one great world ; just as the collective aggregate of all the included forests constitutes the one great forest [that includes these constituent parts]; or as the collective aggregate of all the masses of water included in the collective mass is one great mass of water. So too the intellect located therein—the intellect, reckoning from the 'Pervader' [No. 73] and the 'Spirit of Humanity' [No. 72] up to the 'Lord' [No. 25], is one only—just as is the space [but one space—which is] designated [and occupied] by the [various smaller] forests included [in the great forest], and as the sky [is but one—that is] reflected in the [various smaller] masses of water included [in the great mass of water].

आभ्यां महाप्रपञ्चतदुपहितचैतन्याभ्यां तन्नाय: पिण्डवदविविक्त सत् अनुपहितं चैतन्यं सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति महावाक्यस्य वाच्यं भवति। विविक्तं सल्लक्ष्यमपि भवति।

No. 78.—Intellect—which is not [really] invested [with that phenomenal world which seems to invest it], when not discriminated out of these two, viz., the great world [constituted by the three specified in No. 77] and the intellect [seemingly] immersed therein—[when undiscriminated, we repeat,] like [the heat undiscriminated from the iron in] an ignited iron ball [see No. 35], is what is [ostensibly or] expressly spoken of in the great sentence "All this, truly, is God only." [But, just as, when we expressly say "the hot iron scorches," we really *mean* to say "the *heat* scorches"—and this meaning is *indicated* in the former expression—so too] intellect *discriminated* [apart from all phenomenal investment—under which absolute aspect it is technically

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named 'the Fourth'—see No. 35—] is the really indicated [and intended] meaning [of the terms in the great sentence,—which therefore reduces itself to the identical formula that "God is God"].

एवं वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपोऽध्यारोपः सामान्येन प्रदर्शितः।

No. 79.—Thus have we exhibited, under its generic aspect, the [great error, announced in No. 20, of] clothing or investing the Real with the Unreal [—of imputing to God the garb or vesture of a phenomenal world when there is really no such thing].

a. [But this, which is held to be an error common to deluded mortals of all descriptions, takes particular aspects in particular cases, and these the author proceeds to specify.]

इदानीं प्रत्यगात्मनि इदमिदमयमयमारोपयतीति विशेष उच्यते।

No. 80.—Now this or that person attributes this or that [erroneous] investment to Soul. The varieties [of opinion on this point] shall be now stated.

a. [To make sure of an exhaustive enumeration, he commences with the man who knows so little about the nature of the soul as to be misled by a familiar metaphorical application of the term to a beloved object. Each man, it may be remarked, here cites Scripture in favour of his own view, offers a reason, and makes an appeal to consciousness].

अतिप्राकृतस्त्वात्मा वैजायते पुत्र इत्यादिश्रुतेः। स्वस्मिन्निव स्वपुत्रेऽपि प्रेमदर्शनात् पुत्रे नष्टे पुष्टेऽहमेवः नष्ट पुष्टश्चेत्यनुभवाच्च पुत्र आत्मैवेति वदति॥

No. 81.—But a very uncultivated man says "My *son* is my soul;"—because the Veda declares, for example, that "Soul is born as one's son;"—and because one sees that one has love for one's son just as for one's self; and because one feels that "If my son be destroyed or be in good case, I myself am destroyed or am in good case."

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चार्वाकस्तु स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमय इत्यादिश्रुतेः। प्रदीप्तगृहाद्यपुत्रं परित्यज्यापि स्वस्य निर्गमदर्शनात् स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहं इत्यनुभवाच्च स्थूल शरीरमात्मेति वदति॥

No. 82.—But a [man of the sect named] *Chárváka* says that the gross body is the soul—because the Veda declares, for example, "This same man [by which is meant the soul] consists of solid food and juices;" and because one sees that one escapes from a house on fire—even leaving one's son; and because one is conscious that "*I* am fat" or "*I* am lean"—[so that this "*I*" must be the body.]

अपरश्चार्वाकः। ते हि प्राणाः प्रजापतिं समेत्य ब्रूयुरित्यादिश्रुतेः। इन्द्रियाणामभावे शरीरचलनाभावात्। काणोऽहं बधिरोऽहं इत्याद्यनुभवाच्च इन्द्रियाण्यात्मेति वदति।

No. 83.—Another Chárváka says that the organs [of sense and action—see No. 45] are the soul; because the Veda declares that "Those vital airs, having approached Prajápati, said"—and so on; and because in the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the functions of the body, and because [—feeling that the loss of an organ is the loss of a part of one's self—] one [having lost an organ] is conscious that "it is *I* that am one-eyed," or "it is *I* that am deaf" &c.

अपरश्चार्वाकस्तु। अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमय इत्यादिश्रुतेः। प्राणाभावे इन्द्रियचलनायोगादहमशनायावानहं पिपासावान् इत्याद्यनुभवाच्च प्राण आत्मेति वदति।

No. 84.—But another Chárváka says that the vital airs are the soul; because the Veda declares that "The other inner soul is that that consists of the vital airs," and so on; and because in the absence of the vital airs the organs are not capable of their functions; and because one is conscious that "it is *I* that am

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hungry," or "it is *I* that am thirsty," &c.—[and these conditions pertain to the vital airs on which depends the digestion—see No. 54].

अन्यस्तु चार्वाकः अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमय इत्यादिश्रुतेः। मनसि सुप्ते प्राणादेरभावात्। अहं सङ्कल्पवानहं विकल्पवानित्याद्यनुभवाच्च मन आत्मेति वदति॥

No. 85.—But another Chárváka, says that the mind is the soul,—because the Veda declares that "The other, the inner soul, consists of mind," and so on; and because one observes that, when the mind is asleep, the vital airs [—see No. 84—] are absent; and because one is conscious that "it is *I* who opine" or "it is *I* who doubt," &c. [—and there is no question that these—see No. 46—are functions of the *mind*].

बौद्धस्तु अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमय इतिश्रुतेः। कर्तुरभावे करणस्य शक्त्यभावात्। अहं कर्ता अहं भोक्ता इत्याद्यनुभवाच्च बुद्धिरात्मेति वदति।

No. 86.—But the Bauddha says that understanding [—see No. 46—] is the soul, because the Veda declares that the other, the inner soul, consists of knowledge; and because, in the absence of an agent, there is no power in the *instrument* [—and the mind is held to be an instrument—see No. 46—]; and because one is conscious that "it is *I* that act," or "it is *I* that experience"—[and these even the other parties will allow to be functions of the understanding].

प्रभाकरतार्किकावन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमय इत्यादिश्रुतेः बुद्ध्यादीनामज्ञाने लयदर्शनात्। अहमज्ञोऽहं ज्ञानीत्याद्यनुभवाच्च अज्ञानमात्मेति वदतः॥

No. 87.—The Prábhákaras and the Dialecticians say that ignorance is the soul, because there is the text beginning with "The

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other, the inner soul, consisting of joy" and so on; and because we see that the understanding and the rest resolve into unconsciousness [during profound sleep; and, as the commentator explains this doctrine of the Prábhákaras, the soul, the *substratum* of knowledge, must be something else than the knowledge which, in the train of thought, momentarily occupies it,—so that, as it is not *jnána*, it must be *ajnána*;—] and [the Prábhákaras hold that the soul is unconsciousness] because one is aware [at one time] that "I am ignorant," and [at another time] that "I am cognizant" [—so that the "I" is not knowledge, as the Bauddha supposes—see No. 86—but the soul and knowledge stand in the relation of subject and attribute].

भाट्टस्तु प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमय आत्मेतिश्रुतेः। सुषुप्तौ प्रकाशाप्रकाशसङ्भावात्। मामहं न जानामीत्यनुभवाच्च अज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यमात्मेति वदति॥

No. 88.—But the Bháṭṭa says that intelligence united with ignorance is the soul, because the Veda declares that "the soul consists of knowledge alone, with much happiness," &c.; and because, in profound sleep, there are present [at once] both light [in the soul] and the absence of light [—for, as the commentator says, referring to the sentence—see No. 33—"I slept pleasantly —I was aware of nothing"—if there were not light, or knowledge, in the soul, how could the sleeper have known that his sleep was pleasant?—and if there were not the absence of light, or knowledge, how could he say "I was aware of nothing?"]; and [the Bháṭṭa further argues that the case is as he says] because [every] one has the consciousness that "Myself I do not know."

अपरो बौद्धः। असदेवेदमग्र आसीदित्यादिश्रुतेः। सुषुप्तौ सर्वाभावादहं सुषुप्तौ नासमित्युत्थितस्य स्वाभावपरामर्शविषयानुभवाच्च शून्यमात्मेति वदति॥

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No. 89.—Another Bauddha says that the void is the soul, because the Veda declares that "This [universe] previously was simply non-existent," &c.; and because in profound sleep [No. 33] every-thing ceases to exist; and because [every] one, on arising from a deep sleep, has a conviction which has for its object the recollection of his own non-existence—[thus] "During that deep sleep, I was not."

a. [These various opinions respecting the nature of the soul—Nos. 81—89—he now undertakes to refute].

एतेषां पुत्रादीनां शून्यपर्यन्तानामनात्मत्वमुच्यते। एतैरनिप्राक्तनवाद्यादिभिरुक्तेषु श्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासेषु पूर्वपूर्वोक्तश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासानामुत्तरश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासैर्बाधदर्शनात् पुत्रादीनामनात्मात्वं स्पष्टमेव। अमना अकर्त्ता चैतन्यं चिन्मात्रं सदित्यादिप्रदर्शितश्रुतिविरोधादस्य पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तस्य जडस्य चैतन्यभास्यत्वेन घटादिवदनित्यत्वात्। अहं ब्रह्मेति विद्वदनुभवप्राबल्याच्च। तत्तच्छ्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासानां बाधितत्वादपि पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तमखिलमनात्मैव॥

No. 90.—It shall be now explained how these, beginning with "the son" [No. 81] and ending with "the void" [No. 89], are *not* the soul.

a. As for these mere semblances of scriptural evidence, of argument, and of judgment, adduced [in support—see No. 80. *a.*—of their respective opinions as to the nature of the soul] by the speakers, from the "very uncultivated man" [see No. 81] downwards; since we see that the seeming texts arguments and judgments of each one that comes first are rendered nugatory by the seeming texts arguments and judgments of each that follows, it is clear that "the son" [whom the "uncultivated man" regards as his soul] or any of the others [of the things suggested in succession] is *not* the soul.

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b. [Moreover, as each of these holders of an incorrect opinion supports his view of the matter by what he fancies to be an appropriate text, argument, and appeal to consciousness—No. 80. *a.*—, we, adopting so much of their example as is good, proceed to remark that the opinions which have been just detailed are incorrect] because [first] they are at variance with such very forcible [and unmistakable] texts as this that "The soul is not mind, it is not an agent, it is mere Thought, existent;" [secondly] because whatever is other than Thought—beginning with "the son" [No. 81] and ending with "the void" [No. 89]—is no more *eternal* than a water-jar or the like, seeing that it is only through Thought that it appears at all;* and [thirdly] because the wise man's consciousness, that "I am Brahma," is of more force, [as an argument, than the mistaken notions for which your ignorant man fancies that he has the evidence of direct consciousness;†—for all these reasons—] and also because [as remarked in No. 90 *a.*] each of the *seeming* texts arguments and judgments is rendered nugatory [by some of the others,—it follows that] all these, beginning with "the son" [No. 81] and ending with "the void" [No. 89] is *not* the soul.

अतस्तन्नङ्गासकं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावप्रत्यक्चैतन्यमेवात्मत्वमिति वेदान्तविद्दनुभवः॥ एवमध्यारोपः॥

No. 91.—Therefore [—i. e. for the reasons specified under No. 90—] the eternal, pure, intelligent, free, self-existent, and self-evident Thought alone, to which each of these [that is regarded see No. 81—89—by erroneous thinkers as the soul] owes that it appears at all, is the soul. Such is the direct conviction of those who understand the scope of the Veda.

a. So much for the "erroneous imputation" [—to the soul—of characters that do not belong to it;—see No. 20].

* The law maxim "de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio" is here followed out to the letter.

† On the liability to mistake inference for direct consciousness consult Mr. J. S. Mill's "System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive," Introduction, §4.

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अपवादो नाम। रज्जुविवर्त्तस्य सर्पस्य रज्जुमात्रत्ववत्। वस्तु-विवर्त्तस्यावस्तुनो ऽज्ञानादेः प्रपञ्चस्य वस्तुमात्रत्वम्॥

No. 92.—[What then is] the Refutation [see No. 19. *b.* of the "erroneous imputation" referred to under No. 91. *a.*]? It is the recognition of the reality itself, instead of the unreal world which, originating in ignorance, envelopes the reality; and this is like the recognition of the rope itself [see No. 20] instead of the serpent [the erroneous notion of] which enveloped the rope [and, till the discovery of the mistake, prevented the observer from discerning the real nature of the object].

तथाहि। एतद्भोगायतनं चतुर्विधस्थूलशरीरजातं भोग्यरूपान्न-पानादिकमेतदाश्रयभूतभूरादिचतुर्दशभुवनानि एतदाश्रयभूतं ब्रह्माण्डं चैतत्सर्वमेतेषां कारणभूतपञ्चीक्रतभूतमात्रं भवति। एतानि शब्दादिविषयसहितानि पञ्चीक्रतभूतजातानि सूक्ष्म-शरीरजातञ्चैतत् सर्वमेतेषां कारणभूतमपञ्चीक्रतभूतमात्रं भवति। एतानि सत्त्वादिगुणसहितानि अपञ्चीक्रतपञ्चभूतान्यु त्पत्तिव्युत्क्रमेणैतत्कारणभूताज्ञानोपहितचैतन्यमात्रं भवति। एत दज्ञानमज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यं चेश्वरादिकमेतदाधारभूतानुपहित-चैतन्यतुरीयब्रह्ममात्रं भवति॥

No. 93.—That is to say [—for the passage No. 92 may require illustration—], (1) this scene of fruition, consisting of the four kinds of gross bodies [No. 72, the souls encased in which enjoy or suffer,] and (2) the food and drink and other things in the shape of what is adapted to their fruition, and (3) the fourteen worlds, beginning with the Earth [No. 70] which sustain these [bodies with their food, &c.], and (4) the substrate of [all] this, viz. Brahmá's egg [or the created and vaulted universe], all this is merely

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[or nothing other than] the gross elements [No. 68] which are the cause thereof [—as a jar is nothing else than the baked clay of which it consists].

a. These [things enumerated under No. 93], along with Sound and the other objects of sense originating in the gross elements [as mentioned under No. 93], and whatever is the product of the subtile body [No. 60],—all this is nothing else than the unmingled elements [No. 41. *b.*], which are the cause thereof [—i. e. the cause of the gross elements, &c.].

b. These unmingled elements [No. 93. *a.*] along with the Qualities, beginning with Purity [No. 25], in the converse order of their origination [as laid down in No. 41],—all this is nothing else than Intellect immersed in Ignorance, which is the cause thereof [—i. e. the cause of the 'unmingled elements,' &c.].

c. This Ignorance, and Intellect immersed in Ignorance taking the shape of the Lord [No. 25], &c.,—all this is nothing else than 'the Fourth' [No. 34], i. e. mere Deity, in the shape of Intellect not immersed [in any qualities], and which is [as intimated in the exordium of the book] the substratum of all [the unrealities that appear].

आभ्यामध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां तत्त्वम्पदार्थशोधनमपि सिद्धं भवति। तथाहि। अज्ञानादिसमष्टिरेतदुपहितं सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टं चैतन्यं एतदनुपहितञ्चैतन्त्रयं तन्नायः पिण्डवदेकत्वेनावभासमानं तत्पदवाच्यो भवति। एतदुपाध्युपहिताधारभूतमनुपहितचैतन्यं तत्पदलक्ष्यार्थो भवति। अज्ञानादिव्यष्टिरेतदुपहिताल्पज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यमेतदनुपहितञ्चैतन्त्रयं तन्नायः पिण्डवदेकत्वेनावभासमानं त्वम्पदवाच्यार्थो भवति। एतदुपाध्युपहिताधारभूतमनुपहितं प्रत्यगानन्दं तुरीयं चैतन्यं त्वम्पदलक्ष्यार्थो भवति॥

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No. 94.—The clearing up of the sense of the words 'That' and 'Thou' [in the sentence "That art Thou"—see No. 35—] is effected by means of [a right understanding of] these two, viz., the 'Erroneous imputation' [see No. 20], and the 'Refutation' thereof [see No. 92].

a. [To explain]:—(1) the collective aggregate of Ignorance [No. 23], (2) Intellect immersed in this and distinguished by the possession of omniscience, &c., [No. 25], and (3) that *not* immersed in this [—i. e. the 'Fourth'—see No. 34—], these three, when they seem to be *one*, like an ignited iron ball [—in which—see No. 35—the heat and the iron are intimately commingled—] are what the word 'That' *literally* means [—the word 'That,' therefore, designating the collective aggregate of all things].

b. [Again]:—the *real* [or the 'indicated' as opposed to the 'literal'] meaning of the word 'That' is the absolute Intellect [No. 34] which is the substratum of that [qualified Intellect—No. 25] which is immersed therein [i. e. immersed in Ignorance].

c. [Further]:—(1) the distributive aggregate of Ignorance [No. 28], (2) Intellect immersed in this and distinguished by the possession of partial knowledge, &c. [No. 31], and (3) that *not* immersed in this [—i. e. the 'Fourth'—see No. 94, *a.*] these three, when they seem to be *one*, like an ignited iron ball [—see No. 94. *a.*] are what the word 'Thou' *literally* means; [the word 'Thou,' therefore, appropriately designating any individual in the distributive aggregate of all things].

d. [And again]:—the *real* meaning of the word 'Thou' is the absolute Intellect [—see No. 94. *b.*], in the shape of joy, the 'Fourth' [No. 34], which is the substratum of that [qualified Intellect—No. 28—] which is immersed therein [i. e. in Ignorance].

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e. [The question here, it will be observed, is furnished by the declaration—see No. 35—'That art Thou'—i. e. 'Thou art Brahma'; and the question is this—how can the term 'That' and the term 'Thou' mean the same thing? If they cannot be shewn to mean the same thing, then the sentence does not enunciate a truth. The author therefore undertakes to show that they do mean the same thing. This he does by showing, as we have just seen, that the only apparent difference between the senses of the two terms is that which appears to exist between Ignorance in its *collective* aggregate (No. 94. *a.*) and Ignorance in its *distributive* aggregate (No. 94. *c.*); and as it has been ruled (at No. 34) that these have *no* difference—"as there is none between a forest and its trees"—it follows that there is no difference in meaning between the term 'That' and the term 'Thou' in the sentence 'That art Thou.' The author proceeds to illustrate this important point as follows].

अथ महावाक्यार्थो वर्ण्यते। इदं तत्त्वमसिवाक्यं सम्बन्धत्रयेणाखण्डार्थबोधकं भवति॥

No. 95.—Now the sense of the Great Sentence [No. 35] shall be explained. This great sentence—viz., 'That art Thou'—declares to us, through the three relations [which the sentence involves] what is meant by 'the Indivisible' [see No. 2. *a.*]

सम्बन्धत्रयं नाम। पदयोः सामानाधिकरण्यं। पदार्थयोर्विशेष्यविशेषणभावः। प्रत्यगात्मपदार्थयोर्लक्ष्यलक्षणभावश्चेति। तदुक्तं। सामानाधिकरण्यञ्च विशेषणविशेष्यता लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनामिति।

No. 96.—The 'three relations' [—No. 95—]? These are (1) the reference to one and the same thing of the two words ['That' and

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'Thou'], (2) the relation, of subject and predicate, in which the things stand that these two words [primarily] denote, and (3) the relation of what is 'indicated' [or really meant] and the 'indicator,' which is the relation between pure Soul and the [primary] senses of the two terms ['That' and 'Thou'].

a. This has been declared [by an ancient writer] as follows:—"Reference to the same thing, and the relation of subject and predicate, and the relation of 'indicated' and 'indicator,' are the relations between Soul and the primary senses [of the words 'That' and 'Thou']."

b. [How each of these relations applies to the case in hand is next to be explained.]

सामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धवत्। यथा सोऽयं देवदत्त इति वाक्ये तत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तवाचकसशब्दस्य एतत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तवाचकायंशब्दस्यच एकस्मिन्नपि पिण्डे तात्पर्य्यं सम्बन्धः। तथा तत्त्वमसिवाक्ये ऽपि परोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यवाचकतत्पदस्यापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यवाचकत्वम्पदस्य चैकस्मिन् चैतन्ये तात्पर्य्यं सम्बन्धः।

No. 97.—As for their relation of 'reference to one and the same thing' [No. 96], it is as follows. As, in the sentence 'That [person whom I saw on some former occasion] is this same Devadatta [whom I now behold'], there is between the word 'That' —which denotes the Devadatta of the previous occasion—and the word 'This'—which denotes the Devadatta of the present occasion—the relation that consists in their both referring to one and the same person; so also, in the sentence 'That art Thou,' there is, between the word 'That' which denotes the Soul with the [negative] attributes of invisibility, &c., and the word 'Thou'

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which denotes the Soul with the [positive] attributes of visibility, &c. [attached to it in the shape of its attendant body]—the relation that consists in their both referring to one and the same Intelligence [—see No. 35].

विशेषणविशेष्यभावसम्बन्धस्तु। यथा तत्रैव वाक्ये सशब्दार्थतत्काललक्षविशिष्टदेवदत्तस्य अयंशब्दार्थेतत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तस्य चान्योन्यभेदव्यावर्त्तकतया विशेषणविशेष्यभावः। तथाचापि वाक्ये तत्पदार्थपरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य त्वम्पदार्थापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य चान्योन्यभेदव्यावर्त्तकतया विशेषणविशेष्यभावः।

No, 98.—As for their relation of 'subject and predicate' [No. 96—], it is as follows. As, in that same sentence [viz., 'That is this same Devadatta'—see No. 97—], there is, between the Devadatta of the prior occasion—who is denoted by the word 'That'—and the Devadatta of the present occasion—who is denoted by the word 'This'—the relation of subject and predicate, which is constituted by the exclusion of their mutual difference [viz., the consideration of past and present time—]; so also in this sentence [viz., 'That art Thou'—] there is, between the Soul with the [negative] attributes of invisibility, &c.,—which is denoted by the word 'That'—and the Soul with the [positive] attributes of visibility, &c., [attached to it in the shape of its attendant body], the relation of 'subject and predicate,' which is constituted by the exclusion of their mutual difference [—viz., the Ignorance—see No. 35—which is no 'Reality'—see No. 20. *b*.].

लक्ष्यलक्षणभावसम्बन्धस्तु। यथा तत्रैव सशब्दायंशब्दयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा विरुद्धतत्कालैतत्कालविशिष्टत्वपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धदेवदत्तेन सह लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः। तथाचापि वाक्ये तत्त्वंपदयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा

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विरुद्धपरोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टत्वपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धचैतन्येन सह लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः। इयमेव भागलक्षणेत्युच्यते।

No. 99.—As for the relation of what is 'indicated' and the 'indicator' [No. 96], it applies to the case as follows. As, in that same sentence [viz., 'That is this same Devadatta'—see No. 97—], when we leave out the distinction of contradictory times, past and present, belonging to the words 'That' and 'This,' or to what these primarily denote [viz., the Devadatta of former days and the Devadatta of the present,] then these words stand in the relation of 'indicator and indicated' as regards Devadatta [simply]—who is not the contradictory of *himself*;—so also in this sentence [viz., 'That art Thou'], when we leave out the distinction of the contradictory properties, 'invisibility, &c.,' and 'visibility, &c.,' pertaining to the words 'That' and 'Thou,' or to what these primarily denote [—viz., the invisible Soul and the embodied Soul—], then these words stand in the relation of 'indicator and indicated' as regards the [absolute] Intelligence—which is not the contradictory of *itself*.

a. This [indicatory employment of terms] is what [in Rhetoric] is called *bhága-lakshaṇá*—i. e., the 'indication of a portion [abstracted from what the term primarily denotes].'

b. [The author now proceeds to contend that the meaning of the 'Great Sentence' cannot be accounted for on other principles of interpretation than those that have been just set forth].

अस्मिन् वाक्ये नीलमुत्पलमिति वाक्यवद्वाक्यार्थो न सङ्गच्छते। तत्र नीलपदार्थनीलगुणस्य उत्पलपदार्थोत्पलद्रव्यस्यच शुक्लपटादिव्यावर्त्तकतयान्योन्यविशेषणविशेष्यसंसर्गस्यान्यतरविशिष्टस्यान्यतरस्य वा तदैक्यस्य वाक्यार्थत्वाङ्गीकरणे प्रमाणान्तरविरोधाभावाद् वाक्यार्थः सङ्गच्छते।

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No. 100.—In this sentence [—viz. 'That art Thou'—] the literal meaning of the sentence is not coherent, as it is in the expression 'The lotus is blue.' In that expression, since the blue —the quality denoted by the word 'blue,' and the lotus—the substance denoted by the word 'lotus', exclude such qualities as 'white' and such substances as 'cloth' [but do not exclude *one another*], the literal meaning of the sentence is coherent, because no evidence, from any other quarter, opposes our accepting this as the sense of the sentence that the two are united as subject and attribute, or that either one, to which the other is attributed, is *identical* with it [—the 'lotus' being the thing that we call 'blue,' and the 'blue' thing being what we call 'lotus.' But the case does not stand thus with the terms 'That' and 'Thou' as we shall now see].

अत्रतु तत्पदार्थपरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य त्वम्पदार्थापरोक्ष-त्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य चान्योन्यभेदव्यावर्त्तकतया विशेषणविशे-ष्यभावसंसर्गस्य अन्यतरविशिष्टस्यान्यतरस्य तदैक्यस्य वा वाक्या-र्थत्वाङ्गीकारे प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविरोधाद्वाक्यार्थो न सङ्गच्छते।

No. 101.—But in this sentence [—viz., 'That art Thou'—as opposed to the sentence considered under No. 100—] since the Soul '*invisible, &c.,*' denoted by the word 'That,' and the Soul '*visible, &c.,*' [in association with the body] denoted by the word 'Thou,' exclude *each other mutually,* the literal meaning of the sentence is *not* coherent, because the evidence of the senses, &c., opposes our accepting this as the sense of the sentence that the two [which mutually exclude each other] are united as subject and attribute, or that either one, to which the other is attributed, is *identical* with it.

a. [The author now proceeds to reject another principle of interpretation—see No. 99. *b.*—on which it has been sought to account for the 'great Sentence'.]

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तत्रतु गङ्गायां घोषः प्रतिवसतीतिवज्जहल्लक्षणा न सङ्गच्छते। अत्र गङ्गाघोषयोराधाराधेयभावलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्याशेषतो विरुद्धत्वाद्वाक्यार्थमशेषं परित्यज्य तत्सम्बन्धितीरलक्षणाया युक्तत्वाज्जहल्लक्षणा सङ्गच्छते।

No. 102.—But again, there [i. e. in the sentence 'That art thou'] coherence is not arrived at by our supposing the terms to be 'indicatory with the relinquishment of their own primary meaning' [—see *Sáhitya Darpaṇa* §15. *a.*] as is the case in the sentence, 'The herdsman dwells on the Ganges'. In the case of this latter sentence, since there is a *complete* incompatibility in the primary meaning of [the terms in] the sentence, which indicates that the Ganges and the herdsman stand in the relation of 'location and located' [—while we very well know that the surface of the Ganges is no location for a herdsman—], we *do* arrive at a coherent sense by holding that the case is one of 'indication with the abandonment of the primary meaning' [—the word 'Ganges' abandoning its primary meaning of a particular stream, and then standing for the *bank* thereof—] seeing that it [i. e. the stream itself] is quite qualified to indicate the bank adjoining it [—inasmuch as we may quite intelligibly talk of Benares as standing 'on the Ganges' when we really mean that it stands 'on the bank of the Ganges'].

अत्रतु परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यैकत्वरूपस्य वाक्यार्थस्य भागमात्रे ऽविरोधाद्भागान्तरमपरित्यज्यान्यलक्षणाया अयुक्तत्वात् जहल्लक्षणा न सङ्गच्छते।

No. 103.—In this sentence, on the other hand, [as distinguished from that of 'The herdsman on the Ganges'—No. 102—] coherence is not to be arrived at by our supposing the terms to be 'indicatory with the relinquishment of their own primary mean-

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ing'; because, since there is only a *partial* incompatibility between the things denoted in the sentencc ['That art thou'] which asserts the identity of the invisible Soul and of the Soul visible [as embodied], it would *not* be fit that, abandoning the residue of the meaning, there should be indicated something else [quite different,—as, on the other hand, the word 'Ganges,' entirely abandoning its own sense, very fitly indicates a 'bank'—in the sentence 'The herdsman on the Ganges'].

नच गङ्गापदं स्वार्थपरित्यागेन तीरपदार्थं यथा लक्षयति तथा तत्पदं त्वम्पदं वा वाच्यार्थपरित्यागेन त्वम्पदार्थं तत्पदार्थं वा बोधयतु तत्कुतो जहत्स्वार्था न सङ्गच्छते इति वाच्यं। तत्र तीरपदाश्रवणेन तदर्थाप्रतीतौ लक्षणया तत्प्रतीत्यपेक्षायामपि तत्त्वम्पदयोः श्रूयमाणत्वेन तदर्थप्रतीतौ लक्षणया पुनरन्यतरपदेनान्यतरपदार्थप्रतीत्यपेक्षाभावात्।

No. 104.—And you must not say—"As the word 'Ganges,' by relinquishing [—see No. 102—] its own primary meaning, indicates that which is the primary meaning of the word 'bank,' so also let the word 'That' or the word 'Thou', by relinquishing its own primary meaning, convey the meaning of the word 'Thou' or of the word 'That' [—the meanings being thus interchanged—]; and therefore why does [the figure of speech called] 'Indication with the abandonment of the primary meaning' [No. 102] not apply here [as well as in the case of 'The herdsman on the Ganges']?" [The two cases differ] because, although, in the case of the one expression,—since, from the word *bank's* not being heard, the sense of that word did not offer itself,—it was to be expected that it should be conveyed by indication; still it was *not* to be expected that, when the sense of the two terms 'That' and 'Thou' *had* been apprehended by the hearing of the terms 'That'

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and 'Thou,' the sense of each should be conveyed over again, indicatorily, by each term reciprocally.

अत्र गौणो धावतीति वाक्यवदजहल्लक्षणापि न सङ्गच्छते। अत्र गौणगुणगमनलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात्तदपरित्यागेन तदाश्रयाश्वादिलक्षणायां तद्विरोधपरिहारसम्भवादजहल्लक्षणा सम्भवति। अत्र तु परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यैकत्वस्य वाक्यार्थस्य विरुद्धत्वादपरित्यागेन तत्सम्बन्धिनो यस्य कस्यचिदर्थस्य लक्षितत्वेऽपि तद्विरोधापरिहारादजहल्लक्षणापि न सम्भवत्येव।

No. 105.—To this sentence [viz., 'That art thou'] also [the figure of speech called] 'Indication *without* relinquishment of the primary meaning [see *Sáhitya Darpaṇa* §14. *a.*] does not apply as it does in the case of the expression 'The Red gallops.' In the case of this expression [viz., 'The Red—or the Chestnut—gallops'], since the primary meaning of the sentence is incoherent—purporting, as it does, that a *quality*, viz., 'red,' *moves* [—whereas motion can belong only to a *substance**—], the application of [the figure of speech called] 'Indication *without* relinquishment of the primary meaning' may take place, since we may get rid of the incoherency of the sentence by holding that some *substratum* of the quality,—for example a [chestnut] *horse*,—is indicated *without* the relinquishment of the primary meaning. [The word 'red', when it indicates a horse of that colour, still continues to convey its primary sense along with the horse;—which is not the case with the word 'Ganges,' when, as under No. 102, we speak of 'a city on the Ganges'.] But in the case of this expression [—viz. 'That art thou'—], the application of [the figure of speech called] 'Indication *without* relinquishment of

* See Kaṇáda's Aphorisms, Lect. I. Sect. 1. Aph. 15.

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the primary meaning' cannot take place, because, whilst the primary import of the sentence —viz., the one-ness of the invisible and of the [embodiedly] visible soul—is incoherent, the incoherence cannot be removed by either term's indicating anything else whatever in connection with its own primary meaning retained.

तच्च तत्पदं त्वम्पदं वा स्वार्थविरुद्धांशपरित्यागेनां शान्तरसहितं त्वम्पदार्थं तत्पदार्थं वा लक्षयतु। अतः कथं प्रकारान्तरेण भागलक्षणाङ्गीकरणमिति वाच्यं। एकेन पदेन स्वार्थांशपदार्थान्तरोभयलक्षणाया असम्भवात् पदान्तरेण तदर्थप्रतीतौ लक्षणया पुनस्तत्प्रतीत्यपेक्षाभावाच्च।

No. 106.—And you must not say—"Let the word 'That' [—in the sentence 'That art thou'—], or the word 'Thou,' by relinquishing the inconsistent portion of its primary meaning [—see No. 103—] indicate [severally and reciprocally] the thing meant by the word 'Thou' or by the word 'That;'—and why then [—if this suffice to explain the matter—] postulate an indicatory power of another description—viz., [that which, at No. 99. *a.*, you appear to think it necessary to admit under the name of the] 'Indication of a portion [abstracted from what the term primarily denotes]'?" [This you must not say] because it is impossible that one single word should indicate both a *portion* of its own primary meaning and also the sense of another word [such an incongruous kind of 'Indication' being nowhere recognised by the authoritative expounders of the powers of language—], and because no one expects that what has been already intimated by a separate word shall be indicatorily intimated over again. [For example,—if we employed the expression 'A city on the *bank* of the Ganges,' no one would look to the word 'Ganges' to imply the 'bank,'—as one *does*, however, look to it to imply when allusion is made to 'A city on the Ganges'.]

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तस्माद्यथा सोऽयं देवदत्त इति वाक्यं तदर्थो वा तत्कालैतत्काल-विशिष्टदेवदत्तलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्यांशेविरोधात् विरुद्धतत्कालै-तत्कालविशिष्टत्वांशं परित्यज्याविरुद्धं देवदत्तांशमात्रं लक्षयति तथा तत्त्वमसीति वाक्यं तदर्थो वा परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्ट चैतन्यस्यैकत्वलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्यांशे विरोधाद्विरुद्धपरोक्षत्वा-परोक्षत्वाविशिष्टत्वांशं परित्यज्याविरुद्धमखण्डचैतन्यमात्रं लक्ष-यति।

No. 107.—Therefore, as the sentence 'That is this same Devadatta' [—see No. 96. *a.*—], or what is primarily meant by the terms thereof,—since there is a partial inconsistency in the sentence, importing, as it does, the Devadatta of *prior* times and the Devadatta of the *present* time,—having abandoned the inconsistent portion,—viz., the being one of prior times and the being one of the present time,—indicates merely that portion of Devadatta [viz., Devadatta *minus* the *time* in connection with which he is spoken of,] which involves no inconsistency;—so also the sentence 'That art Thou,' or what is primarily meant by the terms thereof,—since there is a partial inconsistency in the sentence, importing, as it does, the invisible and the [embodiedly] visible Soul,—having abandoned the inconsistent portion,—viz., the being one possessed of invisibility, &c., and the being one possessed of visibility, &c.—indicates merely the Indivisible Intellect, which involves no inconsistency.

a. [This view of the matter may be illustrated algebraically. Not being able to admit as an equation the expression 'Devadatta+past time=Devadatta+present time,' we reflect that the conception of *time* is not essential to the conception of the Devadatta's nature; and we strike it out of both sides of the expression which then gives 'Devadatta=Devadatta,'—the equality being that of identity. In the same way, not being able to admit

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as an equation the expression 'Soul+invisibility, &c.=Soul+visibility, &c.,' we reflect that the visibility, &c., are but the modifications of 'Ignorance,' which, we were told at No. 20. *b.*, is no 'reality.' Deleting the unessential portion of each side of the expression, we find 'Soul=Soul,'—the equality being here also that of identity.]

b. [The next thing to be determined is how the student is to make a practical application of this to his own case.]

अथाहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यनुभववाक्यार्थो वर्ण्यते। एवमाचार्येणाध्यारोपापवादपुरःसरं तत्त्वम्पदार्थौ शोधयित्वा वाक्येनाखण्डार्थे ऽवबोधिते ऽधिकारिणो ऽहं नित्यशुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावपरमानन्दाननाद्वयं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यखण्डाकाराकारिता चित्तवृत्तिरुदेति।

No. 108.—Now we shall explain the import of that expression of [a sagacious] consciousness 'I am Brahma' [—which, see No. 90. *b.*, is held to be intuitive in the wise, as the feeling of hunger or of thirst or the like is in the ordinary man].

a. When the meaning of the 'Indivisible' [see No. 95] has thus been communicated by means of the Sentence ['That art thou'], after the teacher has in the foregoing manner [Nos. 94—107—] cleared up the sense of the two terms 'That' and 'Thou', —then does there occur to the competent student [No. 6.] a modification of the understanding as moulded on the form of the 'Indivisible,' [to which he gives utterance in such terms as the following,] viz., "*I* am the eternal, pure, knowing, free, true, self-existent, most blessed, infinite Brahma,—[One] without a second."

b. [Here it may be worth while to consider what is intended by the expression 'modification of the understanding' *(chitta-vritti)*. What we here speak of as 'the understanding' is

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elsewhere named also 'the internal organ' *(antahkaraṇa)*. In the *Vedánta Paribhásha* we find this organ of the soul compared to water, in respect of its readiness to adapt itself to the form of whatever mould it may enter,—as follows: "As the water of a reservoir, having issued from an aperture, having entered, by a channel, the basins (or beds with raised edges formed in the fields that require irrigation) becomes four-cornered or otherwise shaped just like these beds; so the manifesting internal organ, having gone, through the channel of the sight or some other organ of sense (except through which the internal organ cannot reach its object, just as the water, without a channel, could not reach the beds to be irrigated), to where there is an object, for instance a jar, becomes modified by the form of the jar or whatever the object may be. It is this altered state (of the internal organ) that is called its 'modification' *(vritti.)*"* This 'manifesting internal organ' is regarded as not only moulding itself upon the object but as revealing or exhibiting it as a mirror does. Thus, when the competent student has arrived at the point now under discussion, his 'internal organ,' or understanding, mirrors the 'Indivisible.' But this does not suffice, as the author goes on to say.]

सा तु चित्प्रतिबिम्बसहिता सती प्रत्यगभिन्नमज्ञानं परं ब्रह्म विषयीकृत्य तन्नताज्ञानमेव बाधते तदा पटकारणतन्तुदाहे पटदाह वत् अखिलकार्यकारणेऽज्ञाने बाधिते सति तत्कार्यस्याखिलस्य बाधितत्वात् तदन्तर्भूताखण्डाकाराकारिता चिन्नवृत्तिरपि बाधिता भवति।

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* यथा तडागोदकं छिद्रान्निर्गत्य कुल्यात्मना केदारान् प्रविश्य तद्वदेव चतुष्कोणाद्याकारं भवति तथा तैजसमन्तःकरणमपि चक्षुरादिद्वारा घटादिविषयदेशं गत्वा घटादिविषयाकारेण परिणमते। स एव परिणामो वृत्तिरित्युच्यते॥ वेद० परि०॥

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No. 109.—But this modification of the understanding [No. 108. *a.*], being accompanied by the reflection of Brahma [thus accurately mirrored in the understanding], having taken as its object what was not previously recognised, viz., the supreme Brahma, who differs not from the individual Soul, puts an end to the 'Ignorance' in respect thereof. Then, as a web is burnt when the yarn that was the cause of it is burnt; so too, when 'Ignorance,' which is the cause of all productions, is put an end to, since *every one* of its effects is put an end to, then this modification of the understanding, mirroring the form of the 'Indivisible,' is put an end to also—it being one [product] among these [various productions which *all* have 'Ignorance' as their cause.]

a. [This,—though it may sound strangely—yet follows logically; for, if *everything* other than the 'Indivisible' is 'Ignorance,' and if 'Ignorance' is *nothing*, then the act of the understanding which rightly recognises the 'Indivisible' is itself a non-entity, and disappears in the act of recognition].

तत्र वृत्तौ प्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमपि यथा प्रदीपप्रभा आदित्यप्रभाव भासनासमर्था सती तयाभिभूता भवति तथा स्वयम्प्रकाशमान-प्रत्यगभिन्नपरब्रह्मावभासनानर्हतया तेनाभिभूतं सत् स्वोपाधि-भूतखण्डवृत्तेर्बाधितत्वात् दर्पणाभावे मुखप्रतिबिम्बस्य मुखमात्र-त्ववत् प्रत्यगभिन्नपरब्रह्ममात्रं भवति।

No. 110.—As the shine of a lamp, having no power to illuminate [and not being required to illuminate] the shine of the sun, is overpowered thereby; so too the [reflected] Soul, as reflected in that 'modification of the understanding' [discussed under No. 108. *a.*, &c.], through its having no power to illuminate [and not being required to illuminate] that self-luminous Supreme Brahma who is none other than the individual soul, being overpowered thereby, leaves nothing *besides* the Supreme Brahma who is none other than the individual soul,—just as, on the removal of a mir-

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ror, the reflection of a countenance leaves nothing besides the countenance itself,—[and we say that nothing besides the Supreme Brahma is then left] because that 'modification of the understanding,' which is a portion of that ['Ignorance'] in which He was immersed, has been put an end to [by the recognition of the fact that nothing besides Him exists].

एवञ्च सति मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यं यन्मनसा न मनुते इत्यनयोः श्रुत्योर्विरोधः । वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वाङ्गीकारेण फलव्याप्यत्वप्रतिषेधप्रतिपादनात् ।

No. 111.—And, the matter standing thus [as set forth in the passages just preceding], there is no inconsistency between the two texts of scripture 'By the mind He is to be apprehended,' &c., and 'who is *not* comprehended by the mind,' &c.; because, while admitting [as we did under No. 108] that He is made an object of the understanding, we laid down [in No. 110] a denial that this involved the [usual] consequence [—as we go on to explain,—first citing an authority in support of our assertion].

उक्तञ्च फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रस्याङ्गं नैराकृतं । ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशाय वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षितेति । स्वयम्प्रकाशमानत्वान्नाभास उपयुज्यते इति च । जडपदार्थाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तेर्विशेषोऽस्ति । तथाहि । अयं घट इति घटाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तिर्ज्ञातं घटं विषयीकृत्य तद्गताज्ञाननिरसनपुरःसरं स्वगतचिदाभासेन जडमपि घटं भासयति । यथा प्रदीपप्रभामण्डलमन्धकारगतं घटादिकं विषयीकृत्य तद्गतान्धकारनिरसनपुरःसरं स्वप्रभया तद्वदभासयतीति ।

No. 112.—And [in regard to the point referred to in No. 111] it has been declared as follows:—"Whilst it is necessary that the understanding should be available for the destruction of *ignorance*

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respecting God, it is denied by the authors of the Institutes that the usual result of this applies to Him also." For, again—"Since He is self-luminous, there is no need of light [to be thrown upon Him, any more than there is need of holding a candle to the sun, which shows *itself* on the removal of intervening obstacles]."

a. There is a [great] difference between a 'modification of the understanding' when moulded on a material object and this [when mirroring the Supreme Intelligence]. To explain:—Suppose we have the case—"this [I perceive] is a jar"—Here, having taken as its object the jar, previously un-recognised, the 'modification of the understanding' mirroring the form [and character] of the jar, on dispelling the ignorance that previously attached to the object, throws light upon the jar by the light of its own intelligence;—just as the shine of a lamp, when it throws itself upon the surrounding jars, &c., in the dark, on dispelling the darkness, illuminates them with its own light:—[but this *usual* sequel to the removal of intervening darkness or ignorance does not apply when the object of the understanding is the Supreme Intelligence].

एवं खस्वरूपचैतन्यसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं श्रवणमननिदिध्यासनसमाध्यनुष्ठानस्यापेक्षितत्वात् तेऽपि प्रदर्श्यन्ते।

No. 113.—Until Intellect [or Deity] becomes in this way directly manifest in its own form, since it is necessary to persevere in (1) hearing, (2) pondering, (3) contemplation, and (4) meditation, these also shall be now explained.

श्रवणं नाम। षड्विधलिङ्गैरशेषवेदान्तानामद्वितीये वस्तुनि तात्पर्यावधारणं।

No. 114.—As for 'hearing' [—No. 113—] this implies the determining, through the six characters [or conducers to knowledge], the import of the whole of the theological sections of the Vedas,

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in regard to the 'Real' [No. 20 *a.*], besides which there is nought else.

लिङ्गानि। उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासो ऽपूर्वता फलं अर्थवादोपपत्तीच लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये।

No. 115.—The characters—[or conducers to knowledge—No. 116—]? These are [six peculiarities in the teaching of the Veda, which conduce to the hearer's accurate apprehension of the truth—] viz., (1) the 'beginning and ending with' [see No. 116], (2) 'inculcation,' (3) the 'novelty' [of the fact asserted,—see No. 118—], (4) the ['alluring mention of the] fruit [to be gained from the knowledge offered],' (5) the 'eulogizing of the subject,' and (6) 'illustration from analogy'.

तत्र प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्यार्थस्य तदाद्यन्तयोरुपादानमुपक्रमोपसंहारौ। यथा छान्दोग्ये षष्ठे प्रपाठके प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्याद्वितीयवस्तुनः एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यादौ ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वमित्यन्तेच प्रतिपादनम्।

No. 116.—Among these [enumerated in No. 115] the 'beginning with and ending with' imply that the matter to be declared in any given section is declared both at the beginning and at the end thereof:—as, for instance, in the sixth section of the *Chhándogya Upanishad*, the 'Real, besides which there is nought else'—which is to be explained in that section—is declared at the outset in the terms "One only, without a second," and at the end in the terms "All this consists of That."

प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य वस्तुनः तन्मध्ये पौनःपुन्येन प्रतिपादनमभ्यासः। यथा तत्रैवाद्वितीयवस्तुनो मध्ये तत्त्वमसीति नवकृत्वः प्रतिपादनम्॥

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No. 117.—'Inculcation' [No. 115] is the declaration again and again therein [i. e. in some given section of the Veda] of that thing which the section is concerned with declaring:—as, for example, in that same section [referred to under No. 116], the 'Real, besides which there is nought else' is set forth [no less than] nine times in the shape of the assertion 'That art Thou'.

प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य वस्तुनः प्रमाणान्तरेणाविषयीकरणमपूर्वत्वं। यथा तत्रैवाद्वितीयवस्तुनो मानान्तराविषयीकरणं।

No. 118.—'Novelty' [No. 115] here means that the Thing, which the section is concerned with declaring, is not an object [previously ascertained by means] of any other proof [besides the declaration then first made].—as, for example, in that same section [referred to in No. 116], the truth regarding the 'Real, besides which there is nought else' is not the object of any other proof [besides the declaration of the Veda, and is not to be learned elsewhere].

फलन्तु प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यात्मज्ञानस्य तदनुष्ठानस्य वा तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणं प्रयोजनं। यथा तत्रैव आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये अथ सम्पत्स्य इत्यद्वितीयवस्तुज्ञानस्य तत्प्राप्तिप्रयोजनं श्रूयते।

No. 119.—By the 'fruit' [No. 115] we mean the motive which is heard stated, in this or that [section of the Veda], for seeking the knowledge respecting Soul that is brought forward in the sect on, or for persevering therein [i. e. for persevering in the effort to realize this knowledge for ourselves]:—as, for example, in that same section [referred to in No. 116], we learn that the inducement for acquiring a knowledge of the 'Real, besides whom there is nought else,' is that we may attain to [being ourselves]

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that [Reality];—for [we find it written as follows]—"The man that hath a [fit] teacher knoweth [the truth]; but [not immediately attaining to emancipation] he must abide until he be released [from the body]; then will he attain [to absorption into the one Reality].

प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य तत्र तत्र प्रशंसनमर्थवादः। यथा तत्रैव उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातमित्यद्वितीयवस्तुप्रशंसनम्।

No. 120.—The 'eulogizing of the subject' [No. 115] is the glorifying of what is set forth in this or that section [of the Veda]; as for example, in that same section [referred to in No. 116], the glorifying of the 'Real, besides whom there is nought else,' in the following terms:—"Thou, O disciple, hast asked for that instruction whereby the unheard-of becomes heard, the inconceivable becomes conceived, and the unknowable becomes thoroughly known."

प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यार्थसाधने तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणा युक्तिरुपपत्तिः। यथा तत्र यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात् वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं द्वितीयवस्तुसाधने विकारस्य वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वे युक्तिरुपपत्तिः श्रूयतेः।

No. 121.—An 'illustration from analogy' [No. 115] is the exhibition of a reason, heard stated in this or that [section of the Veda], for the establishment of what is set forth in the section:—as, for example, in that same section [referred to in No. 116], we hear stated, as illustrations from analogy, such arguments as the following, to show, when establishing what is the 'Real, besides whom there is nought else,' that His [supposed] mutations

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[are mere figures of speech, or] rest on nothing but words :—" O gentle one! As, by means of a lump of clay [properly understood], everything that is made of the clay is perfectly known to us,—its modifications, or various names, [such as jars, &c.,] resting merely on language, whilst the truth is that there is [nothing really else in the case than] the clay [which may change its name but not its nature;—so also is it with the one Reality]."

a. [Having directed that the student is to hear the Veda—see No. 113,—and having explained how the Veda is adapted to impress the hearer, the author next explains what he means by the 'pondering' *(manana)* recommended at No. 113].

मननन्तु श्रुतस्याद्वितीयवस्तुनो वेदान्तानुगुणयुक्तिभिरनवरतमनुचिन्तनं।

No. 122.—But 'pondering' [No. 113]? This is the dwelling with uninterrupted attention on the 'Real, besides whom there is nought else,' which he has heard [declared to him in the Vedas], together with such illustrations [of the truth—see No. 121—] as are in accordance with the Vedántic doctrine.

विजातीयदेहादिप्रत्ययरहिताद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारितायां बुद्धेः सजातीयप्रवाहो निदिध्यासनम्।

No. 123.—'Contemplation' *(nididhyásana)* [No. 113] is the homogeneous flow [or continuance] of the understanding mirroring its object, when this object is the 'Real, besides which there is nought else,'—to the exclusion of the notion of body or any other thing heterogeneous [to the one Reality mirrored in the understanding as explained at No. 108. *b*].

समाधिर्द्विविधः सविकल्पको निर्विकल्पश्चेति। तत्र सविकल्पो नाम ज्ञाताज्ञानादिविकल्पलयानपेक्षया ऽद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदा-

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कारकारितायाश्चित्तवृत्तेरवस्थानं। तदा मृण्मयगजादिभाने ऽपि मृद्ज्ञानवत् द्वैतभाने ऽप्यद्वैतं वस्तु भासते। तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः। दृशिस्वरूपं गगणोपमं परं सङ्कल्पभातं त्वजमेकव्ययं। अलेपकं सर्वगतं यदद्वयं तदेव चाहं सततं विमुक्तः। दृशिस्तु शुद्धो ऽहमविक्रियात्मको न मेऽस्ति बन्धो नच मे विमोक्ष इत्यादि।

No. 124.—'Meditation' *(samádhi)* [No. 113] is of two kinds —(1) 'recognising such distinctions as that of subject and object' *(savikalpaka)*, and (2) 'recognising no such distinctions as that of subject and object' *(nirvikalpaka)*.

a. Of these, that [meditation] 'which recognises such a distinction as that of subject and object'? This consists in the continuance of the understanding in that modification [No. 108, *b*.] in which it mirrors the 'Real, besides which there is nought else,'—without any concern about the sinking of the distinction between the knower, the knowledge, &c., [which are not really distinct from each other].

b. Then [i. e. at the time of meditation without exclusion of the distinctions just mentioned] the 'Real, without a second,' *does* shine forth even whilst there is the appearance of duality;—just as there is the recognition of the clay [—the only reality in the case—see No. 121—] when we perceive such a thing as an elephant formed of clay [—the *elephant* being here a mere name given to the clay].

c. Such [meditations, without exclusion of the distinctions just mentioned,] have been uttered by [sages] intent [on emancipation],—in terms such as the following:—"*I* am that being, in the shape of [simple] vision, like the Ether [all-pervading], pre-eminent, immediately manifest, unproduced, one and imperishable, unsoiled [by contact with aught else], omnipresent, self-

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existent, without a second, and for ever free. I am the pure [act of] vision, unchangeable:—I have no fetter, nor am I *set* free [—having always *been* so]."

निर्विकल्पकस्तु। ग्राह्यज्ञानादिभेदत्रयापेक्षया अद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारितायाबुद्धिवृत्तेरतितरामेकीभावेनावस्थानं। तदा जलाकाराकारितलवणानवभासेन जलमात्रावभासवद्द्वितीयवस्त्वाकाराकारितचिन्मात्रवृत्त्यनवभासेनाद्वितीयवस्तुमात्रमेव भासते।

No. 125.—But that [meditation] 'which recognises no such distinction as that of subject and object' [No. 124]? This consists in the [unvaried] continuance of the understanding modified so as to mirror the 'Real, besides which there is nought else,'—[not, as in No. 124, *a.*, *without*, but] *with* advertence to the sinking of all distinction between the knower, the knowledge, and the known,—in absolute oneness [of the Reality and the understanding of the Reality].

a. Then [i. e. at the time of meditation *with* exclusion of all distinction between subject and object &c.], the 'Real, besides which there is nought else,' shines forth *alone*, in the absence of the [separate] recognition of the understanding as mirroring the solitary Reality;—just as there appears nothing but the water when the salt, which [on solution] took the form of the water for its own, is no longer recognised.

ततश्चास्य सुषुप्तेश्चाभेदशङ्का न भवति उभयत्र दृक्त्यभाने समानेऽपि तत्सद्भावासद्भावमात्रेणानयोर्भेदोपपत्तेः।

No. 126.—And you must not entertain the doubt whether there be therefore [—i. e. seeing that the understanding, as mo-

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dified by any impression, disappears here as well as in sound sleep—see No. 33—you must not doubt, we repeat, whether therefore] there is no difference between this [viz. the state of cognition described in No. 125, *a.*], and sound sleep; because, whilst the *non-appearance* of the modification [of the understanding] is common to both cases, the two cases differ just in this that it is present in the one case [though not perceived], while in the other [viz. in deep sleep] it is not present at all.

अस्याङ्गानि यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयः।

No. 127.—The practices subservient to this [meditation—see No. 125—] are (1) 'forbearance' *(yama)*, (2) 'religious observance' *(niyama)*, (3) 'postures' *(ásana,)* (4) 'suppression of the breath' *(práṇáyáma)*, (5) 'restraint' *(pratyáhára)*, (6) 'attention' *(dháraṇá)*, (7) 'contemplation' *(dhyána,)* and (8) 'meditation' [of the kind mentioned at No. 124, *a*].

तत्राहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः।

No. 128.—Of these [enumerated under No. 127,] the acts of 'forbearance' are (1) not killing, (2) not lying, (3) not stealing, (4) continence, and (5) not accepting gifts.

शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः।

No. 129.—Acts of 'religious observance' [No. 127] are (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) penance, (4) study, and (5) persevering meditation on the Lord.

करचरणादिसंस्थानविशेषलक्षणानि पद्मस्वस्तिकादीनि आसनानि।

No. 130.—'Postures' [No. 127] are the various modes of disposing the hands, feet, &c., spoken of as *padma* and *swastika*, &c., [which need not be here described].

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a. [With these and other such like matters of ceremonial our enquiry at present is in no degree concerned; but we proceed with our text-book].

रेचकपूरककुम्भकलक्षणाः प्राणनिग्रहोपायाः प्राणायामाः ।

No. 131.—'Suppressions of the breath' [No. 127] are those methods for checking respiration spoken of as (1) slow expiration (2) slow inspiration, and (3) stopping the breath by shutting the mouth and closing both nostrils with the fingers of the right hand.

इन्द्रियाणां स्वस्वविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याहरणं प्रत्याहारः ।

No. 132.—'Restraint' [No. 127] is the restraining of the senses from their respective objects.

अद्वितीयवस्तुन्यन्तरिन्द्रियधारणं धारणा ॥

No. 133.—'Attention' [No. 127] is the fixing of the internal organ [the Mind] on the solitary Reality.

तत्राद्वितीयवस्तुनि विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्यान्तरिन्द्रियवृत्तिप्रवाहो ध्यानं । समाधिस्तूक्तः सविकल्पक एव ।

No. 134.—'Contemplation' [No. 127,] here [as distinguished from that spoken of under No. 123,] refers to the train of thought's being conversant about the solitary Reality on separate occasions [instead of being uninterruptedly so]. And the 'Meditation' here spoken of is only that [mentioned under No. 124, *a.*] 'which recognises such a distinction as that of subject and object.'

अस्याद्वितीयो निर्विकल्पकस्य लयविक्षेपकषायरसास्वादलक्षणाश्चत्वारो विघ्नाः सम्भवन्ति ।

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No. 135.—Of this [Meditation] '*with* exclusion of all distinction between subject and object, &c.,' [No. 125], to which these practices [No. 127], are subservient, four things may be obstacles,—viz., (1) 'listlessness,' (2) 'distraction,' (3) 'passion,' and (4) 'the tasting of joy [as something distinct from the taster].'

लयस्तावदखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन चित्तवृत्तेर्निद्रा।

No. 136.—As for 'listlessness' *(laya)*, this is the sleep of the understanding whilst not sustaining [or mirroring] the Indivisible Reality.

अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन चित्तवृत्तेरन्यावलम्बनं विक्षेपः।

No. 137.—'Distraction' *(vikshepa)* is the understanding's mirroring any thing else instead of mirroring the Indivisible Reality.

लयविक्षेपाभावे ऽपि चित्तवृत्तेरागादिवासनया स्तब्धीभावाद् अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनं कषायः।

No. 138.—'Passion' *(kashâya)* consists in the understanding's not mirroring the Indivisible Reality, even in the absence of 'listlessness' [No. 136] and 'distraction' [No. 137], through its being paralysed by the fancies of desire, &c.

अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेनापि चित्तवृत्तेः सविकल्पानन्दास्वादनं रसास्वादः। समाधारम्भसमये सविकल्पानन्दास्वादनं वा।

No. 139.—'The tasting of joy' *(rasâswâdana)* [as something—see No. 135—distinct from the taster] is the understanding's experience of felicity, whilst recognising such distinctions as that of subject and object [see No. 124], when it does *not* mirror the Indivisible Reality;—or [otherwise] it is the experience of felicity,

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recognised as distinct from the enjoyer, at the time of commencing Meditation [which, when freed from error, will no longer recognise that unreal distinction].

अनेन विघ्नचतुष्टयेन रहितं चित्तं निर्वातदीपवदचलं सदखण्ड-चैतन्यमात्रमवतिष्ठते यदा तदा निर्विकल्पकसमाधिरित्युच्यते।

No. 140.—When the understanding, free from this quaternion of obstacles [No. 135], like [the flame of] a lamp unagitated when unaffected by the wind, remains simply [in the shape of] the really existent indivisible Intellect, then is there said to be [the condition described, under No. 125, as] 'Meditation recognising no distinction of subject and object, &c.'

तदुक्तं। लये सम्बोधयेत् चित्तं विक्षिप्तं शमयेत्पुनः। सकषायं विजानीयात् शमप्राप्तं न चालयेत्। नास्वादयेद्सं तत्र निस्सङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत् इत्यादि। यथा दीपो निवातस्थ इत्यादिच।

No. 141.—This [fact asserted in No. 140] has been declared in such terms as the following:—"When listlessness comes on he should awaken the understanding; when distracted, again, he should quiet it; when assailed by passion, he should bring it to understand; when it has attained to quietism, he should not disturb it; he should not let it enjoy any happiness [as something distinct from itself]; by rightly discerning, he ought to become unattached to these [external and unreal objects]":—and again "As a lamp, standing where there is no wind," &c.

अथ जीवन्मुक्तलक्षणमुच्यते। जीवन्मुक्तो नाम स्वस्वरूपाखण्ड-शुद्धब्रह्मज्ञानेन तदज्ञानबाधनद्वारा स्वस्वरूपाखण्डब्रह्मणि साक्षात्कृते सति अज्ञानतत्कार्यसञ्चितकर्मसंशयविपर्ययादीनामपि बाधितत्वादखिलबन्धरहितो ब्रह्मनिष्ठः।

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No. 142.—Now we shall describe him 'who, yet living [in human form], is liberated' *(jívanmukta)*. He is 'liberated while yet living,' who, intent on God, is freed from all bonds through the removal of Ignorance and its resultant mass of actions doubts and errors, &c., on God's becoming manifested as He really is—the Indivisible—, through the removal of ignorance in regard to Him,—this being consequent on the knowledge of God as He is,—the Indivisible, the Pure.

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः। क्षीयन्तेचास्य कर्म्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे इत्यादिश्रुतेः।

No. 143.—[And the fact stated in No. 142 may be inferred] from such texts as the following :—"When He, the First and the Last, has been discerned, then the knot of the heart [which bound it in the narrow error of a separate consciousness] is severed, all doubts are resolved, and one's acts are annihilated."

अयं व्युत्थानसमये मांसशोणितमूत्रपुरीषादिभाजनेन शरीरेणान्धमान्द्यापटुत्वादिभाजनेनेन्द्रियग्रामेणाशनायापिपासाशोकमोहभाजनेनान्तःकरणेनच तत्तत्पूर्ववासनया क्रियमाणानि कर्म्माणि भुज्यमानानि ज्ञानाविरुद्धान्यारब्धफलानिच पश्यन्नपि बाधितत्वात् परमार्थतो न पश्यति। यथा इदमिन्द्रजालमिति ज्ञानवान् तदिन्द्रजालं पश्यन्नपि परमार्थमिति न पश्यति।

No. 144.—Such a one [i. e., see No. 142, he who is 'liberated while yet living' on earth], with his body—which is a vessel of flesh, blood, urine, excrement, &c.,—and his set of organs—vessels of blindness, torpor, stupidity, &c.,—and his mind,—a vessel of hunger, thirst, sorrow, bewilderment, &c.,—though beholding the actions that he performs in accordance with this or that preceding fancy, and the fruits of past deeds which he experiences

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without their obstructing his knowledge [of the truth], does not behold them as realities, [or really behold them] for to him they have ceased to exist;—just as the man who knows that so and so is a juggler's trick, though looking upon the illusion, does not look upon it as a reality.

सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव। सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव इत्यादिश्रुतेः। उक्तञ्च। सुषुप्तवज्जायति यो न पश्यति हृयञ्च पश्यन्नपि चाद्वयत्वतः तथापि कुर्वन्नपि निष्क्रियश्च यः स आत्मविन्नान्य इतीह निश्चय इति।

No. 145.—[And the fact stated in No. 144, may be inferred] from such texts as the following:—"Seeing, yet as not seeing:—hearing, yet as not hearing."

a. And it has been declared that "He, and no other, knoweth Soul, who, in his waking state, sees not,—just as one in profound sleep [sees not]; and who, looking on [what seems] more than one, sees it not under the aspect of duality;—so too who, while acting, yet [in his inmost conviction] acts not:—this is certain."

अस्य ज्ञानात् पूर्वं विद्यमानानामेवाहारविहारादीनां अनुष्ठान-वच्छुभवासनानामेवानुष्ठानिर्भवति। शुभाशुभयोरौदासीन्यं वा।

No. 146.—As he [i. e.—see No. 142—the man 'who, yet living, is liberated'] previously to the attaining of [right] knowledge, followed the ordinary appetites and amusements; so he now follows the impulse to good works only, or else he is alike indifferent to good or bad.

तदुक्तं। बुद्धादैतसतत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं यदि। शुनां तत्त्वदृशा-ञ्चैव को भेदो ऽशुचिभक्षणे। ब्रह्मविद्वन्मथा मुक्तो स आत्मज्ञो न चेतर इति।

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No. 147.—[And since the description of the man 'living, yet liberated,' in No. 146, as being 'alike indifferent to good or bad,' might naturally suggest a doubt, the doubt is met—for] it is said —"If he who rightly understands that there is no duality may act as he chooses, then what difference is there between *dogs* and those that know the truth—in respect [say] of eating what is unclean?—[for, the dog may eat as he chooses, and so, it seems, may the enlightened sage. Well, the difference consists in] the knowledge of God. So, such a one [as knows God—and not the dog, who knows nothing of the truth—], being liberated, is, and no one else is, the knower of Soul."

तदानीममानित्वादीनि ज्ञानसाधनान्यदृष्टत्वादयः सद्गुणाश्चालङ्कारवदनुवर्त्तन्ते। तदुक्तं। उत्पन्नात्मावबोधस्य ह्यदृष्टत्वादयो गुणाः। अयत्नतो भवन्त्यस्य नतु साधनरूपिण इति।

No. 148.—Then [—i. e. when one has attained to the estate described in No. 142—] freedom from egotism, and other such like perfecters of knowledge, and such good qualities as freedom from malice, will attend him like ornaments. And so it has been declared:—"To him who has obtained a knowledge of Soul, such qualities as freedom from malice belong without effort,—but these are not now employed as *means*."

किं बहुना। अयं देहयात्रामात्रार्थमिच्छानिच्छापरेच्छाप्राप्तानि सुखदुःखलक्षणान्यारब्धफलान्यनुभवन्नन्तःकरणाभासादीनामवभासकः सन् तदवसाने प्रत्यगानन्दपरब्रह्मणि प्राणे लीने सति अज्ञानतत्कार्यसंस्काराणामपि विनाशात् परमकैवल्यमानन्दैकरसमखिलभेदप्रतिभासरहितमखण्डं ब्रह्मावतिष्ठते।

No. 149.—What more need be said? This one [viz. he who has attained to the state described in No. 142], merely for the sustenance of his body [and not for the gratification of his sen-

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ses], acquiescing in the experience of those retributive fruits, in the shape of pleasure or pain, procured from [or taking their rise in] desire or aversion on our own part or on another's; and being [—so long as he continues thus much hampered by the effects of Ignorance—] the spirit that enlightens the modifications of the understanding [not yet swallowed up—see No. 110—in the spirit-light itself;—this man, we say,] on the cessation thereof [i. e. of the experience of these retributive fruits, when no more are due to him,] his life dissolving away into the Supreme Deity who is unmingled beatitude, on the destruction of Ignorance and the *vis inertiae* of its results [—whereby it is that, like the potter's wheel revolving long after the motive power has ceased to be applied to it, the man who has learned the saving truth yet lives on hampered in the body,—then finally] abideth God—in absolute simplicity—unvarying felicity—free from every semblance of difference.

न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामयन्त्यत्रैव समवलीयन्ते विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते इत्येवमादिश्रुतेः।

No. 150.—[That the fact is as stated in No. 149, may be learned] from such texts as this, viz., "His vital spirit does not trasmigrate, but is absorbed; and absolutely liberated he is absolutely liberated."

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्य्यश्रीसदानन्दविरचितं वेदान्तसार-प्रकरणं समाप्तं॥

No. 151.—Thus is completed the treatise called the *Vedánta Sára* composed by the pre-eminent ascetic the illustrious SADÁNANDA, the chief of devotees.

No. 152.—Let us now take a retrospective glance at Sadánanda's work, and endeavour to determine the inter-dependence of its parts. The design of the book is to explain how nothing really exists besides God—see No. 20. *a*.— all else being unreal and owing its apparent reality to Ignorance,—see No. 20. *b*.

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a. Under No. 22 we attempted to account for the way in which 'Ignorance' is spoken of by the Vedántins as the cause of the phenomenal world. The universe, according to this theory, being the joint result of Soul and 'Ignorance'—see No. 40—and Soul being the only *substance*, or "the substratum of all"—see No. 2. *a.*—it follows that 'Ignorance' is equivalent to and identical with the sum total of *qualities*. Quality, in accordance with the Sánkhya theory, is regarded, in the first division, as threefold; and therefore, at No. 21, 'Ignorance' is spoken of as *triguṇátmaka*—i. e. "consisting of the three qualities" or of the three "fetters,"—the word for "quality"—viz., *guṇa*, meaning originally a "fetter," and the two senses, in this philosophical system, being closely related;—see No. 22. *f.* Let us see what can have led to the division of Quality into three.

b. The one reality—the universal substratum—being veiled by the garb of the phenomenal world, certain marked distinctions of character among the phenomena present themselves. We have phenomena of calm cognition, of fierce emotion, and finally of inertness—or, in Shakspere's phrase, "cold obstruction." To one or other of these three heads every phenomenon may, with a little ingenuity, be referred. The three heads are named respectively, in Sanskrit, *sattwa, rajas,* and *tamas*. According to the commentator on the *Tattwa-samása* (see Sánkhya Lecture § 50—52), the first of the qualities, whilst endlessly subdivisible into calmness, complacency, patience, rejoicing, &c., consists summarily of *happiness*. The second, on the other hand consists summarily of *pain*. To these categories belong almost all the sensations and thoughts of thinking beings;—scarcely any feeling, viewed strictly, being one of sheer *indifference*. This *indifference*, the third of the qualities, is exemplified in its highest potency in such things as stocks and stones,—where Soul, the substratum of these as of all else, is altogether "immersed in matter" or obfuscated by the quality of *Darkness*—as the word *tamas*, the name of the quality, literally signifies. In its lower potencies this quality exemplifies itself in sloth, drowsiness, &c.

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c. These three qualities, separately or commingled, more or less obscure the Soul, which is held to be simple *Knowledge—jnána*; and as the aggregate of them is the opposite of Soul, or in other words *not*-Soul, the aggregate takes the name of *a-jnána*, i. e. not-knowledge, or 'Ignorance.' This account of the term may to some appear preferable to that previously offered under No. 22. *a.* The Soul is often spoken of as a *light*. Now suppose a lamp to be enclosed in a lamp-shade; the glass may be either so pure that the light passes through scarcely diminished; or it may be stained, so that the light is tinged and partly dimmed; or the lamp-shade may be of opaque materials, so that the light within is altogether obstructed. These three cases may perhaps illustrate the supposed operation of the three Qualities, as well as account for the names by which they are spoken of as 'Purity,' 'Foulness,' and 'Darkness.'

d. 'Ignorance'—see No. 36—has two powers; that by which it *envelopes* Soul, giving rise to the conceit of conscious individuality, and that by which it *projects* the phantasmagoria of a world which the individual regards as external to himself. Soul thus invested (No. 40) is what the world consists of; and the order of the world's developement is the next topic. The order of emanation is held to be from the more subtile to the more gross —see No. 41. First the 'subtile elements' appear—No. 41. *b.*— and these confine the Soul within a 'subtile body'—No. 43—consisting of whatever belongs to or enwraps the individuated soul when not lodged in a body of flesh and blood. The 'gross elements' arise from the blending and confusion of the 'subtile elements' —see No. 68. *a.*—and out of these are formed the Earth, the heavens and hells, and the 'gross bodies' of their occupants, &c.

e. Throughout his exposition of this process of development, the author inculcates the indifference between a collection of individuals and the individuals that make up the collection. Thus —see No. 23— a forest is nothing else than the trees viewed collectively; and the trees are nothing else than the forest viewed

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distributively.* As, however, a name is conveniently given both to things viewed collectively and to the same things viewed distributively, so our text-book gives names to certain collections viewed under an aspect of mystic unity. Thus whilst 'Ignorance' is regarded distributively—see No. 31—as separately investing separate human souls, the collective aggregate of the same is taken—see No. 24—as the vesture of *Íśwara*—the Lord—the cause of worlds. At No. 34 we are assured that there is no difference between the collective aggregate tenanted by *Íśwara* and the distributive aggregate tenanted by the separate souls then called *prájna*, any more than there is between the forest and the trees of which it consists:—but it is left unexplained how the two, thus declared identical, yet differ so far that the quality of *sattwa* is *pure* in the one—see No. 25—, and *impure* in the other—see No. 31. When 'Ignorance,' in the course of development, has given rise to the 'subtile bodies,' the collective aggregate of these is regarded as the mystic body of *Hiranyagarbha*—see No. 62. An individual soul, when invested with nothing beyond the 'subtile body,' takes the name of *taijasa*—see No. 64. Lastly the aggregate of 'gross bodies' is regarded as the mystic body of *Vaiśwánara*—a being who, as indicated in No. 72, might be taken for an impersonation of the Spirit of Humanity, only that his mystic body includes all bodies whatever as well as those of the human species. The individual soul also, as located in the 'gross body,' has its technical name, being then called *viśwa*—see No. 73.

f. When a man, with all his wits and his limbs about him, is wide awake,—see No. 72—, he is regarded as being furthest removed from the state in which he ought to be,—he being then enveloped in the densest investment of 'Ignorance.' When he falls asleep, and dreams, he is considered to have shuffled off his

* Another thing, however, is apt to be tacitly assumed, which is not so evidently true, viz. that each tree severally is the forest. The trees might fairly say, "*We* are the forest," but no single one can be suffered to say "*I* am the forest,"—much less can they all be suffered to say this each of himself.


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outermost coil;—and therefore, a dream—see No. 65—is spoken of as 'the scene of the dissolution of the totality of the gross.' The objects viewed in dreams are regarded as 'subtile objects'—see No. 66. When a man sleeps so soundly that he has no dream, he is regarded as having got rid not only of his 'gross body' but also of his 'subtile body;' hence profound and dreamless sleep—see No. 32—is spoken of as 'the scene of the dissolution both of the gross and of the subtile body.' But although, in profound sleep, a man has got rid of all the *developments* of 'Ignorance,' yet he is still wrapped in 'Ignorance' itself, and this must be got rid of. He must not, like the sleeper in No. 33, who 'slept pleasantly and knew nothing'—'enjoy blessedness by means of the very subtile modifications of Ignorance illuminated by Intellect'—No. 32—, but he must become Intellect simply—identical with Blessedness—No. 2. *a*. To this Absolute Unity is given the name of 'the Fourth' (Nos. 34 and 78) because, beyond the three Qualities which constitute 'Ignorance' (No. 151, *a*), and which are regarded as being peculiarly characteristic of the three deities severally of the Hindú triad, lies—as the fourth—the substratum of all things—the Indivisible.

g. Under No. 93 is explained the train of thought by means of which the belief is got rid of that any thing really exists besides the 'Indivisible;' and then the author explains at considerable length how the sentence 'That art thou'—i. e. 'thou, whosoever thou art, art the Indivisible'—is a sentence conveying the truth, and constructed on just principles of expression. When the dictum has been rightly understood and accepted, the accepter of it, changing the 'thou' to the first person; reflects thus—'*I* am the Indivisible.' This is so far well;—but he must finally get rid of the habit of making even *himself* an *object* of thought. There must be *no* object. The *subject* alone must remain—a Thought, a Joy, an Existence,—and the only one.

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