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Or

The Homage of Indology

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सर्वेऽधिकाराः सुरक्षिताः

प्रकाशक-संकेतः,

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Arthavādas

By

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The Vedas are classified into *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas.*[1] The *mantras* are so well-known among the Vedic scholars by their name itself, and they are mostly prayers. The rest are called the *brāhmaṇas*[2]. They have two divisions, namely (1) *vidhis* and *niṣedhas*- injunctions and prohibitions, and (2) *arthavādas* –their supplementary portions that praise and condemn the enjoined and prohibited things respectively. The *arthavādas* are classified into three groups, namely (1) *guṇavāda*- which speaks of something that goes against our ordinary experience, (2) *anuvāda*- which repeats what has already been experienced, and (3) *bhūtārthavāda*- which deals with things which are unknown and which may be taken to be true.[3]

The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtra,* **चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः** (I 1.2) explains that the entire Vedic text including *codanās*–injunctions is the authority on *dharma.* The *Autpattikādhikaraṇa* (I.1.5) on the basis of the eternity of *śabda,* of its meaning, viz. the generality, and of their relation, viz. **वाच्यवाचकभाव,** has established that the entire Vedic text is eternal and that it is a self-revelation and as such self-valid authority on *dharma.* The *Apauruṣeyatvādhikaraṇa* (I 1.8) again establishes that the entire Vedas are not composed by any person and as such are free from the personal defects that are found in human speech.[4]

It is true that the Vedic injunctions (*codanās*) which enjoin various sacrifices like *Agnihotra* become authorities on *dharma* since those sacrifices are not known as the causes of the divine bliss–*svarga* by any other valid authority. But how do *arthavādas* which, as explained above, speak of things some of which are contradicted by our experiences in the world (**स्तेनं मनः**) and some of which are mere repetitions of our outside experience (**अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्**) ? *A*

1. Cf. **मन्त्रब्राह्मणात्मको वेदः ।**
2. **तच्चोदकेषु मन्त्राख्या, शेषे ब्राह्मणशब्दः ।**
3. **विरोधे गुणवादस्स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते ।**
   भूतार्थवादस्तद्भानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ॥
4. (*a*) **वेदः अपौरुषेयः, अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वात्; यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा रघुवंशादिः ।**
   (*b*) **वेदः अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकः, नित्याध्ययनविषयत्वात् ।**
   (*c*) **वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।**
   वेदाध्ययनसामान्यादधुनाध्ययनं यथा ॥

valid authority is that which reveals a thing not experienced by any other authority or not contradicted by other valid experience.[5] The sūtrakāra opens the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* (I.2.1) where he proposes to establish the authoritativeness of *arthavādas* on *dharma* as follows :—

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानां तस्मादनित्यमुच्यते ।

the entire Veda conveys a *kriyā*, viz., *bhāvanā* which has three *aṁśas* or constituent elements–*sādhya* (fruit), *sādhana* (cause) and *itikartavyatā* (the accessories closely associated with the main cause).[6] Since the *arthavādas* do not convey any idea which can be related to this *bhāvanā* under any of these three constituent elements, they are to be declared as unauthoritative on *dharma*. So what has been established by the *Vedāpauruṣeyatvādhikaraṇa*, viz. that the entire Veda is the authority on *dharma* cannot be explained in the *arthavāda* passages. So the *prāmāṇya* established in (I.1.8) is optional (*anitya*) only ; that is, just like the *vidhi* and *niṣedha* passages it cannot be spoken of in the *arthavāda* passages. So the syllogism :

सर्वोऽपि वेदः धर्मे प्रमाणम्, अपौरुषेयत्वात् स्वाध्यायविधिपरिगृहीतत्वाच्च

is fallacious since the same cannot be spoken of in certain parts of the Veda namely the *arthavādas*.[7] If they do not convey a new idea by the primary significative potency, *abhidhā*, shall we not apply the secondary significative potency, *lakṣaṇā*, on some sense connected with *vidhi* or *pratiṣedha* to which they are the supplementary texts ? Then the question comes–what is the authority or condition for *lakṣaṇā*, is it *anvayānupapatti* or *tātparyānupapatti* ? The former cannot be explained in many *arthavāda* passages like **वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता'** since they explain the well-known idea that the wind-god travels very quickly and as such would bring also very soon the fruit of the sacrifice to the sacrificer etc. The latter also cannot be accepted in view of the fact that there is no sufficiently strong authority (**तात्पर्यग्राहकप्रमाण**) to indicate the ultimate aim that these *arthavādas* should convey some sense which is directly or indirectly related to *dharma*. It is argued that the *svādhyāyavidhi* **'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः'** which enjoins the study of the Vedas for the sake of knowledge which would ultimately lead the student to eternal bliss,[8] is the authority **तात्पर्यग्राहकप्रमाण**, since under *svādhyāya* along with the *vidhi*, *pratiṣedha* and *mantra*, the *arthvādas* are also included as the texts to be studied by the Vedic student. This explanation of the *svādhyāyavidhi* is not accepted by the objector (**पूर्वपक्षिन्**). He says that the *adhyayana* of the Vedic

5. अनधिगताबाधितार्थातिशयज्ञानजनकं प्रमाणम् ।
6. साध्यसाधनेतिकर्तव्यताविशिष्टभावनाप्रतिपादकत्वम् ।
7. अवच्छेदकावच्छेदेन साध्यानुमितिं प्रति सामानाधिकरण्येन साध्याभावसिद्धिः प्रतिबन्धिका ।
8. प्रयोजनवदर्थज्ञानोद्देशेन स्वाध्यायाध्ययनं विधीयते ।

text need not be enjoined by this *vidhi* for the sake of *arthajñāna*, since every one in this world knows by experience without the Vedic mandate that the study of a particular subject would bring him its full knowledge. Shall we not impose then by means of a *vidhi* (**नियमविधि**) restriction to the effect that since the causes of knowledge are known too many to be enumerated, only by the prescribed *adhyayana* of the Vedic text by the student under a teacher the knowledge of the Vedic contents is to be acquired ? The main objector answers that this kind of imposing a restriction on the study of the Vedic texts is of no use or significance. In the well-known instances of *niyama vidhi* like '**व्रीहीनवहन्ति**' there is the utility of *avahanana* in the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice, the knowledge of which is obtained by *prakaraṇa* (context) and it can be said that *kratvaṅgatva* will be produced only by *avahanana* and not by any other well-known means of the removal of the chaff of the paddy. In the case of *adhyayana* there is no such *prakaraṇa* to associate it with any sacrifice, because the *svādhyāyavidhi* is *anārabhyādhīta*, i.e. not studied under the *prakaraṇa* of any sacrifice. Nor can it be said that the *adhyayana* or its fruit *arthajñāna* is invariably associated with or utilised in the sacrifice only, as in the instances of **पशुतन्त्रविधि**[9] which is an **अनारभ्याधीत** and has the invariable connection with and utility in the sacrifice (**अव्यभिचरितक्रतुसम्बन्ध**) in view of the fact that *arthajñāna* is made use of in the earning of wealth and many other worldly benefits. So the objector argues that the *svādhyāyavidhi* is not a *niyamavidhi*, but is an *apūrvavidhi* enjoining *adhyayana* for the sake of *svarga* by the *viśvajinnyāya*.[10] It can also be said that *śāstra*, the *svādhyāyavidhi*, enjoins *adhyayana* for the sake of *arthajñāna* itself before the operation of the *lokapramāṇa* (**लोकतः पूर्वं शास्त्रं प्रवर्तते**) since the *pramāṇas* can function in *loka* under limited conditions while *śāstra* works independently. Or the *vidhi* '**स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः**' takes *adhyayana* itself as *bhāvya* if it is not known as *iṣṭa* desired or undesirable for man ? The passage **अनधीयाना व्रात्या भवन्ति** makes us understand that *adhyayana* is *iṣṭa* lest we should fall under the category of *vrātyas*, morally and spiritually condemned people. So the study of the Vedas is to be accomplished under a teacher by the prescribed rules, not for the sake of the knowledge of the Vedic contents leading to the attainment of the final bliss but for *svarga* or for avoiding *vrātyatva* as explained above. The objector concludes, therefore, that the *svādhyāyavidhi* does not enjoin *adhyayana* for the sake of *arthajñāna* and as such it cannot be a **तात्पर्यग्राहकप्रमाण** for adopting *lakṣaṇā* on these *arthavādas* in the sense of *prāśastya* and *aprāśastya* of the thing enjoined and prohibited respectively.

The *siddhāntin* begins his view by saying that the *svādhyāyavidhi* does not enjoin *adhyayana* for the sake of *svarga* by *viśvajinnyāya* in view

9. यस्य पर्णमयी जुहूर्भवति ।
10. स स्वर्गः स्यात्सर्वान् प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् ।

of the fact that a visible fruit (दृष्टफल) like *arthajñāna* can be explained for *adhyayana*. It is generally accepted rule that an *adṛṣṭaphala* (invisible fruit) should not be explained for anything if a *dṛṣṭaphala* is available.[11] The *phala* अर्थज्ञान of this injunction is not the ordinary superficial knowledge of the Vedic texts (यथाश्रुतार्थज्ञान) since this fact is already known from the *mantra* : स्थाणुरयं भारहारः किलाभूत् which praises the man with Vedic knowledge and condemns him without it by comparing him to a pillar which bears the burden ; and the *adhyayana* of the Vedic texts under a teacher is also made compulsory by the *arthavāda* passage condemning the man without the knowledge of the Vedas as a *vrātya*. So the *svādhyāyavidhi* is accepted as enjoining *adhyayana* for the *arthajñāna* which has the ultimate aim (प्रयोजनवत्) to make the Vedic student perform the Vedic sacrifices with the help of this *arthajñāna* and then attain the divine bliss (*abhyudaya* like *svarga*) as the final goal.[12] It can also be said that this *vidhi* enjoins *adhyayana* as a *saṁskāra* for the attainment of *svādhyāya* which is known as *āpyakarma* by the *tavya-pratyaya* in the word अध्येतव्यः ; so the word *svādhyāya* in the *vidhivākya* means by *lakṣaṇā* प्रयोजनवदर्थज्ञानसाधनीभूतस्वाध्याय which is the *uddeśya* of the *vidhi*. Thus it is a *niyamavidhi* and not an *apūrvavidhi*. This *vidhi* enjoins the *adhyayana* of the *svādhyāya* that particular Vedic text that has come down to the Vedic student from the unbroken tradition of his father and his grand-father and others ; and this includes *arthavāda* passages also along with *vidhis* and *mantras* and so some sense associated with the *vidhyartha* is to be explained by *lakṣaṇā* in all *arthavādas* if the literal sense is of no use. In other words, this *svādhyāyavidhi* is the तात्पर्यग्राहकप्रमाण to employ *lakṣaṇā* in the sense of *prāśastya* and *aprāśastya* which can be directly related to *vidhis* and *niṣedhas* respectively, to which these *arthavādas* are the suplementary texts.

The Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsakas explain *vidhi* and *niṣedha* as the chief sense of the potential, imperative and other injunctive suffixes like *tavya-pratyaya* in the affirmative and negative prepositions like स्वर्गकामो यजेत and न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत् ; and these *vidhi* and *niṣedha* are explained as that activity of the Vedic *śabda* or the desire of the speaker (if he is available) who prompts another to do or to abstain from doing a particular thing. This activity or desire is called by different names like *pravartanā* and *nivartanā*, respectively. It is technically known in this *śāstra* as *śabdabhāvanā* in that it belongs to the *śabda* and it generates action in others to do or not to do a particular thing. It has three *aṁśas* or parts *sādhya* (fruit), *sādhana* (cause) and *itikartavyatā* (the accessories of the

11. दृष्टे सम्भवत्यदृष्टकल्पनायोगात् ।

12. प्रयोजनवदर्थज्ञानोद्देशेन स्वाध्यायाध्ययनं विधीयते, प्रयोजनं च अर्थज्ञानेन कर्मानुष्ठानम्, तेन चाभ्युदयप्राप्तिरिति ।

main cause in producing the desired fruit). Since it is *pravartanā*—the activity or the desire of the prompter to produce *pravṛtti*–activity or volition in another, this *pravṛtti* is evidently its *sādhya* or fruit. The *sādhana* should not be taken as the cause of *pravartanā* but it is the cause of the *pravṛtti*, the *sādhya* of *pravartanā*.[13] So the knowledge of the *śabdabhāvanā* which generates *pravṛtti* in the hearer is the *sādhana*. The *itikartavyatā* is the *prāśastyajñāna* and *aprāśastyajñāna* which induce the hearer to act or not to act as the case may be.

This *śabdabhāvanā* otherwise known as *pravartanā* conveyed by the potential suffix, which has three *aṁśas* as explained above, is related to the *pravṛtti* or *kṛti* otherwise known in the *śāstra* as *arthabhāvanā*, the leading concept of verbal cognition conveyed by the personal termination '*ta*' in the example यजेत स्वर्गकामः. The one and the same suffix '*ta*' is known as *ākhyāta-pratyaya* and *liṅpratyaya*. So in these two separate capacities आख्यातत्व and लिङ्त्व as शक्ततावच्छेदक it conveys two *bhāvanās* respectively, the *arthabhāvanā* (*pravṛtti*) and the *śabdabhāvanā* (*pravartanā*). The relation of *śabdabhāvanā* to *arthabhāvanā*, the leading concept, is *prayojyaprayojakabhāva*, the relation subsisting between the cause and effect.[14] This *pravṛtti* is not the direct result of the knowledge of *pravartanā*, but it is produced only through the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva*[15], i.e. a thing which one is asked to do is to be known as the cause of the desired fruit. This *iṣṭasādhanatvajñāna* is indispensable for *pravṛtti*. So it is known by *saṁsargamaryādā* since it is included in the body of the relation as स्वविषयकज्ञानजन्यानुमितिप्रयोज्यत्वसम्बन्ध, the *pravṛtti* is produced by the inferential knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* which again results from the knowledge of *pravartanā*.[16] The knowledge of *prāśastya* and *aprāśastya* as conveyed by the *arthavādas* would act as stimulants to perform the sacrifices enjoined to or abstaining from the कलञ्जभक्षण prohibited. Hence they are authorities on *dharma* in as much as they become the *itikartavyatā* of the *śabdabhāvanā* which enjoins or prohibits a *dharma* or an *adharma*.

The nature of *prāśastya* and *aprāśastya* as conveyed by the *arthavādas* is explained in various ways in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* śāstra. Khaṇḍadevamiśra, the founder of the Navya school among Bhāṭṭas, elucidates *prāśastya* and *aprāśastya* as equivalent to *stuti* (praise) and *nindā* (condemnation) which are

13. भावनाकारणत्वं च न भावनोत्पादकत्वेन किन्तु भावनाभाव्यनिष्पादकत्वेन ।

14. स्वप्रयोज्यत्वसम्बन्धेन शब्दभावनाया अर्थभावनायामन्वयः ।

15. प्रवृत्तिं प्रति इष्टसाधनत्वमेव साक्षात्कारणम् ।

16. प्रवर्तनाज्ञानेन इष्टसाधनत्वानुमितिः, यथा याग इष्टसाधनम्, प्रवर्तनाविषयत्वात् । इष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानेन च प्रवृत्त्युत्पत्तिः ।

further elaborated as **बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वानुबन्धित्वयोग्यत्वरूप**, that which has no capacity to produce any undesirable fruit more than what he has to reap (at the time of his performing the sacrifice) and that which has capacity to produce a more harmful or sinful fruit than what he actually enjoys if and when he does the prohibited thing. He explains **बलवत्त्व** in **अनिष्ट** as **उत्कटद्वेषविषयत्व** that is, one man, however much he is told that the Vedic sacrifices like Agnihotra are to be performed, may feel that they are very difficult to perform and involve heavy expense etc., while another who wants to act, correctly understands that the sacrifices are the sources of *abhyudaya* and that the initial difficulties are very small and insignificant. So it is left to one's own taste and conviction to like or dislike these sacrifices. So also are the prohibited things like **कलञ्जभक्षण**. However much one is informed that these prohibited acts are sinful and are sources of hellish life, one chooses to perpetrate it simply for the sake of the tempting pleasure. That is why it is said **औत्कट्यं च जातिविशेषः फलैकोन्नेयः**, the *autkaṭya* in *dveṣa* is a generality which can be inferred only from its result, viz. the action or the non-action of the person. This idea is well explained by Khaṇḍadeva in his *Bhāṭṭarahasya* as follows[17] :

अतो विध्यर्थवादेषु विधेयतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येन बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वरूपं प्राशस्त्यं लक्ष्यते । निषेधार्थवादेषु च निषेध्यतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येन बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वरूपप्राशस्त्यम् । अत्रानिष्टे बलवत्त्वम् उत्कटद्वेषविषयत्वम्, न त्वाधिक्यम् । स्वर्गेन्यूनेऽपि तात्कालिकदुःखे प्राचीनकर्मवशेन कदाचिदुत्कटद्वेषोदयात् । अत एव नैव तदा यागादौ प्रवर्तते । नरकेन्यूनेऽपि च तात्कालिकसुखे प्राचीनकर्मवशेनोत्कटरागोदयाच्च । अत एव अभिचारादौ प्रवर्तते । अत एव यागादौ कदाचित् प्राचीनशुभकर्मवशाद् बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वं, न तु सर्वदा । अत एव विधेयतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येनेत्यनेन तस्य कालिकाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वं विवक्षितम् । एवं न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादौ कदाचिदेव शुभकर्मवशाद् बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वज्ञानम् । अतस्तत्रापि कालिकाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वसिद्धयर्थं निषेध्यतावच्छेदकेत्यादि । एतादृशाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वज्ञापनार्थमेव कौस्तुभादौ योग्यतापदम् ।

17. *Bhāttarahasya*, Conjeevaram edn. p. 18.