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पातञ्जलं योगसूत्रम्।

राजमार्त्तण्डाख्यवृत्तिसहितम्।

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI,

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA

AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BY

RAJENDRALALA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E.

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CALCUTTA:

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PREFACE.

The doctrine of Pessimism as evolved by Schopenhauer and developed by Hartmann created quite a sensation in Europe. The novelty, the bold generalizations, the closeness and vigour of ratiocination with which it was set forth, endowed it with qualities which could not but attract attention and claim consideration. But, carefully analysed, it does not appear to have any pretension to novelty or originality to which its admirers lay claim.

The doctrine of evil as inseparable from the world is nearly as old as humanity. It was the dread of evil that drove the primitive man to seek the shelter of superhuman power, and laid the foundation of religion. There would have been no religion if there had been no dread of evil, here or hereafter. Nor would philosophy have had its birth had not the necessity arisen to discriminate between good and evil. Morality, too, presupposes a differentiation between that which is proper and that which is improper—of a consciousness, however vague and undefined, of future reward and punishment. Doubtless the doctrine assumes constant and unalloyed evil, and not a mixture of good and evil; but in so doing it only places the evil in the present condition, and transfers the

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good to a hereafter, in a hazy, cloudy, dubious, undefined way, but does not absolutely deny it.

The preëminence of the unconscious Will is the most important element of the doctrine; and it, too, under the names of Freewill, Máyá, Buddhi, and the like, has occupied men's mind and played its part in philosophy from a pretty remote period of antiquity.

Then comes the repugnance to worldly attractions, love, affection and joy; and under the form of asceticism it is almost as old as civilized man.

The denial of the existence of God is an assumption of no modern date; it unquestionably preceded the formation of human ideas about Divine Providence; and the assumption about the objectification of Will forms the corner-stone of the doctrine of Patañjali.

It might be said that, if thus the leading tenets of the Pessimist doctrine be old, their association into a compact and complete system is not so, and that in this respect it may well claim the full meed of praise for its originality. This, however, cannot be conceded. Even as are its tenets, so is it in its entirety as a system. What Schopenhauer enunciated in his 'World as Will and Idea' (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*) in 1819, and Hartmann worked out in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (*Philosophie der Unbewussten*) in 1869, is no other than the nihilist philosophy of Buddha put forth in a modern European garb, or, as an able writer puts it, a system "little more than Buddhism vul-

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garised." It is the farthest from my wish to assert that the two German philosophers have surreptitiously, or deliberately, borrowed their system from the Indians: it is almost certain that Schopenhauer at the beginning of this century had no knowledge of any Buddhist Philosophy, and Hartmann, working on the model of his predecessor, had, probably, no occasion to consult the texts of the Sunyavâda system of the Buddhists as accessible to him in meagre abstracts in European languages. The similitude may be—nay, most probably is—purely accidental, the result of human mind set to thinking in a particular line of ideas arriving at the same conclusion; but it exists, and is as clear as possible, and that is all that is here intended to be emphasized.

The system of S'ákya Buddha is a modification of a more ancient and more fully developed doctrine—that of Kapila, as known under the name of Sânkhya. Thoroughly logical in its scheme of ratiocination, the Sânkhya enunciates that there is no proof of the existence of a Supreme Divinity, and therefore leaves it entirely out of consideration in its scheme of primal causation. Its words, as summarised in the text book of the school, but which is obviously of a much later date than Kapila, are, *Is'varásiddheh:* "It is not proved that there is a God." (Sânkhya, Aph. I, 92.) The idea is more fully developed and argued in a subsequent part of the work (*Vide infra*, pp. 31*f*). S'ákya Buddha, less logical but more bold, adopted this idea in a positive form, instead of keeping the question open by admitting only the want of

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dialectic demonstration. Schopenhauer does the same without any reserve, describing theism as "a tradition of the nursery."

The next subject is Soul or the vitalizing and conscious principle of life. Kapila's theory recognises its existence, assuming a separate soul for each living being. Buddha did the same. These souls are uncreate and eternal, never coming to an end. Buddha acknowledged and, indeed, made them the basis of his system, but practically, though not in so many words, he denied them absolute eternity, for his theory of Nirvâṇa assigned them an ultimate and final goal after many transmigrations in *sunyatá*, vacuity or nihility. It may be that his Nirvâṇa did not extend to absolute nihility, for there is nothing authentic and unquestionable in his sayings; but his immediate followers, who developed the Maháyána school, announce it in unmistakable terms, and for the purposes of the present comparison this is enough. The German philosopher goes a step further, and insists on the absolute negation of Soul. His words put in English are, "there is no psyche;" but unable to dispense with it altogether, he supplies its place by an "unconscious will" which plays the part of Soul. Practically this amounts to admitting Soul, but divesting it of its consciousness and eternity.

In the Sánkhya system, the category next after Soul is *Pradhána*, or Nature, having inherent in it the threefold qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or as the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya defines it, "the equilibrium of the three qualities,"

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('*triguṇa-sámyam*'). The terminology is archaic, but it implies the sum-total of the laws and forces of nature, which regulate the course of the phenomenal world. Buddha availed himself of this category to the full, and Schopenhauer does the same, using only modern terms in conformity with the physical science of the day.

The next is Intellect. It is common to all the three systems under notice, and alike unconscious in all. The Sánkhyas call it *Mahat*, the Buddhists *Buddhi*, and Schopenhauer Will, "the Reality, the absolute Existence, the Ultimate Fact, the universal and fundamental essence of all activities, both of the organic and the inorganic world, the primordial thing whence we and everything proceed." In the Yoga system, the term used is *chittva*, which, in the following pages, has been rendered into 'thinking principle;' but would have been as well—nay more pointedly—expressed by will.

Kapila assigned real substantiality to matter. What the primitive Yogís thought about it we know not. Patanjali is silent on the subject in his Yoga aphorisms; but in his *Mahábháshya* he admits an absolute reality of it. He raises the question by saying, *yadi távad guṇasamudáyo dravyam*, "if you hold matter to be the aggregate of qualities," (IV, 1.) and then refutes the theory, Buddha's idea of Sunyatá necessitated the same theory in a more prominent manner. He could not admit absolute reality to any thing, and as the inevitable nihilistic consequence of his creed, matter had to assume the character of a phantasmal play of mental phenomenality—

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"—— A fleeting show
For man's illusion given."

The Vedánta took it up after him, Berkeley worked it out in England in the early part of the last century, and Schopenhauer has done the same in our own days.

As already stated the theory of evil—constant, ever-present evil in everything mundane,—is common to all the three schools. Kapila designed his system with the express object of removing "the threefold pain" which is inherent in existence (Aph. I). Buddha's dread of the ever-recurring pain of birth, existence, decay, and death, drove him to the shelter of nihility, and the Pessimists of our day look upon pain as constant and inherent in worldly existence. The Yogís, who represent a section of the Sánkhyas, sum up the fruit of worldly existence by the significant remark, "to the discriminating all are verily painful." (Yoga, II, 15.) According to Hartmann "the world is so bad that it had better not exist, and that it is steadily becoming worse."

Nor are the means devised for the removal of this evil different. Perfect knowledge, attainable by hard, unremitting study amidst the most rigorous asceticism and self-mortification, and total renunciation of the pleasures of the world, is the only remedy accessible to man. Neither Kapila nor Buddha would have any other, and Schopenhauer, after dwelling on the miseries of existence, and showing that even suicide was not enough to put a stop to them, asks, "Whence then is deliverance to come?" and the answer given is "In *knowing* that the world is radically and essentially bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for

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that old affirmation of the Will to live; it leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of Will, that true *Nirváṇa* in which there is no more Will, therefore no longer an ideal presentation, or a real world."

In so far the correspondence is as close as possible in works set apart by an interval of considerably over four and twenty centuries—between Buddhism of the 6th century before Christ and the Pessimism of our own times. A learned writer describes Pessimism as the "goal of modern thought" in Europe. If so, that "goal" was reached in India over four and twenty centuries ago.

Nor should the limit be set there. It is impossible to believe that Sánkhyaism, like Minerva, issued forth in all its perfection at once. It is but natural to suppose that many ontological and biological questions, such as God, soul, mind, primary causation, &c., must have formed the theme of speculation and enquiry from a long anterior period, to prepare the Indian mind for the conception and reception of so recondite a system as the Sánkhya. Kapila could not have conceived and brought it forth, had not his predecessors discussed and made themselves familiar with such philosophical ideas. There must have existed many doctrines, many dogmas, many theories to afford him the necessary materials to work out his scheme. Even as Bacon's *Novum Organum* was not the spontaneous generation of a novel thought, but the crystallization or solidification of ideas which

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were extant at the time in a more or less undefined, nebulous way, so was Kapila's Sánkhya. Various phases of philosophic thought were well known and current in his time, and his was the master mind which put them together to create a complete system. The bricks existed, and Kapila was the architect who used them in constructing a novel edifice.

How long before the time of Kapila metaphysical dogmas had currency among the Hindus we know not for certain; but the remarkable hymn in the Ṛig Veda which discusses whether entity or non-entity existed before creation (X, 129) carries us to a remote period of antiquity beyond which we cannot speculate. The reference in the Sáma Veda to a Yati who condemned sacrifices, and whose wealth was transferred to Bhṛigu, is equally germane to the point. According to the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa some such Yatis were punished by being thrown before jackals. In the A'raṇyaka period of Vedic history, these rationalistic speculations and metaphysical controversies were of frequent occurrence, and the Upanishads have preserved for us the substance of some of the orthodox speculations on the subject. They afford us traces also of the heterodox dogmas which they were intended to combat. Kautsa was the leader of one of the rationalistic schools, and he is named by Yáska. Jábála was an atheist, and his name occurs in the Upanishads. Páṇini alludes to atheists, sceptics, fatalists, and revilers of the Vedas. It may be taken for granted without any offence to reason that these heterodox people did entertain many dog-

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mas in opposition to the received exposition of primal causation and other recondite doctrines of the Hindu faith. They could not have been heterodox if they had not adverse theories to propound; and they must have been met by counter theories to keep up the antagonism. One may go further and assume that these disputes led to the development of adverse schools of thought which have since been overthrown by later developments. The earliest Vedic cultus was purely ritualistic. It embraced prayers and peace-offerings—prayers in set forms, and peace-offerings in the form of sacrifices accompanied by libations of spirituous liquors. Those who reviled the Vedic religion opposed it principally on the ground of the futility, cruelty and unmeaning character of the offerings. The atheists, pure and simple, denounced the whole system as false. This, however, was a purely destructive course, and not calculated to win the multitude in its favour. Mere negation suggests the idea of the doctrine of Metrodorics, the Epicurean, which had for its main object the stomach. Society needed some check to vice by holding up a threat of future retribution, and absolute negation of divine providence and future life did not provide it. Besides, a future state being admitted, a preparation for it in the present state was felt a necessity, and a large majority of the opponents, therefore, appealed to self-torture and meditation for aid.

Meditation as a means of communion with the Divinity was known long before the date of the Sánkhya. Indeed, in all ancient forms of religion,

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meditation occupies a prominent place as a religious exercise. In the Rig Veda the Gáyatrí enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent sects and systems. This meditation is called *Dhyána*, the word used in the Gáyatrí being the verb *dhímahi* "may we meditate." Now, this *Dhyána* cannot be performed without fixing the mind on one particular object after abstracting it from worldly cares and enjoyments, and this fixation is called *Dháraṇá*, or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, and this is called in the Vedas *Tapas*. A man must foreswear all worldly enjoyments before he can fix his mind on one unworldly object, and the fixation must take place before he can begin a meditation. Austerity, therefore, forms the first step in the process; fixation or steadfastness the second; and meditation the third; and all these exercises have enjoyed a halo of sanctity from a remote period of antiquity. No Rishi could live without his hermitage; none without performing *Tapas;* none without steadfast devotion; none without his meditation. These are the essential attributes of a Rishi. It would be a contradiction in terms to suppose a Rishi could be so, without them. They suggest the idea of communion with something superhuman, and create a feeling of mysterious awe and veneration in the mind of the common herd. At first the object of meditation was of course the Divinity in some form

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or other; but atheistic philosophers soon found it practicable to dispense with that object, and they converted the objective thought to a subjective one, and thus produced the highest meditation of the Sánkhyas, a meditation in which the mind meditates on itself, or, as the philosophers of this class express it, on nothing. The next step was to dispense with the eternity of matter, to reduce it to a phantasmal character. The mind was all in all, and there was no necessity for an eternal co-ordinate, and this is the dogma of the Buddhists and the Vedántists. None of these, however, dispensed with individual soul. That formed an integer in all the leading systems of early Indian philosophy. Nay, more, in order to provide for a future state of retribution, it was necessary to develop or retain the system of metempsychosis. It was seen that neither virtue nor vice always brought on its deserts in this life, and the necessity for a next life became unavoidable; and if the soul was to have a next corporeality of some kind to bear the deserts, there was nothing to hinder the transmigration many times. It may shock European ideas of the present day to be told of metempsychosis; but between worldly life, purgatory, and eternal hell-fire, or heaven on the one hand and metempsychosis on the other, dispassionate and unsophisticated logic will readily yield the palm to the latter. An English lady was once shocked at the sight of a Hindu lady with her nose bored for a nose-ring. She said, "how barbarous is this custom of yours, dear sister, of boring the nose?" "I fail," replied the Hindu, "to perceive the difference, Madam, between boring the two ears and

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boring the nose." The Hindu controversialist may adopt this line of argument and ask, the matter not being susceptible of positive proof without the aid of revealed religion, "logically what is the difference between three corporealities and a dozen or more?" But, however that be, all the ancient leading schools of India accepted metempsychosis, and the grand object they had in view was to devise the means for putting a stop to the ever-lengthening and never-ending chain of transmigration. And so long that was kept prominently before the masses, most of whom keenly felt, as they do now, and will always do, what Schelling calls "that sadness which cleaves to all finite life," the system propounded, however otherwise discordant in doctrinal points, had a fair chance of success, as a proselytising system, particularly if it were favourable to peace and welfare in this present existence.

Buddhism was peculiarly well-adapted for this purpose. It was the most attractive in its moral and social phases. No system of human religion has propounded a more perfect course of morality, humanity, mercy, and sympathy. The universal benevolence it preached could not but exert a potent influence on the mind of the people. At a time when sacrifices of animals by hundreds were every-day practices, and those sacrifices were often effected by driving wooden spikes into the heart of writhing victims, the dogma of total abstinence from all sacrifices and uniform mercy to all creatures could not but produce a marked revulsion of feeling against the current religion, and to draw large numbers of

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men to the standard of the new faith. The doctrines of equality of man and of non-recognition of caste also contributed very largely to recommend it to the favour of those who had been for a long time ground down by caste rules. The result was wholesale conversions of the lower and the middle classes of the people in all parts of India—so much so as to make Buddhism the leading religion of the country. The intellectual classes, the men of leading and light, also appreciated these moral and social advantages, and were willing to accept them. They perceived, however, the worm in the flower, and were shocked by the sight. The atheism which forms the basis of Buddhist philosophy never obtruded itself on the perception of the multitude. It was unknown to them, and they cared not at all to understand its true purport. But the intelligent few felt it, and wished to avoid it. Even professed Buddhists could not always tolerate it, and many were the attempts made to gloss over it, or to supplant it in an insidious way so as to divest the system of its atheism without injuring it in its constitution. The Aiś'varika system of the Buddhists was the outcome of one of these attempts, and the Vedánta and the Yoga systems with their various Gitá, Tántric and Puráṇic modifications represent the results of Hindu attempts at reconciling the higher philosophy of Kapila and Buddha with a theistic religion.

It is not my object here to enter into the vexed question of the chronology of these different systems. It would take more time and space than what are

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at my disposal now. It is necessary, however, to state that in appealing to the Sánkhya, I appeal to the doctrine, and not to its text-books. There is abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and authenticity, of the Sánkhya and the Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha. The most prominent part of the exercise of those systems involved the most rigorous self-mortification, and that mortification was currently practised with the utmost rigour before the time of Buddha. Buddha himself notices this. According to the Lalita-Vistara :—

"While at Uruvilvá, Śákya called to mind all the different forms of penances which people at his time were in the habit of submitting to, and which they thought raised the mind above all carnality. 'Here,' he thought, 'am I born in the Jambudvípa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption (*ádhímukti*), crowded by Tírthikas with diverse wishes, and at a time when their faculties are wriggling in the grasp of the crocodile of their carnal wants. Stupid men, who seek to purify their persons by divers modes of austerity and penance, and inculcate the same! Some of them cannot make out their *mantras*. Some lick their hands. Some are uncleanly. Some have no *mantras*. Some wander after different sources. Some abstain from fish and flesh-meat. Some mind not the annual duties. Some abstain from spirit and the water of chaff. Some beg alms from one, three, five, or seven tribes. Some indulge in tubers, fruits, mosses, kuśa grass, leaves, cow's dejecta, frumenty, curds, clarified butter, molasses, and unbaked cakes. Some wash the body of charioteers, parrot-flyers, and news-purveyors. Some dwell in villages, or in woods for their livelihood. Some adore cows, deer, horses, hogs, monkeys, or elephants. Seated at one place in silence, with their legs bent under them, some attempt greatness. Some speak to only one person, others to seven. Some eat once in a day and night, some once on alternate days, and some

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at intervals of four, five, or six days; some once in a fortnight, performing a *chándráyaṇa*. Some put on themselves the feathers of vultures or owls. Some, seated on a board or a munjá mat, wear bark, kuśa grass, valvaja grass (*Eleusine Indica*), or blankets of camels' hair, or of goat's wool, or of hair, or hides. Some sleep more or less in wet clothes Some sleep on ashes, gravel, stones, boards, thorny grass, or pestles, with the face downwards, in a hut or the bare ground. Some wear one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven pieces of cloth; others go naked, making no distinction between fit and unfit places. Some have long hair, nails, beard, and matted hair, and wear bark. Some live upon a single meal of a mixture of sesamum and rice. Some smear themselves with ashes, cinders from altars, dust, or clay. Some carry on their persons and in their hands down, munja grass, hair, nails, rags, mud, or a cocoanut-shell alms-bowl. Some drink hot water, or rice-water, or fountain water, or water preserved in earthen jars. Some carry on them cinders, metals, astringent things, three sticks, skulls, alms-bowls, bones or swords, and by these means they hope to attain to immortality, and pride themselves on their holiness. By inhaling smoke or fire, by gazing at the sun, by performing the five fires, resting on one foot, or with an arm perpetually uplifted, or moving about on the knees, some attempt to accomplish their penance. Some seek salvation by killing themselves by entering into a mass of lighted chaff or charcoal, or by suppressing their breath, or by roasting one's self on (hot) stones, or by entering any fire or water, or ascending in the air. The syllables "om," "vashaṭ," "svadhá," sváhá," as also, blessings, hymns, lighting of the sacred fire, invocations, repetitions of mystic *mantras* teaching of the Vedas (lit. *mantras*), or fancying the image of a divinity in one's mind, afford means of purification to many. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmá, Indra, Rudra, Vishṇu, Deví, Kumára, Mátrí, Kátyáyaní, Chandra, Áditya, Vaiśravaṇa, Varuṇa, Vásava, Aśvina, Nága, Yaksha, Gandharva, Aśura, Garuḍa, Kinnara, Mahoraga, Rákshasa, Preta, Bhúta, Kushmáṇḍa, Párshada, Gaṇapati, Devarshi, Brahmarshi, or Rájarshi. Some select some of them, others resort to the earth, the water, heat, the air or the ether. Mountains, rivers, fountains, tanks, lakes, long narrow sheets of water (taḍágas), oceans, vats, ponds, wells, trees, lotuses, herbs, creepers,

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grasses, stumps, pastures, cremation grounds, courtyards, and bowers afford asylums to others. Houses, columns, stones, pestles, swords, bows, axes, arrows, spears, and tridents, are the objects of salutation to some. In curd, butter, mustard, barley, garlands, darbha grass, jewels, gold and silver, some seek their welfare. Thus do these Tírthikas, dreading the horrors of mundane life, seek their shelter. Some seek heaven and salvation in their offspring, and resolutely apply to them. They all follow the wrong road; they fancy that to be the true support which is untrue; they hold evil to be good, and the impure to be pure. I shall then commence that kind of vow and penance by which all hostile sects shall be overpowered. To persons deluded by works and sacrifices, I shall show the destruction of all works and sacrifices. To Devas, perceivable by meditation, as also to those who become manifest in divers forms, I shall exhibit a meditation by which they may be overpowered."—My *Buddha-Gayá*, pp. 24, *et seq.*

The meditations he practised were all in accord with the rules of the Yoga system, and even their technical names were the same. These facts demonstrate the antiquity of the Sánkhya and the Yoga doctrines; but this cannot be said of the text-books of those systems as we have them before us now. They are obviously of a later date than Buddha, and this may safely be predicated of all the six leading texts of Hindu Philosophy. The Sánkhya Sútra quotes the Vais'eshika by name in two places (A. I., 25 and VI, 35), and refutes the doctrine of the Vedánta Sútra. The Yoga Sútra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sánkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost *verbatim*. The Vais'eshika Sútra recognises the Nyáya as well as the Sánkhya. The Nyáya Sútra refutes the doctrines of the Vedánta, and of the Sánkhya. The Mímáñs'á either directly or practically

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by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognises the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and Bádaráyaṇa, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedánta Sútras or later Mimáñs'á, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Sútra. The Vedánta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text-books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sánkhya Sútra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmá, we find it refers to an "ancient teacher" (*A'chárya*, A. V, 31), and to "venerable preceptors" (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Pañchas'ikha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A'surí, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. A'surí imparts it to Pañchas'ikha, who is, according

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to the Puráṇics, again a brother. This Pañchas'ikha, again, according to the Mahábhárata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sánkhya doctrine to that king of Mithilá. Had Kapila written the Sútra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an A'chárya.

In the Vedánta Sútra, Bádaráyaṇa, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 33; III, 2, 41; III, 4, 1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the statement that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sánkhya he says "the text of the Sánkhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by I's'varakṛishṇa,—and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Pañchas'ikha who had been himself instructed by A'surí, the pupil of Kapila." (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety; he says "The *Sútras*, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The *Sútras* mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sánkhya school, which in itself I should consider

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one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vais'eshika in I. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93." (Colebrooke's Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sútras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors.

As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahmá, and the text-book to be the work of Patañjali, who, says the commentator, "compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them" (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvious from the fact of the Yoga which Patañjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sánkhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sánkhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patañjali, and did not lend it to him. But the arguments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patañjali initiated the theory of the Tattvas he would have for certain defined them,and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sánkhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sánkhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more

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imperative. Secondly, the author of the Mahábháshya cannot possibly be proved to have lived before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor M. M. Kunte, in his "Vicissitudes of Aryan Civilization," has combated, with great tact and ability, the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of Patañjali; and it may be admitted that individually each argument as put forth by Goldstücker and others admits of refutation, and I may add that a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number of names of a given period is one which in Indian history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, however, one's attention to the text-book only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that Patañjali has contented himself by tacking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic model, without in any way blending the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the Hindus call it *Sés'vara Sánkhya*, or *Sánkhya cum deo*, as opposed to the former which is *Niris'vara Sánkhya*, or *Sánkhya sine deo*.

The cardinal difference between the two rests on their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated, it makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either case, and meditation in Samádhi is the only means available. The believer in the existence of the Godhead assumes that divine grace facilitates the end sought, but he does not dispense with Samádhi, and his belief, therefore, is of no material importance.

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"In less momentous matters," as noticed by Colebrooke, "they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patañjali's *Yoga-s'ástra* is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions." (Essays I, p. 265.)

And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the Sánkhya text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man's commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most

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transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the "material reality" of soul according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogís, may be apparently contradictory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that "the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals" but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. "We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can project his soul out of his body to any place he pleases." The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement.

The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is *Yogánus'ásana*, or 'the Institutes of the Yoga.' This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the *Yoga-s'ástra* or 'the science of Yoga,' or *Yoga-sútra*, the 'Aphorisms of the Yoga.' According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyása, one name of the work would appear to be *Sánkhya pravachana*, or 'an exposition of the Sánkhya.' The words of the colophon are *Pátañjala-yoga-s'á'stre sánkhya-pravachane*, which may be translated into, in Patañjali's science of the Yoga, the *Sa'nkhhya pravachana*.

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Vyása, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sánkhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, "the name of the work is *Yogánus'ásana*," (*Yogánus'ásanam náma s'ástram*). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says: "the title of *Sánkhya-pravachana* seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patañjali's *Yoga-s'ástra*." (Essays I, p. 244). In short, *Yogánus'ásana* is the specific, and *Sánkhya-pravachana* the descriptive, name of the work. Anyhow it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sánkhya.

The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters *(pa'das)*. The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled *Samádhi-páda*. The second is called *Sádhana-páda*, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called *Vibhúti-páda*, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is *Kaivalya-páda*, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms.

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The work opens with a definition of the term *Yoga*. It is derived from the root *yuj*, which means both "to join" and "to meditate." Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a derivative one. Instead of giving prominence to the joining, it implies the detachment which that joining occasions. The definition is, "the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle." This suppression, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar meditation which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Ṛig Veda, but not in the technical sense. In the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfection, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sánkhya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the *Tapas* of the Vedic Ṛishis got the more expressive name of Yoga at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad-

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gítá takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sánkhya Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jṇána-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyása Yoga; 6, Dhyána Yoga; 8, Tárakabrahma Yoga; 9, Rája-guhya Yoga; 10, Vibhúti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajna Yoga; 14, Guṇatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyása Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here.

The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (*a*) exercise, or "effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state," (XIII,) and (*b*), dispassion, or "the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects," (XV). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter.

The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an unconscious one. The former is that which is attended

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by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness; the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought; as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, *Savíja-samádhi* or "seeded meditation," because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long-continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, *nirvíja*, or perfect, and this is the *summum bonum* which the Yogí exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be *isolated* or free.

The expedients aforesaid are always and imperatively necessary—nothing can be attained without them; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that is "Devotion to God." This devotion is absolute resignation of one's self to the Divinity. In the language of the commentator, "it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to him, the preëminent guide." This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of

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the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patañjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divinity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be "a particular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires," one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and preserver of the universe. His name is Ís'VARA or "the ruler," and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one "in whom the seed of the omniscient attains infinity," (XXV,) and "who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (XXVI)." The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable OM, called Praṇava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordinate position.

Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogí in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability in the stage obtained (A. XXX);

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and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (xxxi). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously overcome. The means for overcoming them are various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (xxxii,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (xxxiii). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called *Práṇáyáma*, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadying the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (*cf.* p. 41). Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called *Haṭha-yoga*, from the letters *ha* and *ṭha*, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in procuring occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogí is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogís might also effect this (xxxvii). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one's fancy, is, likewise, an efficacious remedy.

The author then enters into a more elaborate classification of the Yoga. The twofold division first

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pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (XLI), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the *ultimatum* sought by the Yoga.

The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called *Kriyá-yoga* or "practical Yoga." In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceticism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances is to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind.

The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or 'the Will to live' as Hartmann designates it. Some of these are subtile, others gross, (III). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (X) and the latter by meditation, (XI).

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The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave behind their stock of residua to be worked out in a subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence; while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what is true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discriminating they are invariably painful, (xv). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (xvi).

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The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected.

In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said "to be of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation," (XVIII). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (XXI). Soul is called the spectator; "it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas," (XX). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and it is ignorance which brings them into conjunction) they produce life and its consequences, (XVII,) or as the text puts it "the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power," (XXII) *i. e.*, Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it is the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, ignorance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and

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this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true character of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect. This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained.

The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (xxvii). The first stage is that in which a person feels that "the knowable has been known by me." (2) He next feels that "there is nothing remaining to be known." (3) The conviction then arises that "my afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome." (4) This is followed by the belief that "discriminative knowledge has been attained by me." These four suffice to effect what is technically called "liberation from work," (*Kárya-vimukti*), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,—1st "my intellect has accomplished its purpose;" 2nd, "the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;" 3rd, "my meditation has been identified with my soul," that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called "intellectual liberation" (*Chitta-vimukti*). The last is called isolation (*Kaivalya*), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated.

In order to bring on this consummation the Yogí should apply himself to improve his understanding so

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as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To effect this improvement eight means are recommended, and these are technically called 1, Restraint; 2, Obligation; 3, Posture; 4, Regulation of birth; 5, Abstraction; 6, Steadfastness; 7, Contemplation; and, 8, Meditation (xxix). Of these the first includes five negative acts, *viz.*, abstention from (1) slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence, and (5) avarice; and the second five positive acts, namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) penance, (4) study, and (5) devotion to the Lord. These two classes of acts are called *mahávratas*, or acts of primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes of the community, whether householders or ascetics, and none should neglect them. Slaughter is *in se* sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a householder or a hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned by all. Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible, and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these restraints; it is necessary that one should keep himself free from filth, both material and moral; that he should be contented with his lot and not rapine; that he should submit to penance for his sins and for curbing his passions; that he should study the Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No one can be a good citizen who does not practice these restraints and obligations, and therefore they are recommended to all classes of the community. And if they are good and necessary for ordinary

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people, they must *ipso facto* be so for the Yogí, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advantages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here.

Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogís the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogí has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are conducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (XLVI), and entail the least effort (XLVII); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most beneficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assumption, (*cf.* pp. 102*f.*).

When the Yogí has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out

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through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 42*f*.

This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstructive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it.

All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called "practical Yoga," or "accessories to the Yoga," but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called "intimates" or *antarangas*. These three include Steadfastness (*Dhárańá*), Contemplation (*Dhyána*), and Meditation (*Samádhi*); and the third chapter opens with a description of these. "Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place," (L). As an exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied: so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a

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moment thinking of anything else, it is Steadfastness. When the understanding is brought to bear upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (II), *i. e.*, when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this contemplation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or *Samádhi.* The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impressions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of *Sañyama.* How this union is to be effected, or how this Sañyama is to be performed, is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers.

A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of

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Sañyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Sañyama in producing occult powers. Sañyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogí, *i. e.*, it should not be applied to a subtile object, until it has been practised and perfected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogí is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (VI).

The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Sañyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtile, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situated far away from the earth; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have occular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body; subdue his hunger and thirst; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. It is possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them.

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He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another's body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists.

When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogí is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (LI). In this they play the part of Mára in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temptations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogí. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome.

Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogí should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the "seeded" or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfection result in the all-saving knowledge, *tárakjṇána*,

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which makes manifest the relation between the thinking principle and Soul, and brings on the "seedless meditation." They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the *summum bonum* which the Yoga promises to its votaries.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that special faculties may result from five different causes, (1). Some of them are described to be due to birth; such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the same way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samádhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objec-

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tions as might be started against the theory of Samádhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the Sútras supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny causality to Samádhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samádhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogís pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided? and how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations or scintillations from the creating one, and are therefore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the

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body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (III—V).

The possibility of Samádhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same character as those produced by other causes? or are they different? The reply is that they are different, (VI). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the residua of former births are the active principles which animate them; whereas the faculties produced by Samádhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-consequences which the others do.

This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua; the last pertains to Yogís, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (VII).

The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking principle an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (*cf.* p. 26—174). This

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revival is Instinct, *i. e.*, instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as European philosophers describe it, (*cf.* p. 175,) Yogís take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experience, revived by particular circumstances. These residua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience; kind implying birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one's deserts; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the residua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (VIII). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between residua and instinctive manifestations, (IX), inasmuch as the result manifests itself invariably at the first favourable moment.

The theory of residua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no residua can be predicated; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (X). This involves a *regressus in infinitum*, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, it is not objectionable, or illogical. More-

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over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity.

The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to an end, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the author replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences; its asylum is the thinking principle; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits; and if they ceased there would be no root left *in re* the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (XI).

But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of *omne ens est unum*, is lost. This argument is met

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by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal, all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or asumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (XII). This is the theory of the moderate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their *universalia ad rem, universalia in re,* and *universalia post rem.* Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. It is produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (XIII). The action, however, is not simultaneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, (XIV). This leads to the question are sensibles the causes of sensation? or sensations the causes of sensibles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The relation of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sensations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to representative sensations as distinct from presentative

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ones. In fact, as Professor Müller, in his 'Elements of Physiology' (Baly's *Translation*, p. 1059), has observed, "external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves." Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, "if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle would be occupied with one particular thing." It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the world is causeless. The solution afforded is that there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv); and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predominates for the time and produce its effects. Patañjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, *i. e.*, of the *Vivartaváda* doctrine of the Vedánta.

The preception above produced is still incomplete.

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The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive what it sees, (XVII). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it perceive directly what is presented to it. It is accordingly said that a thing is known or unknown according as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (XVI).

An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stability in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at a time, and the Soul perceives only that modification, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (XIX).

The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he suggests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, and so on, and that would lead to a *regressus in infinitum*. There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would

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be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand.

There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (XXI); and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (XXII). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (*Cf.* p. 197).

These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others,

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its object must be to subserve another's purpose, and that another is soul, (XXIII). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another's purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we see it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Sánkhya-káriká adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent substance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (*Cf.* V.'s LVII to LX). The example of the cart carrying saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to.

Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, "as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there," (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have a purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it is a shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking principle, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscriminate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (*cf.* p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow

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and not to the reality, and the benefit derived goes to nature or Prakṛiti, which is entertained and ultimately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free.

Patañjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. When a person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and acquired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (XXIV), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (XXV). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasionally, (XXVI), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (*cf.* II, XXVIII). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works, (XXVIII—XXX). All obscurations are removed; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (XXXI); and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, (XXXIII). This isolation is absolute and eternal, and the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore.

Following the order of the text, the above summary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and

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metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on the Yoga now available in the English language are brief, obscure, and not unoften misleading and incorrect, it would not be amiss to attempt here a categorical resumè. The cardinal dogmas are, as already above stated, taken from the Sánkhya system, but there are differences, and the importance attached to some of them, in their mutual coöporation is markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the Yogís are:

1st. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om, and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation; but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the father, creator, or protector of the universe, with which He is absolutely unconnected.

2nd. That there are countless individual souls which animate living beings, and are eternal. They are pure and immutable; but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable embodied forms in course of ever recurring metempsychoses.

3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal. It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon, it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is called *Prakṛiti* or nature; it is always associated with the three qualities or active forces called goodness, foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of

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the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it.

4th. That next to soul there is a noumenon called *Chitta*, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications according to the prevalence of one or other of those qualities. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflection of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The consciousness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to Buddhi or intellect of the Sánkhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both Prakṛiti and Buddhi in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system.

5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities.

6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects

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have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state.

7th. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal.

8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles.

9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul.

10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua (αναμνησις of Aristotle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences.

11th. That desires are the origin of pain in this world.

12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to enquire when residua first arose to create desires.

13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain.

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14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions.

15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of certain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation.

16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers.

17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence.

The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, it is fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, " As few of the twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If we exclude the immundities of the *Tantras* and of the *Káma-s'ástra*, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries

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of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos," (*Contributions*, p. xi). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry—exceedingly so—and the enigmatical form in which it is presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Paṇḍits, when called upon to explain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patañjali's Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Puráṇas, the Tantric Sañhitás, the Pañcharátras, and the Bhagavadgítá—works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (*Cf.* pp. 103, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patañjali's doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tántrics and the Puránics.

The tenets of Patañjali are all that concern the

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critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind—some of them are unquestionably futile,—but they are certainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to commit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious enquirer. If the history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected, and that without in any way pledging ourselves as their defenders. There is no reason to doubt that such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine.

It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may

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be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.* The Bhagavadgítá thus sums up the Upanishad idea:

'He who all paths stops up, and in the heart
'Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within
'The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters
'The single syllable "Om"—the Soul Supreme,
'And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning
'The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.'

(*Telang's Translation*, p. 52.)

This idea, however, involves the necessity of additions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically distinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogís obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicating it with joy or bliss.

The threefold division of the intellectual man into *purusha*, *chitta* and *ahankára* is the counterpart of νους, ψυχὴ and σομα of Plato and other ancient

* Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Puráṇas as stated on page 208.

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European authors. (Plato, *Timæus*, Aristotle, *Politics*.)

The theory of Prakṛiti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal world, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allegorical way in which it is frequently described, is certainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, however, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the subject. It is no other than the φυσις or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitousness on the one hand and God's constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his 'History of modern Philosophy' (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says:

'The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we *immediately* perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not pourtray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these *substances*, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the *reality*, therefore, is not *the thing as*

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a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of *reality* recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.'

Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes—

'This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation"—this which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis"—is what the Sáṅkhya expositor, proceeding, "more Indico," synthetically, lays down as his first position. This is Kapila's *múlaprakṛiti*—the "root of all"—"the radical producer"—that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the 'soul' takes cognizance of. This primordial essence—among the synonymes for which, given in our text-book, are the 'undiscrete' *avyakta*, the 'indestructible' *akshara*, that 'in which all generated effect is comprehended' *pradhánaka*, &c., is the 'absolute' of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is 'not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind." So, according to Kapila, "From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness."' (*Benares Magazine*, Vol. III, pp. 284*f.*)

This Prakṛiti is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another's purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says 'doth never consult nor deliberate;' 'it goes on in one constant unrepeating tenor from generation to generation; it acts artificially and for sake of ends, but itself understands

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not the ends which it acts for.' 'It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act FATALLY, magically, and sympathetically.' ('True Intellectual System of the Universe,' B. I., Cap. III, 37.)

Again, Prakṛiti and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogí, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, *i. e.*, to noumena as distinct from phenomena, we have nothing more preposterous than the "eternal verities" of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion.

The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected; and, carefully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose.

Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research; and they are well-known

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to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster's theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively concieved image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce startling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to separate the wheat from the tares—to discriminate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogís and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubtless the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on on catholic, honest and scientific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogís had anticipated them. In the meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pretensions should not make us spurn the Yogís as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly false and fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain

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restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and I know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogí myself, nor anywise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogís should be subjected to examination and analysis.

As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (*ante*, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved; but I shall content myself here with a quotation.

Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop's College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commenting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says:

'The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the "origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffer-

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ing evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

'If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same *stand-punkt* as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the *regressus in infinitum* here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet—and we do well:—but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe—short of the primal mystery of "Being" itself. The Hindu's explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so—

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but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The "origin of evil" has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach—but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus. We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his 'Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.'

'The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture-accounts of 'sin entering the world, and death by sin;' whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to *account* for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the *first* evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the *first* pair.'" (*Benares Magazine*, III, pp. 286*f*.)

Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, 'it may somewhat tend to check the mischievous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.' (*Opus cit.*, pp. 283*f*.)

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To turn now to the life of Patañjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudra-yámala Tantra, the Vrihannandikes'vara Puráṇa, and the Padma Puráṇa, describes him to 'have been born in the Ilávrata Varsha, where his father Angirá and his mother Satí resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupá, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a "Vaṭa" tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhoṭa-bhaṇḍára, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.' (*Hindus*, II.)

There occurs in the *Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya* of Mádhava A'chárya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahádeva, and besought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Bauddhas and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divinities would from time to time appear on earth as Jaimini, Vyása, Patañjali, and S'ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishṇu and S'ankarshaṇa *alias* Ananta

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to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patañjali,* and Mahádeva himself appeared as S'ankara.† The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patañjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. Mádhava A'chárya of the 14th century is no authority for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patañjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion expressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doctrine as we have it in Patañjali's work is of post Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deductions made by Goldstücker and others regarding the age of Patañjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahábháshya, entirely undermining, as it does, the arguments of Professor Kunte as given in his 'Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.' It is true that the Yoga-sútra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (*maitri*), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (*Sarvadars ana-sangraha*, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is

* मध्यमं कांडमद्यर्तुमनुज्ञातो मयैव नौ ।
अवनौर्यांशतो भूमौ सङ्घर्षपतञ्जली ॥ १ । ५१ ।
मुनीभूत्वा मुदोपात्ति योगकाण्डमनौ क्षितौ ॥
अग्निमं ज्ञानकाण्डन्तूदरिष्यामीति देवताः । १ । ५२ ।

† यतीन्द्रः शङ्करोनाम्ना भविष्यामि महीतले ।
मद्वत्तथा भवन्तोऽपि मानुषीं तनुमाश्रिताः ॥ ४२

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common to all systems of religion, and reference to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but apart from them, I believe, I have produced sufficient evidence to show that Patañjali cannot reasonably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent, and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patañjali is frequently indicated by the homonym *phani* or 'serpent,' (*cf.* p. 1).

The references given of Patañjali in his Mahábháshya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr. Ward's notice. The sage describes himself as the son of one Goṇiká, not Satí, and his place of birth was the eastern country, whereas Ilávrata is said in the Puráṇas to lie to the north of the Himálaya. These facts are thus given by Goldstücker in his essay on Páṇini:

'Of the lineage of Patañjali all the knowledge I possess is, that the name of his mother was *Goṇiká*. It occurs in the last words of Patañjali on a Káriká to Páṇini. Of more importance, however, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily in *Káshmír*, for this circumstance throws some light on the interest which certain kings of this country took in the preservation of the great commentary.

'His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for he calls himself *Gonardiya;* and this word is given by the Káśiká in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patañjali's birthplace had therefore the name of *Gonarda*. But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence. Kaiyyaṭa calls him on several occasions *A'cháryadeśiya*. If we interpreted this word according to Páṇini's rules V, 3, 67 and 68, it would mean "an unaccomplished teacher;" but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyyaṭa intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patañjali, it is necessary to

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render the word by the teacher "who belongs to the country of the Áchárya." Now, since Kaiyyaṭa also distinctly contrasts *áchárya* as the author of the Várttikas, with *Ácháryadeśiya*, the latter epithet can only imply that Patañjali was a countryman of Kátyá. yana. Kátyáyana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school; Kaiyyaṭa, therefore, must have looked upon Patañjali also as belonging to it.

'Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhaṭṭojí Díkshita on the Phiṭ-sútras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the *eastern* grammarians attribute the accent in question of *saha* to Páṇini's rule VI, 3, 78, we find that it is *Patañjali* himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.' (Goldstücker's *Páṇini*, p. 237.)

Meagre as these notes on the life of Patañjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the 'Indian Antiquary' (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Müller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of *Juni* or *Chuni*. The learned professor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahábháshya, and then very pertinently asks, "Is this (*Juni*) possibly a name connected with Goṇiká, the mother of Patañjali, who calls himself Goṇikáputra, or with Gonarda, his supposed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gonardíya?" Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question.

In a note on a Páli inscription from Bhárhat, published in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a

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great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate illegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Goṇikáputra in the case of Patañjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, 'my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,' Patañjali might well appeal to his Mahábháshya as the root of his family tree.* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his 'History of Indian Literature' he has several remarks with reference to Patañjali in connection with the Vedic Kápya Patamchala. He says, on page 137, 'Again, though only in the Yájñavalkíya-káṇḍa, we have mention of a Kápya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Bráhmaṇical theology; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patañjali, the traditional founders of the Sánkhya, and Yoga systems.' This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 223,) in which it is said, 'The name of Patañjali (we should expect Pát.†) is certainly somehow

* Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, 'identifies Pingala with Patañjali, the author of Mahábháshya and the Yoga-sútra,' but he justly adds, it 'should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.' ('Hist. Indian Literature,' p. 231.)

† This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patañjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship.

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connected with that of the Patamchala Kápya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yájn̲avalkíya-kán̤da of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-sútras.' On page 236, we are told that, 'Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kápya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yájn̲avalkya-kán̤da of the Vṛihad A'ran̤yaka as a zealous representative of the Bráhman̤ical learning.' This is repeated on page 284,—'Kápya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.' It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kápya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Patan̲jali, and that as certainly as the phrase 'we cannot but see' can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be 'certainly' connected with Patan̲jali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can 'hardly be unconnected' with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase 'can hardly be unconnected' is replaced by 'ought probably to be connected.' No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kápya Patamchala was 'a zealous representative of the Bráhman̤ical learning.' It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying 'there is no proof that such a being existed,' and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kápya having been 'a zealous representative of the Hindu learn-

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ing,' unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted in atheism. It is obvious that the learned professor has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, unless he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an *ex cathedra* opinion, without any reason to back it. Kápya has the letters *k* and *p* and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patañjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, 'of a very curious kind.' It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the identity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kápya of the letter *l* of Kapila, and of *j* of Patañjali in Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-foundered his antagonist with the pithy remark: 'Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.' I have nothing to show that Patañjali was not connected with Kápya by the father's or the mother's or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture.

The son of a Bráhmaṇ priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patañjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was

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doubtless married and probably the father of a family, but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,—his great commentary on the grammar of Páṇini and the Yoga-sútra. It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the first. It is the noblest monument of profound erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philological perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an *A'ryyá-panchásáti* on the Vaishṇava theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed to him. The work has been published in the Benares 'Paṇḍit,' No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of *Ishṭis*, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit grammar (*Vártikas*), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the *Mahábháshya*. The manner in which they are cited in the 'great commentary' suggests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work.

To turn now to the Bibliography of the Yoga doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the *Yogánus'ásana*, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of subsequent treatises, and its literature is now represented

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by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' collected the names of 28 separate works. But recent researches carried on under the auspices of the Government of India enable me now to put in the Appendix a list including no less than 150 names. It is probable that further researches will bring to light the texts of several other works. It must be admitted, however, that while Mr. Hall's list was compiled by a single individual after himself examining all the Mss. named, thereby obviating all risks of error, mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it is likely, therefore, that there will be found in it mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably very few—of works unknown to, and unseen by, me I have recorded the same work under two or three names. I have included, too, a few works which treat of varieties of the Yoga, the Tántric and Puráṇic forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the doctrine of Patañjali. The differences in some cases are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions. On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be found useful.

In preparing my list I have followed an alphabetical arrangement, a chronological one with anything like accuracy not being practicable in the present state of our information on the subject. If the *Yoga-s'ástra-sútra-páṭha*, attributed to Yájñavalkya, be really his, it

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is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yájn̲avalkya lived long before Patan̲jali, and the Bháshya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the Yoga-sútra, which was compiled for the benefit of novices; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, 'It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yájn̲avalkya) were noted down by Baudháyana, as they were orally delivered by S'ukra to Yájn̲avalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S'ukra, who here has the epithet of Mahákavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it: but, it is, I suspect, of comparatively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.' (*Contributions*, p. 18.)

Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patan̲jali, the *Yoga-sútra* alias the *Yogánus'ásana* or the *Sánkhya-pravachana*. It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of *Yoga-bhdshya*, *Pátan̤jala-bháshya*, and *Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya*. It is held in high estimation by the Pan̤dits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by Váchaspati Mis'ra, and the other by Vijn̲ána Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvantage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once

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at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvivedí, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Váchaspati Mis'ra, edited by Paṇḍit Jívánanda Vidyáságara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen Mss. of it of different dates; but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author's name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author's name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyása, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata, is the author of it. This tradition has been generally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. Váchaspati Mis'ra in his gloss (*ṭíká*) on the commentary *(bháshya)* says, "Saluting the saint Patañjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (*vyákhyá*), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vyása."* The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much weight. There were two writers of this name. One of them was a legist, and, according to the colophon of his *S'udráchára-chintámaṇi*, court Paṇḍit of Mahárájá Harinárayaṇa, of Mithilá, and Harinárayaṇa lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and commented both on the Yoga and the S'ankhya texts, as well as on the Vedánta-sútras. Adverting to him

* नत्वा पतञ्जलिमृषिं वेदव्यासेन भाषिते ।
सङ्क्षिप्तस्पष्टवर्णार्था भाष्ये व्याख्या विधास्यते ॥

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Mr. Hall says, 'Váchaspati's exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapáda, in the *Nyáyasára-vichára* of Bhaṭṭa Rághava, which was written in the *Śaka* year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was reigning in A. D. 1042.'* (*Sánkhya-sára*, p. 40.)

Vijn̲ána Bhikshu dates from a much later time. According to Mr. Hall, 'in all probability, Vijn̲ána lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijn̲ána Bhikshu is, without question, the style of a devotee.' (*Sánkhya-sára*, pp. 37*f*.)

He continues, 'In the *Prayogaratna*, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Náráyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Rámes'vara Bhaṭṭa, its author says, that he was assisted,

* This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, whereas the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere constructively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' he observes, 'that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the *Rájamártaṇḍa*, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the *Sarasvatíkaṇṭhábharaṇa*; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranaraṅgamalla.' (*Contributions*, p. viii.)

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in preparing it, by Ananta Díkshita, son of Vis'vanátha Díkshita. The father of one of Vijn̲ána's disciples, Bhává-gaṇes'a Díkshita, was Bhává-vis'vanátha Díkshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis'vanátha Díkshita, and if Bhává-gaṇes'a Díkshita was brother of Ananta Díkshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijn̲ána Bhikshu. For Náráyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's youngest brother's second son, Raghunátha Bhaṭṭa, dates his *Kála-tattva-vivechana* in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijn̲ána may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier.' But whatever the times of Vijn̲ána Bhikshu and Váchaspati Mis'ra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many centuries before them.

The name Vyása may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyása was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahábhárata. In the Mahábhárata every epigraph gives the name of Vyása, and there is no reason why it should be omitted in the commentary. Then Vyása lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the beginning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief, and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patan̲jali, for we have unmistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Páṇini, Yáska, the Prátis'ákhyas, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a *raison d'étre* before the Yoga-sútra was

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composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Christian era. That exegesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyása. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahábhárata could be the author of the Bháshya under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bháshya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the 'great commentary' of Patañjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S'ankara on the Vedánta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svámí on the Mímáñsá; and, whatever his age, Vyása was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patañjali, or Sabara, or S'ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an indecision, a want of logical precision, in the Bháshya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyása's learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasam. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, 'all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,' (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing discredit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al-

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together unauthorised. The invocation at the beginning of the Bháshya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Ṛishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vyása would be the last to pray to Mahádeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bháshya. The tone of the Bháshya is that of a third class mediæval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Its author may have borne the name of Vyása, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages.

The next commentary I have to notice is the *Rájamártaṇḍa*, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious as the last. It styles itself a *vṛitti* or gloss, whereas the other is a *Bháshya* or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, 'Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons,' (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it

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certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text.

It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dhárá, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Maharájádhirája Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (*cf.* my 'Indo-Aryans,' II, pp. 385*f*,) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the *Bhojaprabandha* and a sovereign of Dhárá in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the title of *Rájamṛigánka*, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the *Bhojaprabandha* to its hero. On the other hand, that hero is known to have written or published in his name a work on judicial astrology as bearing on Smṛiti rites, under the name of *Rájamártaṇḍa*, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduction to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether

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left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the Yoga exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the Yoga gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the *Rájamártaṇḍa* is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the S'ánkhya bearing the name of Rájávártika, which is believed to have been dedicated to Ranarangamalla. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the Bhoja of the 10th century, who was also a king of Dhárá. Adverting to him, Mr. Hall says, "That two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever were the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the *Rájamártaṇḍa* and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the *Yoga* work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the *Sarasvatí-kaṇṭhábharaṇa*; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, Raṇarangamalla.' (*Contributions*, p. viii.)

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Of the other commentaries on the Yoga-Sútra, the works of Bhavadeva, Nágojí Bhaṭṭa, Bhává-gaṇes'a, Udayankara, Nages'a Bhaṭṭa, Náráyaṇa Bhikshu, Sadás'iva, Rámánanda Tírtha, Mahádeva, Ananta, S'ankara, Umápati Tripáṭhí, and Kshemánanda, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of Bhoja, and call for no special remark here.

The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which Yogís resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of Patañjali, suited to Vaishṇava, Sáiva, and Sákta forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidiance in, or union with, the Divinity.

Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the *Haṭha-pradípiká* or *Haṭha-dípiká*. It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 chapters or lessons, (*Upades'a*), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or *mudrás*, and the fourth of Samádhi. Its author is one Chintámaṇi, son of Sahajánanda, but this name of his was what he got when living as a householder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of S'vátmáráma, and received the title of Yogíndra, and is now generally known by the name of S'vátmárama Yogíndra. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, "By Yogis wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when

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kept secret, and worthless when disclosed."* Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by round-about metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named *Haṭha vidyá*, or the science of the letters *ha* and *ṭha*, *ha* meaning the sun and *ṭha* the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate meaning of Haṭha-vidyá is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions, Svátmáráma, indulges at times in language of a grossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, "let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack *(váruṇí)* be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a kulína (a noble householder); the rest are destroyers of their nobility."† Here beef *gomáñsa* stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and *váruṇí* means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: "Let the youthful chaste widow be ravished on the land between the rivers Ganges and Yamuná; it is the highest glory of Vishṇu."‡ Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of

* षठविद्या परं गोप्या योगिना सिद्धिमिच्छता।
भवेद्वीर्य्यवती गुप्ता निर्वीर्य्या तु प्रकाशिता॥

† गोमांसं भक्षयेन्नित्यं पिबेदमरवारुणीं।
कुलीनं तमहं मन्ये इतरे कुलघातकाः॥

‡ गङ्गायमुनयोर्मध्ये बालरण्डां तपस्विनीं।
बलात्कारेण गृह्णीयात्तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं॥

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allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many mediæval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty renowned Yogís who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear A'dinátha, who is generally identified with S'iva, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogís. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmánanda, the author of the *Jyotsná*, is reckoned to be the ablest.

It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sapásiyáns obtained it in its entirety. They believed on efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogís did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samádhi; they claimed occult powers* of the same nature and character as

* 'Of these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun's disk; causing him to appear at night; making the stars visible in the day-time: and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water; making trees productive out of season; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the *Barmgah-i-durvcshí-khushí*. They relate that these great per-

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did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsychosis; and, if they looked upon union with the Supreme Divinity as the *summum bonum* of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patañjali, but not independent of it. (*Cf.* *Dabistán* I, pp. 5*f.*) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sapásiyáns was founded upon any translation of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communication. Some of the Sapásiyáns admitted their obligation to Hindustán, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived.

Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patañjali. The work is no longer

sonages were to such a degree enabled to divest themselves of corporeal elements that they quitted the body at pleasure; also that they had acquired from the court of heaven the knowledge of all sciences, whether known or occult, and *consequently* had the power of exhibiting such wonderful works; having rendered, by the efficacy of their austerities, elementary matters subject to themselves." (*Troyer and Shea's Dabistán i Muzahib*, II, pp. 107*f.*)

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extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhán al Niráni, in his Tárikh-ul Hind, which formed a part of his famous Kánún-i-Mas'údi (A. D. 1025-36), says, 'I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one discusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled Sánkhya, the other is known under the title of Patañjali, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.' (Elliot's Historians, I, p. 99; *Journal Asiatique*, IV serie, tom. IV, p. 121; Reinaud's *Fragments Arabs et Persans.*) It does not appear that any Persian version of Patañjali was ever taken in hand in the time of Akbar and his successor, when so many Sanskrit works were rendered into that language. There is, however, an abstract of the Yoga doctrine in the Dabistán-i-Muzaháb of Mahsin-i Fáni. That author flourished in the middle of the 17th century, and, during a long residence at Allahabad as the Chief Judge (*Sudder*), collected a great deal of information on the subject. Depending evidently on oral information, he could not avoid gross mistakes in his account of the philosophy, but in regard to the details of Yoga exercises and the occult powers he has compiled as reliable an exposition as could be expected from such a source. He notices Gorakhanátha and several other celebrated saints, and states that he had seen some Yogís possessed of wonderful occult powers, but he does not name Patañjali. (*cf. Shea and Troyer's Translation*, II, pp. 123*f.*)

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In English the first attempt to give an account of the Yoga doctrine was made by Ward in his account of the Hindus, but it did not produce any satisfactory result. Colebrooke's resumè in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, is much more philosophic in spirit and faithful in details, but Colebrooke took it up only casually in connexion with his essay on the S'ánkhya, and did not notice much more than the first chapter of the work. Taylor, in the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavadgitá, supplies the Kriyá-yoga with considerable fulness, and Windischmann's account, though brief, is tolerably good. In 1853 Dr. Ballantyne published a translation of the first two chapters of the Yoga-sútra with extracts from the commentary of Bhojadeva, and from it abstracts of the Yoga system have been compiled by Dr. K. M. Banerjea, and Rev. Mr. Mullins. The translation of Ballantyne was completed, in a disjointed way, by Paṇḍit Govindaram Sástrí in the pages of a Benares magazine called the "Pandit." The two fragments have lately been printed together by the Theosophical Society of Bombay. The text with an original commentary together with an English translation is now being printed in the *Saḍdarsana-chintaniká* of Bombay, and an abstract of the text occurs in Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-sangraha*. An account of Yoga practices may also be seen in a pamphlet by Nabinchandra Pál, published at Benares.

Little need be said in praise of Dr. Ballantyne's work. The profound learning and thorough conservancy with Hindu philosophy which that learned

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scholar brought to bear on his undertaking, enabled him to produce a very accurate reproduction of the original. In his anxiety, however, to be accurate he had occasion to resort too frequently to parenthetical clauses, and they resulted in confused sentences, involving much trouble in understanding them. His extracts from the commentary are particularly amenable to this objection. The extracts, moreover, are somewhat disjointed.

When the Asiatic Society of Bengal first proposed to publish an edition of the Yoga-sútra with the commentary of Bhojadeva, I undertook to reprint Dr. Ballantyne's translation with such additions as would complete the work. I soon found, however, that my work placed beside his produced a very patchy appearance, and his parenthetical style was not desirable for a proper and easy understanding of the text. I preferred, therefore, to translate the whole in my own way. The aphorisms will be found to be as closely literal as the idiom of the English language would admit of, and the commentary a fair reproduction of the spirit, sense and wording of the original, without being a verbatim reproduction.

Much difficulty has been felt in the treatment of the technical terms. Philosophical terms in the English language have not yet arrived at that fixity and firmness which would preclude possible variations. Different writers assign different values to even well-established terms, and their latitude is frequently varying; and such as they are, they are not exact equivalents of Sanskrit words, which in their turn vary

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in meaning under different circumstances and in the hands of different writers. There are instances, too, of Sanskrit terms whose literal significations are very different from the philosophical ideas they are intended to convey, and in dealing with them, the translator has either to sacrifice precision of rendering for the sake of intelligibility, or intelligibility for the sake of precision. In the following pages I have borrowed the terms mostly from Colebrooke's translation of the *Sánkhya-kariká*, translating a few myself, and transliterating the Sanskrit terms in some cases. My reasons I have explained as far as I could in my notes.

When I undertook the task I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogí; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Paṇḍit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupillage under Hindu rules—living in his hut and ever following his footsteps—to which I could not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of Patañjali, availing myself frequently of the aid of my learned friend Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, for the solution of difficulties. I had the assistance, too, of Professor Kámákhyánátha Tarkaratna, of that College, both in revising the text and in translating it. Both the Professors are distinguished

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Nyáya scholars, and Paṇḍit Mahes'achandra commands a deep knowledge of the Sánkhya, and with their aid, I believe, I have been able to avoid gross misinterpretations of the text, though I cannot flatter myself with the idea that I have been able always satisfactorily to expound the meaning of Patañjali.

Manuscripts of the Yoga-sútra are common enough in Bengal, but I have not met with any particularly old, or exceptionally correct text. In carrying the text and commentary through the press, I had the use of the following codices:

A. From the Asiatic Society's Library, yellow paper 13 × 11 inches, bound in a 4to. volume. Bengali character. Lines, 27 on a page. Incorrect.

B. From the Sanskrit College of Calcutta, yellow paper, 17 × 4 inches, puthi form. Folia, 35. Character, Bengali. Generally correct.

C. From ditto, Káshmírí paper, 10 × 4½ inches. Folia, 69. Character, well-written Nágarí. Date, Samvat, 1850. Generally correct.

D. From the Benares College, Káshmírí paper, 11 × 5 inches. Folia, 30. Character, Nágari. Incorrect and incomplete.

E. From Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, Calcutta, yellow paper, 15 × 4 inches. Folia, 55. Character, Bengali. Generally correct. First chapter revised.

G. Ballantyne's reprint annexed to his translation.

H. From Bombay, copied for me from a MS. belonging to the Government collection preserved in

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the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Generally correct.

I. From my family Library, a quarto volume in Bengali. Corrupt and little used.

In the text of Patañjali, no variation of any note has been met with in the above codices. The work appears to have been preserved with every care, as may be presumed from the circumstance of its having enjoyed the benefit of a host of commentaries and glosses. The commentary of Bhoja has not been so correctly preserved. There are many differences of reading in the different codices. But on the whole the differences are not so material as would justify the assumption of different recensions, or produce any marked changes in the meaning of the author.

8 MANIKTOLLAH,
January 28, 1883.

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ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page	vii	*line*	15	*for*	*chittva*	*read* chitta
	„	„	27	„	some theory in a more	*read* the theory of unreality in a
	xiv	„	8	„	alternative	„ resource
	„	„	20		and its object is worldly enjoyment,	*read* its object is worldly injoyment ;
	xxxv	„	4	„	birth	„ breath
	„	„	24	„	rapine	„ repine
	xlvii	„	26	„	produce	„ produces
	lxii	„	29	„	Such a	„ If it did, the
	lxxx	„	6	*after* Bhâshya, *add* Vyâsa himself is the author of a different system of Philosophy, and one cannot reasonably suppose that he would condescend to expound the text-book of an adverse school.		
	„	„	11	*after* this day ; *add, as a footnote,* Brahmanya Tîrtha had a pupil named Vyâsa, who wrote the *Tâtparya-chandrikâ* on the Vedânta Sûtra.		
	17	„	1	*for*	cive	*read* conducive
	19	„	18	„	samâptti	„ samâpatti
	43	„	25	„	thum	„ thumb
	61	„	30	„	word	„ phrase
	77	„	24	„	*dṛishṭâ*	„ *drashṭâ.*
	78	„	15	„	the purpose of for	„ for the purpose of
	83	„	9	„	n	„ in
	91	„	28	„	devotion	„ steadfastness
	96	„	30	„	and naturally hostile individuals having acquired it live	*read* and even naturally hostile beings live beside those who have acquired it

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114	„	20-21	„	steadiness	„	steadfastness
135	„	8	„	(*anyatva*)	„	*anyatva*
152	„	27	„	out	„	out of,
158	„	1	*after*	attainment of greatness	*add*	or unlimited reach of organs such as
164	„	25-27	*for*	country	*read*	situation
168	„	16	„	the perfections	„	Perfections
„	„	22	„	boy	„	body
175	„	28	„	eteology	„	etiology
176	„	7	„	he	„	the author

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(*Sanskrit.*)

पृष्ठं	पङ्क्तिः	अशुद्धं	शुद्धं
१	१	मत्युक्तिभिः	मित्युक्तिभिः
५	१	परिणामाय	परिणामार्थं
८	१	विश्रया	विषया
१०	१४	भावना	भावना
११	१	जडानि	जडानि
१२	७	मंदीत	मंदीद
१३	१	नामस्व	नामस्व
१३	४	निराध	निरोध
१६	१	'आश्रयाः'	'आश्रयाः'
१८	६-११	स्थान	स्थान
१८	१०	रैकाग्र	रैकाग्र
२०	१०	यद्वाधात्	यद्बाधात्
२२	१५	जीयमाद्दः	जीयमानः
२३	४,५,६,७	सम्वित्	संवित्
२४	१६	परमात्मनः	परमात्मनः
२७	५	उक्तं।	उक्तं तत् चक्षिद्रूपर्य्यवसानं।
२४	७	सात्विकः	सात्त्विकः
२६	६	सुखसंवित्	सुखसंवित्
४०	१५	निर्दिष्टं	निर्दिष्टं
४५	१०	ज्ञेया,	ज्ञेयाः,
४६	६	'ग्रानदीग्नि''	'ग्रानदीग्निः'
४७	१	प्रद्यायामस्थैर्य्यं	प्राद्यायामस्थैर्य्यं
५०	१३	संशयविपर्य्यासरूपं	संशयविपर्य्यासरूपं
५१	१	'ग्रह्मचर्य्यं',	'ग्रह्मचर्य्यं'
५६	१२	स्वरूपं	स्वरूपं
५७	७	प्रद्यायामानलिधाय	प्राद्यायाम्यनलिधाय
५७	१८	प्रद्यायामात्	प्राद्यायामात्
५८	१	प्रद्यायामैः	प्राद्यायामः

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५९	१	ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण	ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेव
९१	१	ज्ञयं	ज्ञेयं
९८	७	सर्व्वार्थेप्रत्व	सर्व्वार्थेप्रत्व
९९	७	अनेनाभिप्रावेनैवेन	अनेनाभिप्रावेदैवेव
७७	८	अधिष्ठातृरूपः	अधिष्ठातृरूपः
७७	८	भोक्तृरूपत्वात्	भोक्तृरूपत्वात्
१०४	११	विवेकाप्रत्वाद्भोक्तरपि	विवेकाप्रत्वाद्भोक्तरपि

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THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Gaṇeśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of S'iva and his spouse (S'ivá) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal S'iva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ which besets mankind.

3. That unprecedented work § of the sage Patañjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (*Purusha*) from nature (*Prakṛiti*) to be Yoga‖ (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

---

* A fit of jealousy, according to the Káliká Puráṇa, had caused a temporary separation between S'iva and his spouse Durgá. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. *Vide* p. 207.

‡ Viz., lst, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. *Vide* Wilson's Sáṅkhya-káriká, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

‖ A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment of, lit. disunion from (*viyoga*), the world is a *conditio sine qua non* to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source.

¶ Patañjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. *Vide* Introduction, p. lxvii.

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even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Raṇarañgamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patañjali, and written on medicine a treatise called the Râjamṛigáñka†—may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

---

* A title of Bhoja.
† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
‡ "Commentators each dark passage shun—
And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun."
St. Jerome "not versions but inversions."
Italian, *Traduttori traditori* "Translators traitors."
"Surrender rather than render;
Not turning, but overturning."

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---

* A fit of jealousy, according to the Káliká Puráṇa, had caused a temporary separation between Śiva and his spouse Durgá. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Escaping from transmigration in one of four different ways, all implying equality with the Divinity in some way or other. These are: 1st, *Sárshṭi*, or the enjoyment of equal supremacy with the Divine Soul; 2nd, *Sálokya*, or getting abode in the same region with the Divinity; 3rd, *Sáyujya*, or the merging of the human into the divine, from intimate union; and 4th, *Sárúpya*, or obtaining of the form of the Divinity. The 3rd is also indicated by the term *Kaivalya*, the word used in the text. It means abstraction or separation from nature and the products thereof.

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. *Vide* Wilson's Sáṅkya-káriká, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

‖ A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment lit. disunion (viyoga) from the world is a *conditio sine qua non* to the Yoga which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is abstraction from sensuous objects is concentration in the Divinity.

¶ Various causes have been assigned for this title of Patañjali. *Vide* Introduction.

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even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Raṇarañgamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patañjali, and written a treatise on medicine called the Rájamrigáñka†—may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning fo their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mistifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting its inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

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* A title of Bhoja.
† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
‡ "Commentators each dark passage shun—
And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun."
St. Jerome "not versions but inversions."
Italian, *Traduttori traditori* "Translators traitors."
"Surrender rather than render;
Not turning, but overturning."

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CHAPTER FIRST.

Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made).

This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) "Now"* (*atha*) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction.

(The word) *Yoga* means 'union,' or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root *yug* "to meditate." An "exposition" (*anus'ásana*) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words *Yoga* and *anus'ásana* form the compound) *Yoganus'ásana*, (which means) "an exposition of the Yoga." This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patañjali).

Yoga, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the Yoga. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between Yoga, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (*Kaivalya*), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the Yoga which is its subject—that Yoga the accomplishment of which leads to the consummation of emancipation called *Kaivalya*.

[Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word Yoga into "concentration." That English word, however, in its ordinary signification, does

* Dr. Ballantyne's text has *athátah* "now then."

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not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coining a new one. The commentator so explains the word *Anus'ásana* as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named *Pátanjala-bháshya* takes it along with the word Yoga to be the specific name of the work. (*Yogáns'ásanam náma s'ástram*). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, "Now, the (work called) Yogánuśásana, (will be expounded)." Váchaspati Miśra, the annotator on the last named work, and Vijñána-bhikshu in his *Vártika*, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patañjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Hiraṇya-garbha was the first performer of the Yoga; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. *Nanu hiraṇyagarbao yogasya kartá nányah purátana iti yogiyájña-valkyasmṛiteh, katham patañjaler yoga-śástritvamityás'aṅkya sútrakáreṇa anus'ásanamítyuktam, s'ishṭashyánusásanam.*)]

Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies :—

II.

Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.

"Thinking principle" (*chitta*) is of the form of goodness without a taint. "Functions" (*vṛitti*) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. "Yoga" or meditation is described to be the "suppression" (*nirodha*), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of

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the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (*kshipta*) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (*rajas*). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (*múḍha*) proceeds from an excess of darkness (*tamas*). It is common to demons (Rákshasas), ghosts (Pis'áchas), &c. Voluptuousness (*vikshipta*) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (*sattva*), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c. in a disorderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, *viz.*, concentration and suppression, that in which

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the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *chitta* which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word *manas* "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy —*i. e.*, "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills," (Taylor, *Elements of Thought,*) "or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, *Hermes*, p. 227)—he is right. In the Sáñkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart *manas* has been used in the same sense (*Mahadákhyamádyam káryam tanmanah*, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sáñkhya aphorisms the word *chitta* does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyáya. The Vedántists use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (*Vedánta-sára*). Its equivalent in the Sáñkhya is *Adhyavasáya*, which is synonymous with *Buddhi*. (*Adhyavasáyo buddhih*, II, 13). It is called *Mahat* "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (*Mahattvam svetara-sakalakárya-vyápakatvan-mahaiśvaryáchcha.*) It is *mati* "understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (*manyati anayá*) ; *khyáti* "familiar knowledge;" *jñána*, and *prajñá*. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by *chitta* is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sánkhya does, and by say-

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the tendency outward, of the functions in question. The form is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. That suppression being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—unquietness, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of unquietness (*kshipta*) is induced by the access of the quality of foulness (*rajas*). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, and Titans, sons of Danu &c. Addiction to evil action without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (*múḍha*) proceeds from an excess of darkness (*tamas*). It is common to demons (Rákshasas) and ghosts, (Piśáchas) &c. Voluptuousness (*vikshipta*) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness, (*sattva*), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes active (or desirous); by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression having an excess of the quality of the goodness and foulness, successively placed, are reckoned fit for that.

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ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (*Vṛitti-nirodhát tatsiddhih*, III, 31). Thus Váchaspati Miśra—*chitta-s'abdenántahkaraṇam buddhimupalakshayati.* According to the order of creation *prakṛitri* comes first, thence *chitta*, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtile organs &c., and this both according to the Sáṅkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is *vṛitti.* I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into "functions." The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijṇána Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which *prakṛiti* is the materiality. (*Pariṇámarúpam jagadupádánakatvantu-prakṛititvam.*) *Pariṇáma* or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying "they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions." Vijṇána Bhikshu calls it transformation of Prakṛiti, (*prakṛitivirúpam*). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne's use of the term "modification" affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is *nirodha*, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The *Pátanjala-bháshya* points this out by saying that since the word *sarva* "all" has not been used before *vṛitti* "functions," the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (*Sarvasabdágrahanát samprajṇátopi Yogah*). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]

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Now the author of the Sútras, wishing to describe the words *chitta-vṛitti-nirodhah*, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word *chitta*.

III.

Then (*i. e.* at the time of meditation) there is abidance of the spectator in its own form.

"Then," at that time, the soul, as "the spectator," (*dṛashṭá*) "abides" remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one's self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form.

[The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influenced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions being stopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul.]

What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, *i. e.* other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies:

IV.

At other times it is in the same form as its functions.

"At other times"—*i. e.*, at times other than that of meditation. Its "functions" are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) "In the same form" means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, involving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul *i. e.*, it appears so to itself. If so, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentration, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which

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being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle *chitta*.

[It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants].

To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says:—

V.

The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not painful.

The "functions" (*vṛitti*) are certain modifications of the thinking principle. The word *pañchatayi* (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix *tayap* (Páṇini v. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant.

How are they? They are painful or not painful. "Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful."

[This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapíla's aphorism 33, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subsequent aphorisms].

The five functions are to be described after being named.

VI.

(The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory.

Of these the author gives the definitions successively.

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VII.

Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

"Perception" (*pratyaksha*) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

"Inference" (*anumána*) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is "testimony," (*ágama*).

[*Pramáṇa* means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, *i. e.*, evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sáṅkhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sáṅkhya-káriká they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyáyikas, however, reckon four kinds, *viz.*, preception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumána*), comparison (*upamána*), and testimony (*śabda*). The Vedántís follow this latter, and the Mímáñskas recognise six, *viz.*, perception (*pratyaksha*), presumption (*arthápatti*), proportion (*sambhava*), privation (*abháva*), comprehension (*pratibha*), and oral communication (*aitihya*).

The word used for perception is *pratyaksha*, which means "that which is seen," but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception,

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"evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." For testimony Patañjali gives *ágama*, which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym *áptavachana* "reliable words"; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony].

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.

VIII.

Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object.

"Misconception" (*viparyaya*) is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not; as the notion of silver in mother-o'pearl. "Which abides in a form which is not that of its object" is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt *(sañsaya)* founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a particular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception.

To describe the function of Fancy, he says:

IX.

Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality).

Knowledge dependant on words is *śabda-jñána*. That which follows it, is *śabda-jñánánupáti* (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word "notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words"). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object

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is "Fancy." Thus the words, "the intelligence of the soul (*purusha*) is its own form." Here a notion is assumed by admitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase "the blanket of Devadatta," though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed).

["In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among these fancy next
Her office holds; of all eternal things
Which the five watchful senses represents
She forms imagination's airy shapes,"
Paradise Lost, B. V.]

In order to declare what Sleep is, he says:

X.

Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing.

Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (*abhávapratyayá.*) Hence it follows that "Sleep" (*nidrá*) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that "I slept pleasantly," which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function.

In order to describe Memory, he says:

XI.

Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised.

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"The not letting go" (*asampramosha*) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence is "Memory" (*smṛiti*).

Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fancy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it is a Dream (*svapna.*) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep.

[Bishop Hall says, "Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been." It is said to be dependant on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes.]

Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II,) of these with the means thereof, he says:

XII.

The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion.

"Exercise" (*abhyása*) and Dispassion" (*vairágya*) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is "suppression" *(nirodha)*. What is meant is the placing of the functions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on external objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes.

Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by "Dispassion" resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle), and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by "Exercise," which makes it a source of happiness and quiet; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed.

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[The purport of this aphorism has been given by Kapila in six aphorisms, 31 to 36 of Book III.]

With a view to describe Exercise, he says:

XIII.

Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the thinking principle) shall remain in its functionless state.

Sthiti or "functionless state" is that condition of the thinking principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is "Exercise" or *abhyása*.

He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise).

XIV.

It is again a firm ground attained by proper devotion for a long time unintermittingly.

It (Exercise) is a firm ground, *i. e.*, it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness.

He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.)

XV.

The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion.

Objects are of two kinds, "Perceptible" (*drishṭa*) and "Scriptural" (*ánus'ravika*). The Perceptible is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs).

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That which is heard (*anus'rúyate*) from the mouth of a preceptor is *anus'rava* or the Veda. What comes to our knowledge therefrom (*i. e.*, from the Veda) is what is meant by "one heard of" *ánus'ravika*. Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion *(Vairágya.)*

[The word *Vairágya* (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix *vi*, and *rága*, 'affection,' 'prepossession,' 'love,' 'desire,' the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed.

The word *vas'ikára-sanjńá* literally means "consciousness of being able to subjugate," in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the *Pátanjala Bháshya:* "devoid of hatred and desirability" (*heyopádeya-sunyá*); and Váchaspati Miśra explains the phrase by the words "a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred" (*ásaktgadvesharahitá upekshábuddhih*).

The word rendered into 'perceptible' is *drishṭa* 'seen;' but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, &c., (*Sánkhya-káriká*. V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The *Pátanjala Bháshya* illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (*striyonnapánamaiśvaryamiti*). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "seen," which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite

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inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into "temporal" which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with *adrishṭa*, the antonym of *drishṭa*, in which case *non-temporal* would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; *the unseen* is in that case the best.

The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is *ánuśravika*, which means "that which has been heard from another," but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of *ánuśrava* is the Veda, which is also called *śruti*, or "that which has been heard," and the object is to imply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym '*revealed*.' The *Pátañjala Bháshya* takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudimental body, and dissolution into nature (*svargavaidehyaprakṛitilayah*). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the *Sáṅkhya-káriká*: "The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others." (Wilson's Sáṅkhya-káriká, p. 13). In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.]

A peculiarity in it is to be described.

XVI.

Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a knowledge of God.

"It" *i. e.*, "Dispassion." "Highest" (*para*) the most estimable. The first degree of "Dispassion" (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is

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cive to a knowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation.

[The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called *visaya-vairágya*, and the other to qualities, *i. e.*, to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrete, (*vyaktávyaktadharmakebhyoviraktah*). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word *para* is the leading term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by reducing it into a predicate. He says "This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities." This is obviously not the right meaning.]

Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (*samprajñáta*) and that in which consciousness is lost (*asamprajñáta*).

XVII.

Conscious, because it is attended with argumentation, deliberation, joy and egoism.

The word "meditation" (*samádhi*) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.

That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, *i. e.*, makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pondered is "Conscious meditation," (*samprajñáta samádhi*). *Samádhi* or meditation is a kind of pondering (*bhávaná*.) The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered is Conscious or Discriminative meditation; it is the same with "Seeded meditation"—*savíja-samádhi*. And from there being distinctions of argumentation, &c., it is of four kinds, (namely) 1st, the "Argumentative" *(savitarka)*; 2nd,

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the "Deliberative" *(savichára)*; 3rd, the "Joyous" *(sánanda)*; and 4th, the "Egoistic" *(sásmita)*. "Pondering" is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds; the Godhead *(is'vara)*, and the categories or principles *(tattvas)*. The last again are of two kinds according as they are "irrational" or "rational." The irrational are the twenty-four; the rational is the soul.

Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is consequent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called 'Argumentative meditation' *(savitarka-samádhi)*. Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, it would be called "Non-argumentative" *(nirvitarka)*. When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtile, as the subtile elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is "Deliberative" *(savichára)*. But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be "Non-deliberative" *(nirvichára)*. What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. *(Gráhya-samápatti.)*

When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes "Joyous" *(sánanda)*. In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other *(i. e.*, last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word "bodiless" *(videha)*, because they have risen above their body and egotism. This is the Acceptance Form. *(Grahaṇa-samápatti.)*

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Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (*sasmita*), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) *I* (*i. e.*, with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it is egotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it is egoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be *Prakṛitilaya* 'resolved into nature.'

Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, *Grihitṛi-samáptti.*

Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, *samprajṇáta-samádhi.*

[Meditation is described to be of two kinds, 1st, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected ed upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categories of the Sáṅkhya system which the Yoga school adopts; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative applies to subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When that quality attains ascendancy the meditation becomes "Joyous;" and it

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ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes disembodied. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primæval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration: on the evolution of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Non-argumentative and the Non-deliberative; and these four form a class called the *tangible forms*.

The next is the "Joyous" kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the "acceptance form." In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the "Egoistic," in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the "acceptor" form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism.]

The author now describes that form of meditation in which consciousness is lost, *asamprajñáta*.

XVIII.

The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection.

By *viráma* is meant that whereby rejection takes place, *i. e.*, the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). *Pratyaya*, "thought," added to *viráma*, "cause of rejection," produces the compound expression *viráma-pratyaya*. Exercise (*abhyása*) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega-

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tive, "not this, not this," whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it is *asamprajñáta-samádhi*. In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscriminative, or seedless meditation (*nirvíja*).

Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking, commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppression are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of commencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concentration.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *Sañskára*, and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been explained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the *Pátanjala Bháshya*. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyáya it occurs frequently in three different senses, *viz.*, velocity (*vega*), thinking (*bhávaná*), and elasticity (*sthitisthápaka*). (*Tarka-sañgraha*). Adverting to the second meaning the *Bhásá-parichchheda*, says: "Sañskára, called thinking, (*bhávaná,*) resides in sentient beings; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty

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which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition." (*Bhávanákhyástu sanskáro jívavrittiratíndryah.*

Upekshánátmakastasya nischayah káraṇam bhavet.

Smarane pratyabhijñáyámapyasau heturuchyate.)

Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his translation of the *Bháshá-parichchheda,* for there it is described to be the cause of memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation, nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "self-reproduction of thought;" but there is nothing like "self-reproduction" in it; for it is said to be revived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is something then—a trace, a mark, a celule, a psychograph—which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell ('Mental Philosophy,' p. 95) "When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not *absolutely lost;* for, if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be *something* deposited within us which subsists *permanently,* and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This *something,* then, we term a *residuum,* using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever." The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Sañskára. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or residua so obtained constitute the sum total of

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our experience, and these are *Sañskáras*. According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother's breast from the *sanskára* it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence.

The next word is *s'esha*, and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means 'remainder' 'balance,' or 'end.' Compounded with *sañskára* the meaning is that in which the remainders are the sañskáras, or that in which the sañskáras are ended, or brought to a close. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous *sañskáras* or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are destroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious meditation is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The *Pátañjala Bháshya* takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the residua alone remain behind. *(Sarva-vṛittipratyastamaya-sañskára-śeshah nirodhah.)* And Váchaspati Miśra emphasizes this by adding the word "alone"—sañskáras alone remain—(*sanskára-mátra śeshah.*) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the *Pátanjala-bháshya* has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Unconscious meditation, and that that meditation is often practiced, and in such cases the sañskáras must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Patañjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word *śesha* would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the *Pátañjala Bháshya*. See A. L. at the end of the chapter.

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The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot he acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconsious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Váchaspati Miśra says—"the first word in the aphorism (which I have rendered into 'preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejection,' and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) describes the means, and the other two define the nature of the meditation in question" *(púrvapaderupáyakathanamuttarábhyam cha svarúpa-kathanam)*. Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the *conditio precedent*. His version is "The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose;—the other [—independent of any fresh antedecent—] is in the shape of the self-reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects.]" After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that it is not at all usual with authors of Sútras to repeat in a subsequent sútra what has been already explained in a previous one.]

Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of *Yoga*, and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully.

XIX.

Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unembodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause.

The "unembodied" (*videha*) and the "resolved into nature" *(prakṛitilaya)* have been described in the aphorism on the argumentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.)

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Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word *bhava-prataya* is formed of *bhava* 'world' and *pratyaya* 'cause.'

The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participators of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscient of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga. Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, with a view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said.

[In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primæval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earth earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or Prakṛití is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as preparatory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed.]

Of others :—

XX.

(In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

"Of others" *i. e.*, of Yogís, other than (those who have been described as) "the disembodied" and "the resolved in nature." "Preceded by inclination" &c.; that meditation which has *śraddhá* &c. as the first means, is called *śraddhádipúrvaka*. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, *i. e.* they serve as the means or instruments for the Conscious meditation. Thereof "Inclination" (*śraddhá*) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. "Energy" (*vírya*) is strenuous exertion. "Memory" (*smṛiti*) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) "Meditation" (*samádhi*) is intentness on a single point.

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"Discernment" *(prajñá)* is thorough understanding of that which is to be known. Now, he who has "Inclination" gets "Energy," or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of "Energy" comes "Memory" of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues.

[This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career as a Yogí. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided.]

Of the Yogís possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different expedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object).

XXI.

Proximate for the ardently impetuous.

(To complete the aphorism the words:) "The attainment of the state of meditation" are required to be supplied. "Impetuous" (*sañvega*), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. "Ardent" (*tivra*), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Meditation is "proximate" (*ásanna*). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, *i. e.*, quickly accomplished.

[Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogís, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be "ardently impetuous" to ensure quick reward.]

Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies.

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XXII.

There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive.

There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these expedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are "mild" (*mṛidu*), "moderate" (*madhya*), and "excessive" (*adhimátra*). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into "the mildly impetuous," "the moderately impetuous" and "the excessively impetuous." And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogís. The mild expedients are (severally) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The moderate expedients are (also) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The excessive expedients are (likewise), "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the "ardently impetuous" form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogís.

[The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogís into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and so each of the three orders has three sub-divisions, making a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogís should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed.]

Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preceding expedients.

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XXIII.

Or by devotion to God.

"God" *(Íśvara)* will be described presently (A. XXIV). "Devotion" (*praṇidhána*) is a form of resignation to Him. It is thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one's actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to Him, the preëminent guide, is "devotion," *praṇidhána*. This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition.

[In this aphorism the author departs from the Sáñkhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, is evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gítá this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there it appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patañjali adopts it as a sort of compromise to give a theistic character to his system; but it plays only a very subordinate part.]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

XXIV.

God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.

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Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (*kleśah*). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (*karma*), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the S'ástras), as also what are mixed, *i. e.*, partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are "deserts" (*vipáka*). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (*ásaya*). "Untouched," (*aparámrishṭa,*) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (*Purusha-viśesha*), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (*I'śvara*) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom aud almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of *Prakṛiti* and *Purusha* cannot happen except by the will of that Íśvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogí, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with Íśvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Íśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by S'ástric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor

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is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *Ísvara*. Derived from the root *Ís*, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is *purusha*, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (*shete*) in the body (*pure*); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life (Ψυχή) and spirit, or rational life (Πνεύμα) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patañjali did not much care for the Vedántic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Áchárya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patañjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápáśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as S'iva,—the Vaishṇavas as Puru-

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Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (*kleśah*). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (*karma*), such as are enjoined or prohibited (in the S'ástras), as also such as are mixed, *i. e.*, partly one and partly the other. What ripens out of those works are "deserts" *(vipáka)*. They are the results of actions, such as caste, existence, and enjoyment. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires *(ásaya)*. "Untouched," *(aparámrishṭa,)* free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" *(purusha-viśesha)*, who is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (*Íśvara*) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of troubles does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the troubles abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the troubles in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to His sempeternal greatness in the quality of goodness. This greatness is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependant, His wisdom and greatness are not mutually dependant, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that greatness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of *Prakṛiti* and *Purusha* cannot happen except by the will of that Íśvara. In ordinary beings, the thinking principle is modified into pleasure, pain and delusion, but in the body of the Yogí, being touched by the reflection of the thinking principle (in its purity) it becomes known as reflected. Such is not the case with Íśvara. He is, by reason of His eternity, always solely of the quality of goodness and super-excellence; he exists as the object (of our meditation). Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Íśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by S'ástric means (such as the Yoga &c.). In His case, however, being always in that

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condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is *Íśvara*. Derived from the root *Íś*, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is *purusha*, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (*shete*) in the body (*pure*); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but in philosophical works it is always used for soul, and to preserve the spirit of the text I have accepted that word. The use of the term shows that Patañjali did not much care for the Vedántic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and to avoid trouble uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the incidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Áchárya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patañjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápáśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Śaivas as Śiva,—the Vaishṇavas as Puru-

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shottoma,—the followers of the Puráṇas as the great Father (Brahmá),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mímáñsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Chárvákas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyáya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Śiva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?"—(Cowell's *Kusumánjali*, p. 2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chárvákas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kápilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Sáñkhya aphorisms says, "It is not proved that there is a God." (*Íś'varáśiddheḥ* I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne's translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world's—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—*i. e.*, by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—["by works alone, which are indispensable,"—and if we *do* make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for

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"if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c."].

Aph. 5.—Or ["if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely"] a technical term ["for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will"].

Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, ["and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered."—"Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply,—as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative"].

Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. "In regard to the latter alternative he says"].

Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; ["that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c.;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown"].

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Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—"in the first place, there is not *sense*-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;" as he proceeds to show].

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken;—"and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion" that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world's] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord]." (*Sánkhya Aphorisms*, pp. 114*f.*)

I should add here that some Kápilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says "The existence of such a Lord is a settled point," (III, 5 and 7), meaning by "such" an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedánta Sútra treats of this subject; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The *Pátañjala Bháshya* points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus: "If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord." *Kaivalyam práptáhstarhi santi cha bahavah kevalinah. Te hi triṇi bandhanám chhitvá kaivalyam*

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práptáh ; íśvarasya cha tat sambando na bhuto na bháví. Yathá muktasya púrvabandhakoṭíh prajn̄áyate naivamíśvarasya. Yathá vá prakṛitilínasyottará bandhakoṭíh sambhávyate naivamíśvarasya ; sa tu sadeva muktah sadeveśvarah.]

Having described the identity of God, the author next produces a proof that such a being exists.

XXV.

In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity.

In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future &c., attains its "infinity," *(niratisaya)** or highest perfection. Being the source like a seed it is called seed (*víja*). It is well known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection of parvitude is seen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky. In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the S'ástras His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely learnt.

But how does He, without any impulse of His own, cause the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha? Such a doubt should not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to creation the impulse. His impulse is the wish "I shall rescue all creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas." What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse.

[The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. It is a mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Commentator puts it forward to be. He himself felt the difficulty, and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the S'ástra.

* *Niratisaya*, limitness, greatness, or infinity.

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The Śástra here referred to is the Sáṅkhya, and the P. Bháshya quotes a passage from the work of Pañchaśikha which shows that "the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri." *Ádividvánnirmáṇachittamadhishṭháya káruṇyát bhagaván paramarshi rásuraye jijñásumánáya tantram pravácheti.* The first knower is Kapila, who, being an incarnation of Vishṇu, obtained the science from Sayambhu or Maheśvara.]

Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness.

XXVI.

He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time.

Even of the primary creators such as Brahmá and others, he is the "instructor," or preceptor, because "He is not defined by time," for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning.

[The word *guru* has been translated "instructor" in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equivalent *upadeshṭá*. It may be more appropriately rendered into "noblest" or "greatest," as it would make the reason assigned, undefined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Maheśvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. In the P. Bháshya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word *yathásya sargasyádau prakarsha-gatyásiddhah, tathátikránta-sargádisvapi pratyetavyah.*

Váchaspati Miśra explains the term by *prakarsha* "superior:" *na vartate prakarshásya gatih práptih pratyetavya ágamát tadanena prabandhena bhagaváníśvaro darśitah.*

In giving the purport of the aphorism he uses the words: *Samprati bhávatah brahmádibhyah viśeshamáha.*]

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Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion.

XXVII.

His indicator is the Praṇava.

Of the Íśvara thus described, the "indicator," name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly *(pra=prakarsheṇa)* lauded *(nu)* or praised, glorified, or hymned is—*praṇava*, which is the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the derivation which is *pra* = "excessive" and *nu* = "to laud," whence Praṇava). Between the two (the name and the being denominated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) "this is the father, and this is the son," (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.)

[Praṇava is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See Chhándogya Upanishad, Chapter I. In two short notes, published in the 'Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal' for 1865, pp. 46—208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew *Áman* and the English Amen.]

His adoration is next enjoined.

XXVIII.

Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made).

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"Its," *i. e.*, of the Praṇava, consisting of three and a half instants, "Repetition" *(japa)*, pronouncing it in due order, and the "Reflection" (*bhávana*), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (*samádhi*) the Praṇava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogí. This is declared.

[Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters अ (a) उ (u) and म (m), which supply the three instants, and the conversion of the m into the nasal mark ँ supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodial quantity is a protracted circumflex sound.]

The fruit of such adoration is next described.

XXIX.

Thence the right knowledge of the reverted perception, and the removal of obstacles.

From that repetition and that reflection the right knowledge of the "reverted perception" *(pratyakchetaná)* is effected in the case of Yogís. That "perception" *(chetaná)* or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (or in opposition to worldly) objects, is called "reverted perception" (*pratyak* "turning back," *chetaná* "perception") and a "right knowledge" *(adhigama)* of it is thereby acquired. The "removal" (*abháva*), *i. e.*, the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected.

[The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogí, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this roundabout way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.]

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Now, a doubt arising as to what are the obstacles? he says:—

XXX.

Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles.

These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of "distractions," *i. e.*, by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine:—

(1) "Sickness" (*vyádhi*) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours.

(2) "Langour" *(styána)* is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work.

(3) "Doubt" (*sañśaya*) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not.

(4) "Carelessness" (*pramáda*) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation.

(5) "Idleness" (*álasya*) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga.

(6) "Worldly-mindedness" (*avirati*) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world.

(7) "Mistaken notion" (*bhrántidarsana*) is wrong perception, such as taking a bit of mother-o'pearl to be silver.

(8) "Unattainment of any stage" (*alabdha-bhúmikatva*) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction.

(9) "Instability" (*anavasthitatva*) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it.

These being opposed to the practice of concentration of meditation, are called "obstacles," (*antárayáh*).

To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says:—

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XXXI.

Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &c., come on. Thereof—

(1) "Pain" (*duhkha*) is a modification of the foulness of the thinking principle; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove.

(2) "Distress" (*daurmansya*) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes.

(3) "Trembling" (*aṅgamejaytva*) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogí).

(4) "Inspiration" (*śvása*) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is "expiration" *(praśvása)*.

These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here.

[Pain here referred to is described in the Pátaṇjala Bháshya as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The *Sáṅkhya Karika* notices all the three. (Wilson's Sáṅkhya Káriká, p. 2.)

The *Pátaṇjala Rahasya* gives *píḍá* 'disease' as the equivalent of *Duhkha*.]

Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out.

XXXII.

For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.

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For the "prevention" (*pratishedha*)or obstruction of those distractions, let there be "exercise" (*abhyása*) or repeated application of the thinking principle to some one selected "principle," (*tattva*), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside.

[In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, "thought is not." The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for meditation, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentrating itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue.]

Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle.

XXXIII.

The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

"Friendliness" (*maitrí*) disposition to be friendly. "Compassion," (*karuṇá*) mercy. "Complacency" (*muditá*) to be pleased. "Indifference" (*upekshá*) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) "blessed is their happiness;" and not be envious to them. For persons in grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (say-

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ing) "Forsooth, are these virtuous"? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word "happiness" &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities. These feelings of friendliness &c., producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samádhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samádhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &c., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., producing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the conscious form of Samádhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object).

[The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheerfulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, compassion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness; hence it is avoided.]

He points out another expedient.

XXXIV.

Or by expulsion and retention of the breath.

"Expulsion," *(prachchhardana)* means the throwing out of the air from the lungs in a fixed quantity through a special effort. "Retention" (*vidháraṇa*) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold *práṇáyáma,* including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of

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concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions,—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The Agama proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: "All obstructive functions are caused by faults." Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentration of the mind.

[The definition of "retention" (*vidháraṇa*) by the terms "stoppage of motion" (*gativichchheda*) is obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to "retention" immediately after the "expulsion" (*prachchhardana*) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the commentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Pátaṇjala Bháshya calls the retention to be *Praṇáyáma* (*vidháraṇa práṇáyamaḥ*), and in the Sáṅkhya Sútra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted meaning. All other Yogic and Tántric works regard the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the Práṇáyáma. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last. Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word *mátrápramáṇa* in the commentary, which I have rendered into "fixed quantity," has been rendered into *svalpa* or "little" or "slowly" in the Pátaṇjala Bháshya; but it does not express the true technical meaning. The object of the mátrá is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Puráṇa a *mátrá* is equal to the time required in one breathing, (*Eka śrásamapi mátrá práṇáyáme nigadyate*), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the *Yoga-chintámaṇi* adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). *Nidrávasangatasya puñso yávatkálenaikaśváso gachchhatyágachchhati cha távatkálapráṇáyámasya mátretyuchyate.*) And this

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period is equal to two and a half palas. (*Sárddha svása palad-vayátmakah kálah, práṇáyáma kála siddhah.*) The *pala* here means the period occupied by a twinkling of the eye. The *mátrá* is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a práṇáyáma according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regulated in one of two ways; 1st, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (*vija*) of that mantra; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishṇava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the Víja mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspiring, and 20 times while retaining. A Śákta repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the Yogí. The usual mode of performing the Práṇáyáma is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thum, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Praṇáyáma, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The *Haṭha-dípiká* philosophises on this by saying, "by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogí becomes firm as the trunk of a tree; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped."

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("Chale váte chalam chittam niśchale niśchalam bhavet, Yogí sthánutvamápnoti tato váyumni rodhayet. Yávad váyuh sthito dehe tabajjívanamuchyate, Maraṇam tasya nishkrántistato vayum nirodhayet.")

Elsewhere the text asserts that this Práṇáyáma is conducive both to health and longevity, and all minor works on Yoga and the Tantras generally expatiate at great length on the sanitary and the therapeutic advantages of practising it regularly at stated times. The *Haṭha-dípiká*, in one place, says, "all diseases disappear in him who devotes himself to the Práṇáyáma; without it in the state of practising Yoga every kind of disease arises." (*Práṇáyámádiyuktena sarvaroga kshayo bhavet, ayuktábhyásayogena sarvaroga samudbhavah.* The idea seems to have travelled to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists practice this *Práṇáyáma* under the name of "deep breathing," and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his "Harbinger of Health" (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing diseases through its means.

"First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breathing *deep, and slow, and uniformly,* WILL YOURSELF TO BECOME HEALTHY—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs and brain! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice (while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremeties first; then work upward and *inward* progressively; and when, in the lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated in the manner aforementioned.

"By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive *spiritual* strength from the air—nothing is more certain! When, by practice, you can *breathe* deeply and heroically, and at the

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same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. *Consumptive persons*, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systematically, *may enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease.* Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may "right about face" and become harmonially healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will 'pass from death unto life.'

"TIME OF EXERCISES.—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Self-healing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be necessary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them; but the true time is when chilification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the *pneumogastric* conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth."]

In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the conscious form of meditation.

XXXV.

Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness.

"Of the mind" (*manasah* is understood to) complete the sentence. "Sensuous objects" *(vishaya)* are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, and that in which these reside as objects is *vishayavatí*, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cognition of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the

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middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects resulting through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogís in the belief that the Yoga has a fruit.

[By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly unintellegible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commentator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of Práṇáyáma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogí directs his mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The commentator uses the word *divya* for which I use "spiritual" as the equivalent. The *P. Rahasya* uses *alaukika* or "supernatural" as the equivalent. The word *pravṛitti* in the text has been taken by the P. Bhasya to be equal to *sañvit* or cognition. In the commentary above and elsewhere the word *manas* mind has been sometimes used for *chitta*, thinking principle].

He describes another expedient of the same kind.

XXXVI.

Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle).

(The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms, "disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle."

The word "lumen" *(jyotis)* means the manifestation (of the quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposition it is called "extremely luminous" disposition *(jyotismati)*. "Sorrowless" *(viśoka)* is that disposition in which the power resulting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness)

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has removed the grief which is produced by the quality of foulness. It steadies the thinking principle. The purport of this is this:—when the thinking principle is in the quality of goodness located in the cup of the lotus heart as on the waveless milky ocean, and the sensuous functions are all destroyed by the light of knowledge, the steadiness of the thinking principle results as a matter of course.

[Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation.]

In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation.

XXXVII.

Or the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness).

The phrase "becomes the cause of the mind's steadiness" is understood to complete the sentence.

"The Passionless" *(vítarága)* are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness.

[The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Váchaspati Miśra explains this by saying "the passionless are Kṛishṇa Dvaipáyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. *Vítarágáh Kṛishṇadvaipáyana prabhṛitayah. Teshám chittam tadevávalambanam, tenoparaktamiti.*]

He describes another expedient of this kind.

XXXVIII.

Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep.

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"Dream" (*svapna*) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul's agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. "Sleep" (*nidrá*) has been already defined (A. X). The knowledge which results from "reliance" thereon, *i. e.*, reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle.

[Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogís believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of knowledge. (See. A. X,) Váchaspati Miśra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Maheśvara may, on waking, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced.]

Different men having different tastes, Yogís may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating thereon attain his object (*scil.* steadiness of mind). To stablish this he says—

XXXIX.

Or by meditating according to one's fancy.

By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, as a plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied.

[The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keeping the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certain plexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly beneficial in producing steadiness.]

Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is.

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XL.

His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude.

Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking principle, the Yogí, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing "mastery" (*vaśíkára*) over the minutest atoms, *i. e.*, his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflection of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, *i. e.*, it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning.

[The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over every thing, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendantal power over all material and spiritual objects: of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bháshya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogí is perfect in this respect, it does not any longer care for the appliances of exercise elsewhere enjoined. *Tadvaśíkárát paripúrṇam yoginaśchittam na punarabhyásakṛitam parikarmápekshate iti.*]

What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe.

XLI.

To him of overpowered faculties, there are a concentration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, as in a transparent gem.

He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is "of overpowered faculties" (*kshíṇavṛitti*). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, and there result a "concentration" and a "consubstantion." *Tatsthatva* is concentration in it, (*ekágratá*). "Consubstantiation" (*tadañja-*

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natva) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle is lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning is, that such a condition (*samápatti*), or modification to that form, results.

Of this an example is given. In the case of "a transparent gem" or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed.

Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written "perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver," for first the meditation is directed to the perceivable; then it is devoted to the perception; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtile object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived.

[The word *kshíṇa* in the text means weakened, but this weakness is not general; according to the P. Rahasya it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: *kshíṇa-vṛitteh álambanavishayátirikta - vishayanirúpita - vṛitti-sunyasya. Tatsthatva* is literally being in a thing, *tat* 'there,' and *sthá* "to be reposited;" but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, *ekágratá. Tadanjanatva* is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the commentator prefers the equivalent *tanmayatva* "being of that substance." He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. Bháshya amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think-

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ing principle becomes of its special form. *Gṛihitṛipurushálambanoparaktam gṛihitṛipurushasamápannam gṛihitṛipurusha-svarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate. Tathá muktapurushálambanoparaktam muktapurushasamápannam muktapurushasvarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate.*]

Having explained the conditions, he now points out its fourfold differences (in three aphorisms.)

XLII.

The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding.

That which is perceivable by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (*sphoṭa*), is (technically sound or) "word" (*śabda*). "Meaning" (*artha*) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). "Understanding" (*jṇána*) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). "Fancy" (*vikalpa*) has been already defined (A. IX) "Affected" (*saṅkírṇa*) influenced by them, *i. e.*, by the three, words &c. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (*i. e.*, their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word *gau* "a cow," meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called "argumentative," (*savitarka.*)

[The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are fourfold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bháshya explains it by saying, "*Gau* is the word, a cow is its meaning, and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct positions in an undivided form." *Gauriti śabdo Gaurityartho Gauriti jṇánamityavibhágena vibhaktánámapi grahanam dṛishtam.* The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying "when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the *gau* is a word, or it is

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a meaning, or it is an understanding. *Gauriti s'abde s'rute sati gauriti s'abdo vá gaurityartho vá gauriti jṇánam vá evamvikalpah.* (See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition.

The word *sphoṭa,* which I have rendered into "bursting," is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest when spoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy, has given a full account of this dogma.]

The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next described.

XLIII.

That is non-argumentative in which, on the dissolution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent.

When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly graspable, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is "non-argumentative."

[The P. Bháshya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, *i. e.*, it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. *Gráhyasvarúpoparaktá prajṇá svamiva prajṇárúpam grahanátmakam tyaktá padárthamátrasvarúpá gráhyasvarúpápanneva bhavati sá nirvitarká samápatti.*]

To indicate varieties of it, he says:

XLIV.

By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtile objects are also described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (*savichárá*)

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and the non-deliberative (*nirvichárá*) conditions have been described. How are the latter? "Subtile objects," (*sukshmavisaya*)—"subtile" rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependant on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumentative form.) "The deliberative" (*savichárá*) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality, &c. "The non-deleberative" (*nirvichárá*) is that in which the abstract notion is manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects.

[The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the deliberative and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences.]

To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says:

XLV.

This subtile objectivity terminates in the indissoluble.

What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the "Indissoluble" (*aliṅga*) or First Principle (nature, Prakṛiti), and subtile objectivity extends to that limit. Now in the resolution of qualities, there are four stages, *viz.*, 1, defined character, (*viśishṭa liṅga*); 2, undefined character (*aviśishṭaliṅga*); 3, mere character (*liṅgamátra*); 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (*aliṅga*). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the organs. Mere character is indicative of the Intellect; and devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle.

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[The word *liṅga* has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseperable from it, and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakṛiti is called *aliṅga* or that which is without anindicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtile. "It may be urged," argues the P. Bháshya, "that the soul is more subtile than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (*aliṅga* or Prakṛiti) is more subtile than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since the soul is not the material but the instrumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtility must rest with the First Principle." *Nanvasti purushah sukshma iti. Satyam yathá liṅgát param aliṅgasya saukshmyam, nachávam-purushasya, kintu liṅgasya anvayí-káraṇam purusho na bhavati hetustu bhavatíti, atah pradháne saukshmyam niratisayam vyákhyátam.*]

He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions.

XLVI.

These verily constitute meditation with a seed.

"These verily," *i. e.*, the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. "With a seed," (*savíja*) means conscious meditation, (or Samádhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon.

[These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further remarks here.]

Now, these (conscious conditions) maturate into the non-deliberative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof.

XLVII.

In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment.

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"Non deliberativeness" has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). "Purity" (*vaisáradya*) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtile object in view, (is superior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice "purity," as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained "intellectual contentment" results, *i. e.*, the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidence in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII).

[The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. *Prajñáprásádamáruhya aśochyah śochatojanán, Bhúmishṭhániva śailasthah sarván prájñonupasyati.*]

He next explains what happens when this condition is attained.

XLVIII.

In that condition knowledge becomes truth-supporting.

That "knowledge" *(prajñá)* which supports the "truth" (*ṛita*) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is "truth-supporting" (*ritambhará*), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogí perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga.

[In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect knowledge is the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth.]

Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained.

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XLIX.

The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view).

"Testimony" (*s'ruta*) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. "Inference" (*anumána*) has been already defined (Aph. VII). The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fulness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtile, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yogís for the attainment of this knowledge.

[The transcendental powers referred to above are here described to be the power of observing things which are so subtile, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception.]

He now describes the fruit of this knowledge.

L.

The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua.

"The residuum" (*sañskára* Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, *i. e.*, it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more powerful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from non-absolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised.

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[The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.]

Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the un-conscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII).

LI.

On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed.

"Of this," *i. e.*, of conscious meditation. "Removal" (*nirodha*) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction "this is not, this is not," meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul *(purusha)* becomes pure, and abides solely in its own nature.

[The *P. Bhâshya* explains the aphorism thus: "That meditation is not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samâdhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (*nirodha*) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated."]

Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A. I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the

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nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-conscious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XXVII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained.

[The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved.]

This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled *Rájamártaṇḍa* on Patañjali's Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

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CHAPTER SECOND.

May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has been disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object!

Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the *Kriyá-yoga* (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it.

[This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained control over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (*ṛiddhis*). Inasmuch as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topics of this chapter, the chapter is called Kriyá-yoga or "Practical Yoga."]

I.

Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God constitute the Practical Yoga.

"Asceticism" (*tapas*) is the observance of the fasts called Kṛichchhra, Chándráyana and the like enjoined in another Śástra (*Dharma-śástra*). "Muttering" (*sádhyáya*) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the Praṇava, (*i. e.*, the syllable Om). "Resignation to God" (*Í'śvara-praṇidhána*) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one's works, without

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any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga.

[This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smṛiti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense *tapas* would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogís do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The *Kṛichchhra* named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the Prájápatya, and by others with the Sántapana. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not even a mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which *kuśa* grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The Chándráyana has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon's age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances should be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The Haṭhadípiká enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the Rája-yoga. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings.

Muttering, like the last, is a part of the Smṛiti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that each repe-

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tition may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The *P. Bháshya* and the *P. Rahasya* add that *sádhyáya* implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that s'ástra which relates to emancipation. *Praṇavádi-pavitrá-ṇám japo mokshas'ástrádhyayanam vá.*

Resignation to God (*praṇidhána*) has been already explained on p. 28.

These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.]

(To the question) of what use are these, he replies:

II.

It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Samádhi and for weakening afflictions.

"Afflictions" (*kleśáh*) will be presently described (II, III.) To "weaken them" is to make them unfit for their respective works. "Samádhi" (meditation) has been already explained (I, XX.) Its "contemplation" (*bhávaná*) is repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (*artha*), object, is so called (*kriyá-yoga*). What is said is this: These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become accessories to Samádhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogí should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga.

[The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism.]

It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those afflictions are he now describes.

III.

Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions.

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"Afflictions" (*kleśáh*) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive character, *i. e.*, producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities which constitute mundane existence.

[Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their definitions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called "afflictions," is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afflictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation.]

Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says:

IV.

Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.

"Ignorance" (*avidyá*) is delusion; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. It is the "field" (*kshetra*), or ground of production, of those which follow, *i. e.*, egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four conditions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source.

The "dormant, weak, intercepted or simple." Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their

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effect, are called "dormant" *(prasupta)*, asleep. Thus in childhood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause, flare up.

Those afflictions are said to be "weak" (*tanu*) which, becoming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries. This is the case in the practising Yogí (who being engaged in one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to disturb his thoughts. They are in him, but in a condition of weakness produced by their non-indulgence).

Those afflictions are said to be "intercepted" (*vichchhinna*) which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion, or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mutually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same time, (one must for the time intercept the other).

Afflictions are said to be "simple" (*udára*) when, having their auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions. This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not the ways of the Yoga.

Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never sprout again. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of the Yogí to exert for their removal.

[In A. III the afflictions have been described to be five in number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their

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origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception]

He now defines ignorance.

V.

Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non-eternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal, pure, joyous and soul.

The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is "ignorance" (*avidyá*). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of confounding vice with virtue and the useless with the useful.

[The *P. Bháshya* argues that although the word *avidyá* is formed of the privative particle *a* with *vidyá* "knowledge," it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of *amitra* and *agoshpada*, the former of which, though formed of *a* (absence) and *mitra* "a friend," does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of *a* and *goshpada* "the footprint of a cow," does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. *Tasyás chámitrágoshpadavadavastu sa tattvam vijṇeyam, yathá námitro mitrábhávo na mitramátram, kintu tadvirudhah sapatnah, yathá vágoshpadam na goshpadábhávo na goshpadamátram, kintu des'a eva, tábhyámanyat vastvantaram, evamavidyá na pramáṇam na pramáṇábhávaḥ, kintu vidyáviparítam jṇánántaramavidyeti.*]

With a view to explain egoism, he says :

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