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
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पातञ्जलं योगसूत्रम्।

राजमार्त्तण्डाख्यवृत्तिसहितम्।

BODLEIAN

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATAÑJALI,

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RÁJA

AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BY

RÁJENDRALÁLA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E.

FASCICULUS III.

CALCUTTA:

PRINTED BY J. W. THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

AND PUBLISHED BY THE

ASIATIC SOCIETY, 57, PARK STREET.

1882.

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CHAPTER THIRD.

May Bhútanátha, (the lord of elements,) by the thought of whose lotus feet, the occult powers of Animá and the rest are attained by thinkers, be to our prosperity!

With a view to describe the three accessories of the Yoga, Dháraṇá, &c., already referred to, (C. II A. XXIX) and to explain the external, the internal, and other Siddhis, Patañjali begins this chapter, adverting first to the explanation of the term Sañyama.

[The occult powers *(vibhútis)* are the following: 1, *aṇimá*, "molicularity," extreme minuteness, or parvitude, or invisibility; 2, *Laghimá*, "extreme lightness," levity, tenuity, or incorporeality; 3, *Prápti*, "accessibility," or touching anything at will, as touching the moon with the tip of one's finger; 4, *Prákámya*, "wilfulness," or irresistibility of will, fulfilment of every wish; 5, *Garimá*, "excessive pondrosity," magnitude, or illimitable bulk; 6, *Í'śitá* "sovereignty," or supreme dominion over animate and inanimate nature; 7, *Vaśitá*, "subjugation," the power of changing the course of nature; 8, *Kámávasáyitá*, "self-controul," or the power of suppressing all carnal longings. These are also indicated by the term *ṛiddhi*, and also by *siddhi* or perfections. Inasmuch, however, as *siddhi* is applied to other profections it is sometimes qualified by the term *mahá*. The powers are also indicated by the terms *bhúti* and *aiśvarya*.]

Thereof, he describes the nature of steadfastness.

I.

Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place.

"To one place" *(deśe)*, *i. e.*, in the navel-wheel, the tip of the nose, or the like. "Confinement" (*bandha*) of the thinking

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principle is making the thinking principle steady (on one object) by excluding (the thought of) all other objects. This (confinement to one place) is called *Dhárańá* or the steadfastness of the thinking principle.

The meaning is this:—The Yogí, who has purified his internal organ by benevolence and other acts of refining the thinking principle, who has accomplished the restraints and the obligations, who has acquired mastery over his postures, who has subdued the vital airs, who has abstracted himself from the field of the senses, who has conquered the pairs (*cf.* C. II A. XLVIII), should, in a quiet place, and in an erect posture, by fixing it to one object, such as the tip of the nose, produce steadfastness of the thinking principle for the practice of discriminate meditation.

[The preliminary obligations and restraints having been accomplished, and the habit of assuming the various kinds of seats having been acquired, the Yogí should engage himself in training his thinking principle so as to be able to keep it unswervingly steady to any object to which he may wish to direct it; and this unswerving fixity is called Dhárańá, or steadfastness. This steadfastness cannot be acquired without a substratum. There must be some object to which the thinking principle can be applied, whether it be the tip of the nose, or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head, or the ether, or the sky, for without it, in the preliminary stage, the thinking principle would be wandering. And inasmuch as there must be a substratum, the steadfastness of thinking produced by it comes under the head of discriminate meditation (*samprajńáta-samádhi*). (C. I A. XVII.) Practically it is a state of steady, immovable abstraction, but the word abstraction would be an indirect and not a direct definition of Dhárańá, inasmuch as abstraction gives prominence to the act of withdrawing or separating, leaving the result of the act in the background, whereas Dhárańá gives prominence to the fixation of the thinking principle to one point, leaving the separation or withdrawing from other things to be tacitly implied.

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The *P. Bháshya* defines "Dháraṇá to be the fixation of the function of the thinking principle on the navel-wheel, or on the lotus of the heart, or on the light in the head, or on the tip of the nose, or on the point of the tongue, or on such other place, or on some external object." (*Nábhichakre hṛidaya-puṇḍaríke múrdhni jyotishi násikágre jihvágra-ityádishu des'eshu váhye vá vishaye chittasya vṛittimátreṇa bandha iti bandho dháraṇá.*) The "external object" of the commentator is explained by Vijṇána Bhikshu to mean the image of a divinity.]

Having defined steadfastness, with a view to define contemplation he says:

II.

Contemplation is unison there of the understanding.

"There," in that place where the thinking principle is confined. "Of the understanding" (*pratyayasya*) of the knowledge. Whatever unison (or harmonious blending) is obtained through the instrumentality of avoiding untoward modifications, and what knowledge constantly arises through dependance on that on which steadfastness is reposed, is called "contemplation" (*dhyána*).

[The word *dhyána* is usually translated into meditation, for it implies that profound and abstract consideration which brings its object fully and undisturbedly before the mind. Inasmuch, however, as there is deliberation and consideration in this act, contemplation appears to me to be a more appropriate equivalent, the highest state of contemplation, which is Samádhi, being indicated by the term meditation.

The *P. Bháshya* defines Dhyána to be "an even current of thought undisturbed by other thoughts." (*Sadris'a praváhapratyayántareṇáparámṛishṭo dhyánam.*)]

He now describes meditation, the last or highest member of the Yoga.

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III.

When that (contemplation), existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation.

"When that," *i. e.* contemplation as defined above (A. II). When "solely one object" is enlightened, *i. e.*, when the object produced by application to the form of an object, negating all other forms of consideration, and the thought appears as if devoid of its own identity, it is called "meditation" (*samádhi*). That which brings the mind together thoroughly, (*samyag-ádhíyate*), *i. e.*, brings it to one centre by avoiding all disturbing causes, is Samádhi.

[The *P. Bháshya* defines Samádhi to be "that in which contemplation so realizes the form of the object contemplated as to make its own identity, as it were, void from the prevalence of the nature of the contemplated object. (*Dhyánameva dhyeyákára-nirbhásam pratyayátmakena svarúpeṇa sunyamiva yadá bhavati dhyeya-svabhávávesát tadá samádhirityuchyate*). As stated in the foregoing note, Samádhi is only a more advanced state of contemplation than Dhyána. In the latter the ideas of other objects besides the one contemplated are subdued and kept down, but not entirely suppressed; but in the former it is so complete that not only exteraneous ideas are suppressed, but even the distinction between the thinking and the thought are lost, so that the former, as it were, merges into the latter, and nothing but thought remains. Such being the case, the body ceases to be influenced by external stimuli, and a state of catalepsy or trance is produced. Hence it is that Samádhi is not unfrequently translated into trance or catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, takes note of only the cessation of the organic functions, leaving unnoticed the state of the thinking principle, whereas Samádhi brings the intensity of the thinking to the fore, without caring for the organic functions, and the English equivalent used should therefore convey this idea. Medi-

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tation it is true does not give the measure of the intensity, but since that intensity varies greatly under different circumstances, meditation is by itself enough for ordinary use.]

In order to supply for use in his work a technical term for the three constituents above described, he says:

IV.

The three together constitute *Sañyama.*

In this Sástra the application of the three operations of contemplation, (*dhyána*) steadfastness (*dháraṇá*), and meditation (*Samádhi*), to one object is indicated by the use of the term Sañyama.

[The word Sañyama is formed of the intensitive particle *sam* prefixed to *yama* "restraint," and means vow, binding or confinement, and in this work indicates the absolute restriction of one's self to the practice of the three means of accomplishing the Yoga. In connexion with the ceremonial of the Smṛiti, it is used to indicate the day preceding that of the rite itself, because on that day the performer has to place himself under certain restrictions about food, drink, and occupation, the nature of which varies according to the character of the rites. The word is defined with a view to prepare it for subsequent use as a technical term for the three most important acts of Yoga.]

The fruit thereof.

V.

From success thereof comes the light of understanding.

"Thereof," *i. e.*, of Sañyama. "From success" from its becoming similar (*i. e.*, freely blending with each other so as to be the same) by practice. "Understanding" (*prajṇá*), *i. e.*, the nature of the object to be known. The "Light" (*áloka*), (understanding) expands. The meaning is—that which has to be known becomes thoroughly manifest.

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[The purport is obvious. When a person is proficient in performing the threefold acts of Sañyama, he attains the light of understanding, or the power of knowing thoroughly the nature of the object to which he directs his attention.]

Its application.

VI.

It is to be applied according to its stages.

According to "its," *i. e.*, of the Sañyama, "Stages" (*bhúmi*), it should be applied to the varying conditions of grossness and subtileness of the substratum of the function of the thinking principle. The Sañyama should be practised in a higher stage after subduing or attaining proficiency, or knowing thoroughly, the lower stages of the thinking principle, for the fruition is not effected by practicing the Sañyama in the highest stage without first bringing into controul the lower ones.

[The subject matter of this aphorism is a mere detail: it is the rule that Sañyama should not be attempted for the higher stages of perfection until after it has been practised in the lower stages, *i. e.*, it is to be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of the Yogí is divided. See C. II A. XXVII.]

A doubt having arisen why in the chapter on the appliances (C. II) he should have described only five after naming the eight members of the Yoga, and omitted three, the author says:

VII.

The three are more intimate than the former.

"Than the former," *i. e.*, of restrictions and other members of the Yoga, which are the appliances of meditation in a secondary degree. (C. II A. XXIX.) The three members, steadfastness, &c., "are intimate" (*antaraṅga*, lit. akin,) to descriminate meditation, since they establish the true character of meditation.

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[In C. II A. XXIX. the accessories of the Yoga have been described to be restraint, obligations, postures, regulation of breath, devotion, steadfastness, contemplation, and meditation. Of these the first five are subsidiary or ancillary to, and the last three integral parts, lit. members of the body of, the Yoga, and this idea is developed in the aphorism under notice by the statement that the former are strangers and the latter intimates. The first five only prepare a person for the performance of the Yoga, but the last three constitute the Yoga, for without them there can be no discriminate Yoga having a specific object of thought.]

To point out that it is nevertheless a stranger compared to another, he says:

VIII.

It is still a stranger to the seedless.

"To the seedless" (*nirvíjasya*), *i. e.*, to the meditation which depends on nothing, or carries on pondering with reference to vacuity. To it the threefold members of the Yoga are strangers, (*vahiraṅga*,) because they are only secondarily subservient.

[Having in the next preceding aphorisms described the last three of the eight members of the Yoga, to be essential to the Yoga, the author makes a distinction, by saying that though they are essential in the case of discriminate meditation, or that in which there is a specific object of thought, they are not so when the Yogí, rising above all specific objects, makes vacuity (*s'únya*) the object of his pondering. This form of meditation is called "seedless" (*cf.* C. I, A. LXI), and it needs no aid and can derive no help from steadfastness, contemplation and objective meditation.]

Having now clearly explained the subject of Sañjama, wishing to disclose the nature of perfection of the different members of Yoga, he describes successively the three modifications.

IX.

The suppressive modification is the moment of conjunction of the thinking principle with suppres-

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sion on the overthrow and success of the twofold residua of waking and suppression.

"Waking" (*vyutthána*) includes the three conditions of agitation, bewilderment, and voluptuousness. "Suppression" (*nirodha*) is that modification of the thinking principle in which the quality of goodness becomes a part of it, or retires to it. When successively the "overthrow" (*avibhava*) and success "prevalence" (*prádurbháva*) of the residua of the two, *i. e.*, of the waking and the suppressive conditions, are produced, then at the moment of "suppression," the conjunction (*anvaya*) which takes place from the thinking principle having then both functions is called "suppressive modification" (*nirodhapariṇáma*). "Overthrow" is the condition of incapacity to perform work, there being a contempt for it. "Prevalence" is the condition of manifestation in the present condition. The meaning is this:—When the residua cognate to waking are pacified, and the residua of suppression are prevailing and the thinking principle appears connected with both from its being the substratum of quality, then that state is indicated by the word suppressive modification (*nirodhapariṇáma*).

Although there is no stillness of the thinking principle when affected by the functions of the qualities, nevertheless this modification is called *still* or *motionless*.

[Having explained the exact position of the threefold exercise of Sañyama, the author now proceeds to describe what follows that exercise, and in doing so first defines three terms, and the first of them is suppressive modification (*nirodhapariṇáma*). This is defined to be the time when all the residua of the waking state being overthrown, the thinking principle begins to be worked by the residua of the suppressive state; it is the moment of transition from the one condition to the other that the term indicates. The *P. Bháshya* thus defines the term: "the residua of the waking state are the attributes of the thinking principle, but they are not intelligent. The residua of suppression, produced by the intelligence of the suppressive state, are also the

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attributes of the thinking principle. On the overthrow and the success of the two, the residua of the waking state are put down, those of the suppressive state rise up, and there is then a correlation of the thinking principle, and the changes, thus constantly occurring in a thinking principle is suppressive modification." (*Vyutthána-sañskáráschittadharmá na te pratyayátmaká iti, pratyaya-nirodhena niruddhá nirodhasañskárá api chittadharmáh, tayorabhibhava-prádurbhávau vyutthána-sañskárá hiyante nirodha-sañskárá ádhiyante, nirodhakshaṇam chittamanveti tad ekasya chittasya pratikshaṇamidam sañskárányathátvam nirodhapariṇamah.*)

In explaining the text, Bhoja uses a term which, as playing an important part in subsequent explanations, requires a few words of comment. The word is *vartamánádhvan*, a compound of *vartamán* "present" and *adhvan* "a road," but here "time" (*adhvas'abda kálavachanah,*) which I have rendered into "present condition." The theory is that every image, shape, or idea exists from eternity in a latent form; circumstances make it manifest, and when those circumstances are overcome it reverts to its former condition. The first is *anágatádhvan*, or the unmanifest or antecedent condition; the second or what we see is the *vartamánádhvan*, or the present condition; and the third is *atítádhvan*, or the postcedent condition, which is reversion to the first condition. The image existed in the marble in a latent condition; the sculptor brings it to its present condition, and when it is broken it passes on to its postcedent condition. This theory is the same which prevailed in Greece in ancient times. Thus, says Sir William Hamilton: "Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. In the Platonic sense, then, *ideas* were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the

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phenomenal or ectypal world." So Tiberghien, (*Essai des Connoissance humane*, p. 207,) "Seneca considered *ideas*, according to Plato, as the *eternal exemplars* of things, Cicero as their *form*, Diogenes Laertius as their *cause* and *principle*, Aristotle as *substances*."

The word *sañskára*, which, for the sake of uniformity, I have rendered into residua, would have been more pointed here if translated into idea.]

The fruit thereof.

X.

Its tranquil flow from residual habit.

"Its," of the thinking principle, "tranquil flow" (*pras'ánta-váhitá*) is produced by the residua of the suppression aforesaid. The meaning is, from voluptuousness being removed the thinking principle flows in its own modification.

[The advantage derived from the suppressive modification is that, when it is attained, the thinking principle becomes tranquil, and abides in its own nature, that is, it is no longer subject to agitation from the prevalence of the adverse qualities of foulness and bewilderment.]

Having described suppressive modification, he now defines meditative modification.

XI.

The destruction of multifunctionality and enlivenment of concentration of the thinking principle is meditative modification.

"Multifunctionality" (*sarvárthatá*) is the quality of voluptuousness of the thinking principle, which results from its accepting many objects from its versatility. When one object is depended upon there is a similar modification, and it is "concentration," and that too is a quality of the thinking principle. The "destruction" and "enlivenment" (*kshaya* and *udaya*) of the two are successive, *i. e.*, the destruction or extreme overthrow of the quality of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or full mani-

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festation of the quality of concentration are successive. The condition in which there is a junction of the two in the thinking principle, when it has the quality of goodness in excess, is called "meditative modification" (*samádhi-pariṇáma*). This is distinct from the former, (*i. e.*, suppressive meditation). In the former there are the overthrow and the prevalence of the two residua, *i. e.*, the contempt for the nature of the former waking residua and the prevalence in an unsubdued state of the latter or the residua of suppression. In this, however, there is destruction and full enlivenment. Destruction is entrance into the condition beyond that of reproduction, of the voluptuousness of multifunctionality, from extreme hatred. Enlivenment of the quality of concentration is its manifestation in the present condition.

[Suppressive modification as defined in A. IX, is confined to the point of time when the waking state passes on to the suppressive state; but in the meditative modification, there is a farther advance. The waking state has then been entirely overcome, and the meditative state is in full prevalence. The one is the commencement, and the other the consummation, of the condition of meditation. The *P. Bháshya* explains this by saying "multifunctionality is an attribute of the thinking principle, so is concentration; the meaning is there is destruction or disappearance of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or manifestation of concentration." (*Sarvárthatá chittadharmah ekágratá chittadharmah, sarváratáyáh kshayastirobháva ityarthah, ekágratáyá udaya ávirbháva ityarthah.*) Briefly this is a higher state of concentration.]

The third or the concentrative modification.

XII.

The concentrative modification of the thinking principle is that in which both the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are equally recognized.

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Unity of idea is a special function of the abstracted thinking principle. "Tranquil" (*śánta*) is that which has entered the postcedent condition. "Enlivened" (*udita*) is manifestation in the present condition. From the thinking principle being in a collected state, the two are equal, and from their object being one, are similar cognitions (*pratyayas*). When the collected thinking principle abides correlated with both it is called concentrative modification.

[In the suppressive modification the worldly state is just passing away, and the meditative state is just commencing, and the thinking principle is becoming tranquil; in the meditative state the first stage is passed, and concentration is in prevalence or fully enlivened; and when the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are in full play, the condition is called the concentrative modification. The *P. Bháshya* explains this by saying, "of the controlled thinking principle, the first cognition is tranquillity, and the next after it is a similar one that of enlivenment, and the thinking principle in meditation is correlated to both, in the same way" (*samáhita-chittasya púrva-pratyayah śánta uttarastat-sadríśa uditah samádhi-chittamubhayo-ranugatam punastathaiva*). As in the last case so here, we have in this an advance over the last preceding condition.]

Having described the forms of the modification of the thinking principle, he assigns them to other subjects.

XIII.

By this the modifications of property, time, and relation in elements and organs have been described.

"By this," *i. e.*, by the threefold exposition of the modifications of the thinking principle (A. IX, XI, XII.). "In elements," (*bhúteshu,*) both the gross and the subtile. "In the organs" existing severally as Intellect, organs of function, and internal organ. It is to be understood that the three modifications of property, time, and relation have been described (by the above aphorisms).

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When, on the cessation of a former property, the subject undergoes the modification of another property, even as the subject clay, forsaking the form of an undefined mass, assumes another property, that of a jar, it is called the modification of property (*Dharmapariṇáma*). The "modification of time" (*Lakshaṇa-pariṇáma*) (is thus indicated)—when that jar, giving up its antecedent condition, assumes its present condition, or forsaking it, takes up its postcedent condition. The modification of relation (*Avasthápariṇáma*) is the correlation of the jars, in the first and the second conditions, for the train of the functions of qualities is always moving, and does not remain unchanging for even a moment.

[This aphorism applies the theory of eternity of ideas enunciated in the three preceding aphorisms to things in general. The object is to show that even as in ideas, latency, manifestation, and disappearance follow successively, so in the thinking principle ideas appear and disappear under particular circumstances without radically changing its original nature. Change in matter is not absolute, nor radical conversion of one thing into another, but a modification of property, or of time, or of relation. A mass of clay converted into a jar is a change of property, and not of the radical elements of clay. This change is next altered by time, as the breaking of a jar into potsherds; and there is a further change going on in its condition, and the new jar of yesterday is not the same with the jar we see to day, for there has been some change in it since yesterday, for change is constant and cannot be retarded for a moment. The first change is called *Dharmapariṇáma*, the modification of property. The second is *Lakshaṇapariṇáma*, the modification of time. The word *lakshaṇa* ordinarily means a sign or character, but it has been explained by commentators to mean time (*kálabheda*). The third is *Avasthápariṇáma* or change of relation.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what the property is, he defines the nature of the propertied, *i. e.*, the subject.

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XIV.

The subject is the correlative of the qualities of tranquillity, enlivening, and latency.

"The tranquil" (*śánták*) (qualities) are those which, having performed their respective functions, have entered the postcedent condition. "The enlivened" *(uditáh)* qualities are those which, forsaking the antecedent condition, perform their functions in the present condition. "The latent," (*avyapadesyáh*) qualities are those which, abiding potentially, do not produce action. Thus everything is comprised in everything, and so on. By the word property *(dharma)* is implied that simple potentiality which abides distinctly correlated as effect and cause. Whatever proceeds and admits of correlation with that threefold quality is called the "propertied" (*dharmí*) which is the subject of tranquillity, enlivening and latency. Thus gold, giving up the quality of the form of a necklace and assuming that of the form of a svastika cross, still appears as a golden form, *i. e.*, when in these slightly different characters the subject appears as a common property, it is subject, but when it abides as a distinct mode it is a property, and therefore it is described as the correlative of qualities.

[Properties do not always exist in the same form in the same way. Sometimes they are tranquil, at others active, or enlivened, and sometimes latent, and these properties are called *dharma,* and the thing with which they are correlated is the "propertied," or the substratum of qualities, or *Dharmi*—that which has the *Dharma.* A thing cannot be called a subject until it is correlated to a property, and a property ceases to be so when it qualifies nothing. On the other hand, by change of relation a subject may become a property and a property a subject—a subjective law or its objective outcome.]

To remove the doubt as to how a single (propertied) subject undergoes many modifications he says:

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XV.

The diversity of succession is the cause of the versatility of modifications.

Krama or "succession" of property as defined above and *anyatva*, "diversity," which is every moment visible, make the compound *Kramányatva*, (which has been rendered into "diversity of succession" in the text). And that is the "cause" (*hetu*), mark, or indicator of the (*anyatva*) or multiplicity or diversity of the modifications aforesaid. The meaning is this: Constant motion or succession, as from powdered earth into clay mass, thence flattened plates, thence a jar, shows the manifest form of the versatility of modifications. And whatever the motion in the subject of the modifications of time and condition, the same should be understood to be the argument in support of the versatility of modification. For certain all conditions appear constantly changing by constant motion, and the versatility of modification from constant mutability is thereby established. Of all mutable objects, like the thinking principle and the rest, some qualities are grasped by perception, such as pleasures, conditions and the like, and some are known by inference, such as fate, residuum, power, &c., and the propertied subject not being distinct from property is to be explained in the same way.

[Both the text and the commentary explain the subject in a very roundabout way. The purport is that the diversity of phenomena in the versatile world, is due to constant motion, or uninterrupted succession of changes. The three qualities are never at rest, they are flowing in a constant round of changes, and every change brings on some change of property, for were not properties to change, there would be no perceivable change. And the thinking principle, associated directly with the functions of the three qualities, must accordingly with these changes, be the agent of a multiplicity of functions, and that is its multifunctionality. The changes under notice are either perceivable

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by the senses, organs, or felt by the mind, but in both cases they apply to the thinking principle.]

Now, with a view to describe Siddhi (perfection) by showing the object of the Sañyama already described, he says:

XVI.

The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by Sañyama over the threefold modification.

The threefold modification resulting from distinctions of attribute, time and relation has been already described. By the Sañyama, *i. e.*, by practising the controuls aforesaid in connexion with this object, Yogís acquire a full knowledge of the past and the future. The purport is this: When a Yogí, knowing that in any given subject this is the attribute, this is the time, this is the relation, and it having performed its work in the present condition has entered the postcedent condition, performs the Sañyama by surmounting the obstructions, he knows everything, all that is passed, or that is to happen, because from the manifestation of the pure quality of goodness in the thinking principle, he then constantly rejects all obstacles caused by ignorance to the power of perceiving the purport of all and everything. When by these means all obstacles have been set aside, then, through concentration, the power of perceiving the property of all and everything becomes manifest as in a stainless mirror.

[Having explained the rationale of the action of the thinking principle on worldly objects, the author now proceeds to describe the effect of Sañyama on that action, and the occult powers which may be derived by that exercise. The first occult power or perfection noticed is the power of knowing the past and the future. This is acquired by directing the Sañyama to the threefold changes described in A. XIII, *i. e.*, by meditating about them till the light of truth rises in the thinking principle of the Yogí and makes everything manifest.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

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XVII.

A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge (arises) from indiscriminate understanding. By Sañyama with due discrimination, (is acquired an understanding) of the cry of all creatures.

A "word" (*śabda*) is a sound formed of letters joined in a fixed order, perceptible by the organ of hearing, and always conveying the same, single, distinct meaning; or it is a mere explosive sound having in it no fixed order, but still intelligible to cultivated understanding. In either case it forms words and sentences, for both are adapted to convey a fixed meaning. "Meaning" (*artha*) implies kind, quality, action, &c. "Understanding" (*pratyaya*) is knowledge, or the function of the intellect in which it assumes the form of the object (implied). By accepting in our intellect these naturally distinct word, meaning and understanding as one, there is confusion. Thus, in saying "bring a cow," the meaning is a cow (*go*), belonging specifically to the species cow, and having dewlap, &c.; the word is the indicator; and the understanding is the appreciation of it; and all these are grasped without any distinction. It is not used with a clear perception of the word cow being the indicator, the meaning being what is indicated by the word, and the understanding that which accepts the two; and if one is asked what is the meaning? what is the word? what is the understanding produced by it? he gives only one answer to all the questions by saying 'a cow.' Were he not to conceive all these to be identical, how could he give the same answer to all the questions? In this state he who makes the "distinction," (*pravibhága*) that the essential nature of a word is that it is the indicator (*váchaka*), that of its meaning is the indicated, and that of the understanding is making it manifest, and, making this distinction, places himself in Sañyama about it, acquires the knowledge of the cry (*ruta*) or word of all creatures, including feral and domestic quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, &c., *i. e.*,

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he knows with what particular motive a specific sound has been made by a particular animal.

[Words are correlated with meanings, and meanings with ideas. When sounds are reduced to speech there is a fixed relation between their constituents, and this relation is fixed by orthography and syntax; but when, in the cry of an animal for instance, this relation of sounds does not appear to be so fixed, it is not to be understood that there is no such relation, for without it the sounds could not convey meaning and idea. And the relation being admitted, it must follow that the cry of animals, which are intended to convey ideas, must have some such relation, and this relation can be learnt by directing the Sañyama to it. Ergo when the Sañyama is accomplished, the Yogí who performs it is able to understand the meaning of the cries of animals.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XVIII.

A knowledge of former existence by making the residua apparent.

Twofold are the residual impressions of the thinking principle. Some are simply productive of memory; others are the causes of the deserts, kind, life, and enjoyment, called virtue and vice. When Sañyama is performed in regard to these residua, the performer, enquiring into his former actions to the effect—thus has that object been perceived by me, thus has that act been performed by me, remembers all the past by the mere reflection, the residua being by themselves excited without any separate stimulants, and gradually visibly sees in the self-excited residua the kind, &c., experienced in former existences.

[As explained in A. XVIII, C. I., the residual impressions are of a twofold character. One class of them produce memory, that is when excited by a stimulus, the impressions which lie latent in the mind become vivid, even as an action done in childhood and afterwards entirely forgotten, is brought up in the mind many years after by the sight of the locality or other circumstance

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connected with it. Involuntary impressions received in dreams and the like are also so produced. The second class of impressions are those which bring on the desert of works; they are perfectly involuntary, and are mostly residua of former existences. By applying Sañyama to these, they are excited and become visible to the Yogí, and thereby he is able to know the events of his former existences.]

Another form of perfection.

XIX.

With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another's thinking principle.

"Cognition" (*pratyaya*) as indicated by some characteristic sign, such as the complexion and the like, of others. When a Yogí has performed the Sañyama with reference to it, he attains a knowledge of another's thinking principle. The meaning is, that one's own thinking principle, by entering the thinking principle of another, comes to know all its attributes, whether it is excited or otherwise.

[The principle explained above applies also to the thinking principles of other persons. The Sañyama applied to them brings them within the range of the understanding of the Yogí. The theory being that the thinking principle which thinks upon a thing assumes the form of that thing, it follows that the mind of the Yogí performing the Sañyama becomes the mind thought of, and thereby knows it.]

He now describes a peculiarity in the knowledge of other thinking principles.

XX.

(But) not along with its object, that not being the object (of the thinker).

But he is not able to know another's thinking principle (in the text represented by the pronoun it) "along with its object" (*sálambana*), *i. e.*, along with the object to which it is directed,

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because none of the characteristics of the object is made the subject (of the Sañyama). From the characteristic of the object not being reflected upon the thinking principle alone of another is known, but not that it is blue or yellow, because Sañyama cannot be directed to that which has not been made the object of it, and there can be no recognition where it is not made the object. Hence another thinking principle along with its object is not cognizable, the object not being taken into account. Now, the qualities of the thinking principle will be included. When contemplation is made as to what is the object, then from that Sañyama a knowledge of the whole subject is acquired.

[This aphorism qualifies the sense of the next preceding one. It says that by thinking on the thinking principle of another one can know it, but not its objects, unless those objects are also included. When they are included the knowledge is perfect.]

He describes another perfection.

XXI.

From Sañyama with reference to the shape of the body, the power of vision being benumbed, and the correlation of light and sight being severed, there is disappearance.

The "body" (*káya*) is the human frame, and its shape (*rúpa*) is that quality of it which is perceptible by the eye. The meaning is—of such a body such is the shape. Through Sañyama the power of the eye to perceive things becoming 'benumbed' (*stambha*), *i. e.*, obstructed through contemplation with reference to that shape, and "the correlation of light and sight being severed," *i. e.*, the luminousness of the eye which proceeds from the quality of goodness being "severed," or rendered incapable of performing its function, there is a disappearance of a Yogi, *i. e.*, none can see him. By this it should be known that the disappearance of sounds &c. is also implied, *i. e.*, by this exposition of the means of the

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disappearance of shape, &c., the disappearance of sounds, &c., the objects of the ears, &c., is described.

[Objects are perceivable by the light which the quality of goodness throws on them, but if this light be withdrawn by the quality of goodness being confined in the thinking principle, they cease to be so. Accordingly, when a Yogí performs Sañyama with reference to his body or any part of it he withdraws therefrom the quality of goodness, and the body or the part of it so acted upon ceases to have the quality of perceptibility, and the Yogí becomes invisible, inaudible, &c. When an object has no power of visibility in it, it necessarily becomes invisible. This is how the Yogí makes himself invisible.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XXII.

Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by Sañyama about them a knowledge of the final end; or by portents.

Life is the consequence of former works. They are of two kinds, "deliberate" and "non-deliberate." Thereof the "deliberate" or anticipatory (*sopakrama*) is that in which there is an anticipation of consequences in the attempt to produce a result, as in the spreading of wet cloth in a hot place in order that it may dry quickly. The reverse of the former is the "non-deliberate" (*nirupakrama*), as the leaving the same cloth in a lump in a cool place where it may dry after a long time. Whoever performs Sañyama with reference to these two kinds of work, (enquiring) 'whether my work will mature quickly or slowly,' in him, through firm contemplation, a knowledge of the final end is produced. "Final end" (*aparánta*) is the separation of the body from the soul, *i. e.*, death. A "knowledge of it," *i. e.*, 'at such a time, at such a place my death shall happen,' he acquires with certainty.

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"Or by portents" (*arishṭebhyas*). Portents are of three kinds, spiritual (*ádhyátmika*), material, (*ádhibhautika*) and supernatural (*ádhidaivika*). The spiritual is that (which is conveyed in a spiritual way, as) when one with the ears closed does not hear the sound of the vital air in the stomach, or such like (the said sound being ordinarily audible). The material is the sudden sight of a frightful human form, or the like. The supernatural is the accidental sight of invisible things, such as paradise, &c. By them one knows the time of death. Although knowledge may be acquired through portents by other than Yogís, it is in their case general and doubtful. In the case of Yogís, on the other hand, the time and place being certain, the perception is as certain as actual sight.

[The efficacy of this Siddhí depends upon the precision with which the events of past existences are realised in the mind by reviving their residua through the power of Sañyama. When their memory is perfect, one can easily calculate which of his former acts will bring on death within a short time, and which are destined to retard it. It will be seen that in the Yoga system residua or deserts play the part of fate, and if the nature of the residua be known, one knows his fate.]

In order to explain the perfection acquired by the purifying processes (Chap. I, A. XXXIII, p. 40) he says:

XXIII.

In friendliness, superhuman powers.

By performing Sañyama in regard to friendliness, mercy, complaisance, and indifference, super-human powers are acquired with reference to them, *i. e.*, in the performer friendliness, mercy, and complaisance attain such great excellence as to enable him to contract friendship with all (persons).

[The sense is obvious, and needs no comment.]

He describes another kind of perfection.

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XXIV.

In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the powers of the elephant and the like, powers like those of the elephant, &c., become manifest in the Yogí. The meaning is this: He who performs Sañyama in regard to the power of the elephant, the force of the wind, or the vigour of the lion, wishing it to be in him, becomes possessed of those powers.

[As obvious as the purport of the last preceding aphorism.]

Another perfection.

XXV.

From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge (is acquired) of the subtile, the intercepted and the remote.

The light of the extremely luminous disposition has already been described. (C. I, A. XXXVI). The "light" is that which expands the manifestation of the quality of goodness. From "contemplation" (*nyása*) of all things appertaining to it, *i. e.*, from thinking of the objects irradiated by it, a knowledge is produced, in one's own internal organ and the organs of sense endowed with special power, of the "subtile" (*súkshma*) such as atoms, &c., of the "intercepted" (*vyavahita*), as mines under the earth, and of the remote (*viprakrishṭa*), as the elixir of life existing on the other side of the Meru mountain.

[The clear light of the quality of goodness is what is meant by "the light of the extremely luminous disposition."]

Another perfection of a similar description.

XXVI.

From Sañyama in the sun, a knowledge of regions.

He who performs Sañyama with reference to the manifest sun, obtains a definite knowledge of whatever regions and towns exist in the seven spheres, including the terrine, the aërial, and the celestial. In the preceding aphorism the subject is the

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manifestation of the quality of goodness, here it is material, that is the distinction.

[The *P. Bháshya* gives a long account of the seven principal regions and their subsidiaries, taken from the Puráṇas, but it is not worth quoting. In Wilson's Vishṇu Puráṇa the details are given at length.]

Another perfection by means of reliance on material manifestation.

XXVII.

In the moon, a knowledge of the disposition of the stars.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the moon, a knowledge is derived of the disposition (*vyúha*), or the order of arrangement, of the starry luminaries. As the stars lose their light on the manifestation of the sun, Sañyama with reference to the sun cannot suffice to afford a knowledge of the stars, therefore a different means is (here) ordained.

[The reason given why the Sañyama with reference to the sun does not suffice to give an idea of the arrangement of the stars and planets appears ludicrous. Bhoja cannot have seen a star in day light. The *P. Bháshya* does not refer to it.]

Another perfection.

XXVIII.

In the Polar star, a knowledge of their motion.

A knowledge is produced of the "motion" (*gati*) of the particular time and position of each of the stars by performing Sañyama with reference to the Polar star (*Dhruva*), the chief, the fixed star. This is a star, that is a planet, this is the period within which it will reach a particular constellation,—all these are known. What is said is that this is the fruit of knowing their times.

[The *P. Bháshya* adds that the Sañyama applied to the firmanent above suffices the pupose. (*Ú'rddha-vimáneshu kṛita-*

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saṅyamastáni vijáṅíyát). It is not obvious why Bhoja has omitted this.]

After having described perfections regarding externals, he now attempts to describe internal perfections.

XXIX.

In the navel-wheel, a knowledge of the disposition of the body.

A knowledge is acquired by the Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to the "wheel" (*chakra*) of sixteen radii which exists in the middle of the body, and is called "navel" (*nábhi*), of the "disposition" (*vyúha*) obtaining in the body of fluids, excrements, humours, tubes, &c. What is said is this—the navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes, therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body.

[Down to the last aphorism the effect of Sañyama applied to external objects formed the theme of comment; now the author turns to objects situated within the body. The first is the navel-wheel, which is said to have sixteen radii. How this idea got into currency I cannot make out. Ancient Hindus must have seen the human abdomen dissected, and having seen it, it is impossible to imagine, how they conjured up the idea of a wheel with sixteen radii. There must be some recondite metaphor involved in this, but I know not what it is.]

Another perfection.

XXX.

In the throat-well, the subdual of hunger and thirst.

The well in the throat is "throat-well" (*kaṇṭhakúpa*). It is a pit or well-like place (and therefore called a well) behind and below the tongue and palate. By the contact of the vital airs with it (the sensations of) hunger and thirst are produced. The hunger

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and thirst of the Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to that well, are subdued. The streams (of the vital airs) being satisfied below the uvula, this kind of perfection is accomplished.

[The throat-well is the pharynx where the air from the mouth and that from the cavity of the nostrils meet.]

Another perfection.

XXXI.

Firmness in the tortoise tube.

Firmness of the mind is acquired by performing Sañyama with reference to the tube, called the "tortoise" (*kúrma*), which is situated below the throat-well. The meaning is—that on the mind entering that spot there happens no vacillation, in other words, such a firmness of the body is produced that no one can cause it to shake.

[The tortoise tube is the lower part of the larynx including the bronchí.]

Another perfection.

XXXII.

In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones.

In the skull there is an aperture called *Brahma-randhra*. It is called "light" (*jyotih*) because it is the site of light. Even as the spreading effulgence of a jewel in a closed room collects at the keyhole, so the light of the quality of goodness in the heart spreading collects at that aperture. And by the performance of Sañyama in it by Yogís, those perfected ones, or celestial beings, who dwell in the space between the earth and the sky and are invisible to ordinary people, become visible, *i. e.*, Yogís see them, and hold converse with them. This is the meaning.

[The point at the crest of the frontal bone remains open in childhood when the parietal bones are not sufficiently developed; at maturity this opening is closed; but, its existence having once been proved, it is believed to exist always, and is called Brahma-

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randhra. Life is said to depart through this aperture in certain cases, and spiritually it is reckoned to be the most important part of the body. In the Tantras it is referred to with great reverence.

This is the only aphorism in the Yoga system which may be assumed as recognising the truth of the spiritual manifestations of modern European spiritualists; the *rationale*, however, is entirely different.]

He now describes the means of becoming all-knowing.

XXXIII.

Or from *Prátibha*, everything.

Pratibhá is that knowledge which is independent of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved. By performing Sañyama with reference to it this *Prátibha* knowledge, called *Táraka* or emancipator, which results before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, arises. Even as the light which becomes apparent before the rising sun, so this *Táraka*, or knowledge of everything before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, becomes apparent. When this is the case, the Yogí can know everything without resource to any particular Sañyama.

[The *P. Bháshya* explains the word *Prátibha* by the phrase *Prátibham náma tárakam*, which may mean the Morning Star, the one which is visible a little before sunrise, or that it is an emancipator. Patañjali, perhaps, referred to the star, as the light of that star prepares the way for the illumination of the universe by the sun; but Bhoja, having set a limit to external objects at the close of the 28th aphorism, is compelled to take the Pratibhá to be something different. According to his definition, it is a sort of instinct, or intuition, "the knowledge which is independant of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved." He has, nevertheless, been obliged to preserve the relation of the star to the sun by referring to the illumination resulting from sunrise. The

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morning star is not, like the Polar star, always the same, different planets serving its place at different times, and this uncertainty must have told against the material meaning being accepted as the right one. Whether the practising Yogí should think on the morning star, or intuition is a question which I cannot decide, but Bhoja has obviously the best of the argument.]

Another perfection.

XXXIV.

In the heart, a consciousness of the thinking principle.

"Heart" (*hṛidaya*) is a particular part of the body. The locale of the internal organ is within a small, inverted lotus placed in that part of the body. By performing Sañyama with reference to it, a knowledge of the thinking principle of one's own and of another person is obtained, *i. e.*, the Yogí comes to know all the residua in his own thinking principle, as well as the passions, &c., in other thinking principles.

[The description of the heart is obviously rhetorical. As the seat of the thinking principle it is described as the must appropriate spot to which attention should be directed to know it thoroughly.]

Another perfection.

XXXV.

Experience is an undefined conception of the quality of goodness and the soul, which are totally unconnected. From Sañyama for its own object, and not for another's object, proceeds a knowledge of the soul.

"The quality of goodness" (*sattva*) is a particular modification of nature (*pradhána*); it is characterised by illumination and joy. 'Soul' (*purusha*) is the experiencer in the form of a ruler. From the distinction of the experiencer and the experience,—

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of the rational and the irrational—there is total unconnection between the two, *i. e.*, they are separate. "A conception" of the two without any distinction, not knowing them distinctly, is experience. Hence whatever consciousness of pleasure and pain is felt by the quality of goodness assuming itself to be the master is experience. Goodness having no object of its own, its work is for "another's object," (*parártha*), *i. e.*, for the object of the soul. That which is distinct from it is its "own object," (*svártha*); which is reliance on the true nature of the soul, or the connection of the shadow of the soul with the quality of goodness (*sattva*) devoid of egotism. By the performance of Sañyama in that connection, a knowledge of the object of the soul is derived, *i. e.*, the soul knows reliant perception to be in this way dependant on the quality of goodness. Nor does there arise any difficulty about the soul, the knower, becoming the object of knowledge, for the objection will be met by the argument of knowability (*i. e.*, that which is the knower cannot be the knowable); because the knower and the knowable are quite contrary.

[The soul is the experiencer of joys and sorrows; it experiences them by its being reflected on the intellect, which is the immediate experiencer. The two are essentially different; one is sentient, the other inert; one the enjoyer, the other the enjoyed. An association of the two is brought about by the former being reflected on the latter, and then the former experiences what is produced in the latter. The latter, however, being irradiated by the former, acts the part of the agent or actor, and whatever it thereby feels is called enjoyment. This feeling, however, is for another's purpose, *i. e.*, for the purpose of the soul, its own purpose being the merging in that soul. In the one case it works for another, and falsely imagines itself to be the actor, and in the other it acts with a vew to attain its own end. When Sañyama is performed with this discrimination and with the object of knowing the soul, the knowledge is acquired.]

He now describes the fruits of this Sañyama.

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XXXVI.

Thence proceed intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction.

"Thence," from performing Sañyama in the said quality of goodness, or practising it; even in the waking state these faculties are produced. Thereof "intuition" (*Prátibha*) is the knowledge already described (A. XXXIII) on the manifestation of which minute objects become visible.

"Audition" (*S'rávaṇa*) is the knowledge produced in the organ of hearing. Therefrom the highest celestial sound, or that which is produced in the heaven, becomes audible.

"Taction" (*Vedaná*) is the knowledge produced by the organ of touch. That by which is known that a thing exists (*vidyati anayá*) is Vedaná; it is a Tantric term which has been used here. Therefrom proceeds the knowledge of such celestial things as are subjects of touch.

"Vision" (*Ádarśa*) is that knowledge which is produced by the organ of sight. Whereby is seen (*dṛis'yati*) or perceived thoroughly what every form is, is *ádarśa*. When it is in its full development a knowledge of celestial forms is produced by it.

"Gustation" (*Ásváda*) is the knowledge produced by the organ of taste. That by which a thing is tasted (*ásvádati aneneti*) is *ásváda*, and on its full development a perception of celestial taste is produced.

"Olfaction" (*Vártá*) is the sensation of smell. In Tántric terminology the word *vṛitti* means the organ of smelling; that in which resides (*vaṛttate*) the objects of smell (is *vṛitti*) and that which proceeds from that organ of smell is *Vártá*, *i. e.*, the sensation of smell. When that becomes fully developed celestial smells become perceptible.

[This aphorism explains the collateral advantages of performing Sañyama with reference to the soul. These advantages are superior or transcendental powers in the organs of sense. Nor

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are those powers confined to the meditative state; when once acquired, they are retained permanently, and even in his ordinary worldly waking state the Yogí can exercise them, so that in his ordinary faculties he becomes infinitely superior to common mortals.]

Of these different fruits he now describes the respective provinces.

XXXVII.

These are obstacles in the meditative condition (but) perfections in the waking state.

"These," the different fruits described above. In the state of meditation they are "obstacles," (*upasargas*,) hindrances, disturbers, because from joy, wonder, &c., resulting thereform, meditation becomes relaxed. In the state of waking (*vyutthána*), *i. e.*, in the ordinary state of life, they are, however, perfections (*siddhayah*), because then they yield desirable fruits.

[The perfections described are of the world worldly, required for worldly purposes, but useless for higher meditation, *i. e.*, for meditation having isolation for its aim. Nor are they simply useless, but positively obstructive, for they interfere with the even tenor of calm meditation. In the waking state they may be gratifying, and, indeed, they are useful only in that state, but apart from it they are not wanted.]

He describes another perfection.

XXXVIII.

From slackness of the cause of bondage and from a knowledge of the process, the entrance of the thinking principle into another body.

The consciousness which results of the experiencer and the experience, acting from the constant relation existing between the soul and the intellect residing inside the body and from pervasion, is called corporeal bondage (*s'arírabandha*). When through medita-

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tion the cause of bondage, which is work in the twofold form of virtue and vice, becomes slack, or attains attenuity, and when a Yogí knows the process, *i. e.*, the way in which the thinking principle issues from the heart through the organs towards worldly objects, knowing full well this is the tube called *chittavahá* through which the thinking principle circulates, and it differs thus from the tubes through which the vital airs and the rest circulate, and also knows the passages in his own body and that of others, he can enter, by the passage through which the thinking principle circulates, into the body of another, whether it be dead or alive. The thinking principle, after entering another body, follows the bent of the senses even as honey-bees follow the queen bee, (*lit.* king bee). And the Yogí who has entered another body uses it as his own body. Since work is the cause of circumscribing the fruition of the pervading soul and the thinking principle, if that circumscription be weakened or destroyed by meditation, fruition may result everywhere from the independence of the thinking principle.

[The transfer of one's own soul into another body plays a prominent part in the legendary lore of India, and the idea was not unknown at one time in Europe. How this transfer is effected is explained in this aphorism. The bondage of the soul to the body is due to works and their deserts, works having been performed their deserts must be borne by the soul in association with the body; but when through meditation the residua of works are obliterated and the bond is loosened, and the Yogí knows the way in which the soul goes out and comes into a body, he can, at will, make the soul travel by that way and enter another body, whether dead or alive, and again, at will, withdraw it from that body, and bring it back to its own. And wherever the soul rests there it works upon the organs, and enjoys their experiences, or in other words, the organs follow the soul as do working bees their queen.]

Another perfection.

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XXXIX.

From subdual of Udána, ascension and detachment from water, mud, thorns, &c.

The simultaneous waking, like the flaming up of burning chaff, of the functions (of the body) is indicated by the phrase vital air, (*Jívana*), and from differences of action, that vital air is indicated severally by the terms Práṇa, Apána, &c. Thereof one form of air is called *Práṇa*, because it passes (*praṇayanát*,) from the heart through the mouth and the nostrils. That air which descends (*apanayanát*) from the navel down to the great toe is called *Apána*. Another is called *Samána*, because, surrounding the navel, it permeates everywhere (*samantánnayanát*). Another is called *Udána*, because it ascends from the back of the neck to the head (*unnayanát*). Another air pervades the whole body, and is called *Vyána*, because it circulates over the whole body, (*vyápya nayanát*). From the subdual of the Udána, through Sañyama, the other airs being suppressed and the tendency being upwards, the Yogí does not suffer from "water," *i. e.*, in large rivers, &c., nor from large collections of "mud," (*kardama*,) bogs, nor from sharp "thorns" (*kaṇṭaka*), *i. e.*, from his lightness he rises, like a floss of cotton, even when drowned in water or the like.

[The body is kept alive by five vital airs, and of these that which is called Udána is characterised by its tendency to rise upwards. Now, by making Sañyama in reference to it the tendency of the other airs are overcome, and the whole body tends upwards, consequently there is no gravitation, and the Yogí is neither drowned in water, nor submerged in a bog. The attenuity of his body at the time is such that it cannot be pierced by a thorn.]

XL.

From subdual of Samána, effulgence.

From the "subdual" (*jayát*) of the air called Samána which surrounds the fire (of the stomach), *i. e.*, by bringing it under

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control through Sañyama, that unprotected fire ascends, and the Yogí appears effulgent as if flaming in glory.

[The stomach is the seat of the fire which keeps up the heat of the body and consumes food; and this fire is surrounded and kept in its place by the air called Samána. Such being the theory, it follows that when by Sañyama the air in question is overcome or rendered inapt in its special function, the fire, from its natural tendency upwards, should rise up and escape from the body in lambent flames of glory. The Buddhists, who developed the Yoga system to its utmost limit, declare that the crown of the head, the space between the eyebrows, the mouth and the shoulders are the places whence these flames usually issue. In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature of Nepal these flames are frequently described as issuing from the person of S'ákya Buddha, whenever he immersed himself in a profound meditation, and in ancient sculptures images of Buddha are often represented with these flames occupying the place of halo, nimbus, aureola, or glory of European art. A physical cause for these flames may be found in the electric flames which have been noticed by Reichenbach on the persons of highly electric tendency under certain conditions. Of course it is an open question as to whether Yogís had seen such electric flames and derived their descriptions therefrom, or drawn them from their fancy.]

Another perfection.

XLI.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the organ of hearing and ether, a superperfect organ of hearing.

"Organ of hearing" (*S'rotra*) is that organ which perceives sound, and is produced by egotism. "Ether" (*Ákáśa*) is sky, the result of the subtle rudiment of sound (*S'abdatanmátra*). The "relation" (*sambandha*) between the two is that of the site and the situated. The Yogí who has performed Sañyama with reference to it attains a superperfect organ of hearing (*Divyas'rotra*), and

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becomes able to hear simultaneously subtile, intercepted, and distant sounds.

[The ether is the product of the rudiment of sound; and the organ of hearing is dependant on it for the performance of its function; and if the relation between the two be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to ether, the performer obtains the power of knowing it under all circumstances.]

Another perfection.

XLII.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the body and ether, travelling in ether, from acquisition of levity, like that of cotton.

The "body" (*káya*), is the form made of the five elements. By performing Sañyama with reference to the relation which exists between the body and ether which yields space (for objects to abide in) a levity, like that of cotton and the like, is effected, *i. e.*, they become alike. Having effected this and attained the levity, the Yogí, walking at will over water, or on a spider's web, or on the rays of the sun, at his choice travels on ether.

[The *rationale* of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last; the body is kept down by the ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it.]

Another perfection.

XLIII.

The function independent of external functions is the great incorporeal. Therefrom the destruction of the covering of light.

That mental function which is out of the body, *i. e.*, independent of it, is named the "great incorporeal" (*Mahávideha*), because it is exclusive of the stedfastness of the relation between the body and egotism. "Therefrom," from Sañyama performed with reference to it, the destruction of the covering of light is

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effected, *i. e.*, the covering consisting of afflictions, works, &c., which obstruct the light of the thinking principle centered in the quality of goodness alone, is removed. The meaning is this: The external functions of the thinking principle which result from the body and egotism are called factitious (*kalpita*). When, abandoning the feeling of body and egotism, there arises an independent (or self-reliant) mental function it is non-fictitious (*akalpita*). By performing Sañyama with reference to it, all taints in the thinking principle of the Yogí are removed.

[The covering produced by the qualities of foulness and darkness prevent the true light of the quality of goodness from being seen to perfection. If that covering be removed the vision is perfect. When retiring under this covering, which is no other than consciousness under the name of egotism, the mind entertains factitious ideas, and produces factitious works, which are consequently false. Divested of this covering it works differently, and whatever it produces is real. Sañyama performed with reference to the relation existing between the body and egotism removes the covering, and thereby cleanses the thinking principle.]

Having thus described the different forms of perfection, including anterior destruction of objects, posterior destruction of objects, and the middle condition; having also explained the knowledge of the externals, regions, &c., of the internals, the formation of the body, of the powers of friendliness, &c., which effect particular objects; having, further, described the conditions of internal and external organs and such like expedients for meditation, as also the conditions of the vital airs, Práṇa, &c., and other perfections for producing stedfastness in the thinking principle and earnestness in meditation; he now, with a view to point out the various means for the perfection of the seeded and the seedless meditations for the visual inspection of the soul, says,

XLIV.

From Sañyama with reference to grossness, nature, subtlety, concomitance and fruition, conquest of the elements.

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By performance of Sañyama with reference to the five specific conditions or qualities, such as grossness, &c., of the five elements, earth, &c., the conquest of the elements is effected, *i. e.*, the elements become subservient. Thereof "grossness" (*sthula*) implies the specific forms in which the elements are perceived. "Nature" (*svarúpa*) implies respectively their effects, such as smell, viscidity, heat, impulsion, and impenetrability. "Subtlety" (*súkshma*) implies successively the subtile conditions which are the causes of the elements: these are the subtile or rudimentary forms of matter (*tanmátra*). "Concomitancy" (*anvaya*) includes the qualities of shape, disposition, and existence, which are everywhere seen to co-exist. "Fruition" (*arthavatva*) is that power in the qualities which lead to enjoyment and emancipation. Thus, by performing Sañyama in regard severally to the five elements, nature and conditions aforesaid, the Yogí conquers the elements. This is to be done in this way,—first in the gross form, next in the subtile form. To the performer of Sañyama in this order, nature and the elements become fulfillers of desires, even as cows follow calves.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain the advantages derivable from the performance of Sañyama with reference to the five elements. The elements brought under control subserve the wants and wishes of the controller, even as cows subserve the acquirements of calves by following them wherever they ramble.]

He now describes the fruit of this conquest over the elements.

XLV.

Therefrom proceed attenuation, &c., as also excellence of body and the indestructibility of its qualities.

(1) "Attenuation" (*animá*) the attainment of the form of atoms (molecularity).

(2) "Levity" (*laghimá*) attainment of lightness like that of a floss of cotton.

(3) "Ponderosity" (*garimá*) attainment of great weight.

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(4) "Illimitability," (*mahimá*) attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.

(5) "Irresistible will" (*prákámya*) non-frustration of desires.

(6) "Supremacy" (*ís'itva*) highest authority over the body and the internal organ.

(7) "Subjection" (*vas'itva*) prevailing everywhere, *i. e.*, the elements being subservient to him do not disobey his behests.

(8) "Fulfilment of desires," (*kámávasáyitva*) accomplishing one's desire everywhere, *i. e.*, in whatever object a desire is formed, the Yogí becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it.

These, attenuations, &c., as accessories to meditation, become pevalent in Yogís on their conquering the elements. Thus by attaining molecularity he can enter into (the substance of) a diamond. The other cases should be explained in the same way. These eight qualities, attenuation, &c., are called great perfections, (*mahásiddhis*). "Excellence of body" (*káyasampat*), which will be presently described, is also obtained. "The indestructibility of its qualities," means that the shape and the other qualities of that body are not liable to destruction by any means. Neither does fire burn its shape, nor wind dry it up, and so on.

[The exact nature of the advantages to be derived from Sañyama with reference to the elements, not having been described in the next preceding aphorism, the author supplies the omission in this aphorism. The advantages are the eight siddhis or perfections an account of which has already been given on page 121. They include many of the perfections described in separate aphorisms. I fail to perceive any marked distinction between the 5th and the 8th. The explanation of the 8th given on p. 121 is Tántric.]

He next explains what excellence of the body is—

XLVI.

Colour, loveliness, might, and adamantine hardness constitute the excellence of the body.

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"Colour, loveliness, and might" are well-known. "Adamantine hardness" (*vajrasañhananatva*) means that hardness is produced in one's body like that of the diamond. These are the excellences that become manifest in the body.

[While yearning for the severance of all bondage to worldly objects, the Yogís cannot get over the natural love which ties the mind to the body. The body is one's own, and it is always desirable to have it in a perfect state of beauty, and the means are here provided to give it perfection. Of course it is introduced here as the effect of a particular kind of Sañyama, and not as a thing to be desiderated.]

Having thus explained the excellence of the body, he now describes the conquest of the organs by one who has attained his (proper) stage.

XLVII.

From the performance of Sañyama with reference to perception, nature, egoism, concomitance, and fruition, (proceeds) the conquest of the organs.

"Perception" (*grahaṇa*) is the function of the organs directed to their (respective) objects. "Nature" (*svarúpa*) is ordinary manifesting power. "Egoism" (*asmitá*) is consciousness. "Concomitance" (*anvayatva*) and "fruition" (*arthavatva*) as explained above (A. XLIV, p. 157). By performing Sañyama with reference to these five conditions of these organs the Yogí becomes the conqueror of his organs.

[The five conditions of these organs include 1st, their nature, *i. e.*, their power of making objects manifest; 2nd, their function when in active operation; 3rd, their consciousness of being active; 4th, their concomitance or relation to each other or mutual interdependance; and 5th, their fruition or the result they produce. If all these conditions be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to them, the organs necessarily come under complete control.]

The fruit thereof.

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XLVIII.

Therefrom proceed quickness as of mind, uninstrumental perception, and the conquest of nature.

"Quickness as of mind" (*manojavitva*) is the attainment by the body of extreme quickness of motion like that of the mind. "Uninstrumental perception" (*vikaraṇa bhâva*) is the accomplishment of the functions of the organs without the aid of the body. "Conquest of nature" *(pradhánajaya)* is bringing everything under subjection. These perfections are attained by those who have overcome their organs. In this science these are called honey-drops (*madhupratíka*). Even as every drop of honey has its taste, so each of these is tasteful, and therefore they are honey-drops.

[The advantage of having control over the organs as described in the last preceding aphorism is, that the Yogí is then able to perceive things without the aid of his material organs, and to do so with the quickness of the mind, *i. e.*, instantaneously. He also acquires mastery over nature in every way. The nature here referred to is the *Pradhána* of the Sáñkhya categories, the highest of the twenty-five, next only to soul.]

Having described the conquest of the (external) organs, he now points out the conquest of the internal organ.

XLIX.

Supremacy over all conditions and omniscience, the moment the distinctive knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul (is attained).

The knowledge of the distinction between the quality of goodness and the soul which results from performing Sañyama with reference to the modification of pure goodness, is "distinctive knowledge" (*anyatákhyáti*). From the subsidence, through the influence of the Sañyama, of the conception about the qualities being agents the Yogís, who are in that condition, attain in their meditation supremacy over all conditions and omniscience.

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"Supremacy over all conditions" (*sarvabhávádhishṭhátritva*) is the attainment of power like a master over all modifications of qualities. "Omniscience" (*sarvajṇatṛitva*) is correct knowledge of those qualities as they exist in calm, (*śánta,*) enlivened, (*udita,*) and latent (*avyapadisya*) conditions. In this science this perfection is called "sorrowless perfection" *vis'okasiddhi*, while those that have been described before are indicated by the term *vas'ikára* (controul).

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the effect of getting controul over the mind or the internal organ. That controul enables the Yogí to perceive the difference between the quality of goodness and the soul, and endows him with absolute mastery over all conditions of existence and thorough omniscience. The omniscience directly refers to the conditions of the three qualities, but indirectly to all and everything in the universe. Everything in the universe depends upon the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and those qualities are either in a calm state, or in a state of excitement, or latent; and if one comes to know their conditions he necessarily knows all and everything that proceeds from them. This state of supreme knowledge is called *Vis'oka* or sorrowless perfection, for when it is attained there cannot possibly be any cause for pain or sorrow; whereas in the perfections previously described there is always some room for sorrow, or longing of some kind or other. The latter ensure controul over the things they refer to, and the controul is more or less perfect according to circumstances, and they are fitly called *Vas'ikára* or 'controul.' They do not, however, secure absolute immunity from pain, and this necessitates the marked distinction in the designations.]

Next he describes another stage.

L.

From indifference even to this (perfection) through destruction of the seed of evils, (results) isolation.

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When the Yogí becomes indifferent even to that sorrowless perfection, then ignorance, the seed of the evils such as passion, &c., being destroyed by the root, "isolation," (*kaivalya*,) absolute cessation of pain, results, *i. e.*, on the termination of the influence of the qualities the soul is restored, placed permanently, in its own state.

[Nor is the sorrowless perfection the ultimatum. When the Sañyama is exercised freely it produces an indifference in the mind in regard to it, and this indifference destroys ignorance, the root of all evil, and leads to isolation, or the detachment of soul from the bondage of worldly ties.]

He now points out the means of remaining in this meditation.

LI.

Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evils recurring.

There are four classes of Yogís; *viz.*, 1st, those practisers of the Yoga on whom the light is just shedding; 2nd, Ritambharas, or those who possess the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3rd, those who have conquered the elements and the organs; 4th, those who have exceeded all objects of contemplation. Thereof, to those who have attained the fourth meditation, when the seven surrounding stages of knowledge have been attained, and the final stage of 'honeyed knowledge' has been interviewed, the celestial (*sthánináh*) gods become tempters, *i. e.*, they offer presents of handsome women, elixir vitæ, &c. With such temptations no association should be made, nor any encouragement be given to them. From association there is a fall into the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. With regard to them therefore both association and encouragement should be renounced.

[When the Yogí attains the last described sorrowless stage, he is exposed to a great danger. The gods envy his high excellence, but, unable to exercise open enmity, they try to divert him from

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his purpose by insidious means. They place temptations in his way, offer him handsome women, inexhaustible wealth, long life, and so forth to bring him back to the ways of the world, and thereby frustrate his purpose of attaining isolation. They act the part of Satan in the Bible and of Mára in the Buddhist system. In Hindu legends Indra is the chief god who envies men who are about to rise superior to carnal weakness, and the means he employs are the courtezans of his court, who descend on earth and tempt all Yogís by their celestial charms. According to the Tantras when such temptations fail, resort is made to fear. Frightful forms of all kinds assail the Yogí when he is engaged in his meditations; venomous serpents hiss around him; tigers prowl about him; ogres come with wide open mouth to devour him. These are, in the technical language of the Yoga system, called *Vibhíshiká*. The lukewarm yield to these, break their meditation, and are lost; the determined take no note of them, and attain their object. It is believed that these frightful forms never do any actual mischief; their object is to frighten, to put to test the determination and firmness of the Yogí, and not to do any positive harm. The advice given in the Tantras is not to give any encouragement to such temptations, nor to be depressed or frightened by the dangers which become manifest. Firmness suffices to overcome them. The text here does not refer to frightening.]

In connexion with the manifestation of this fruitful understanding, he describes a means besides the Sañyamas above described.

LII.

From Sañyama with reference to the course of moments (proceeds) an understanding born of discriminative knowledge.

"Moment" (*kshaṇa*) is the smallest division of time, which can no further be reduced in quantity. "Course" (*krama*) the suc-

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cessive modifications of such moments of time. By performing Sañyama with reference to the course of moments, the aforesaid understanding of discriminative knowledge results. The meaning is this: This is a moment of time, it is subsequent to another, therefore the first is antecedent to this. For him who has performed Sañyama with reference to this course, interview with the minutest is effected in the course of a moment, and so is the interview effected of the subtile nature. This is manifestation of discriminative knowledge.

[The next step of the Yogí is to perform Sañyama with reference to the progress of time, and when this is accomplished, discriminative knowledge becomes thoroughly manifest.]

He now applies this Sañyama to a special subject.

LIII.

Therefrom results the knowledge of the difference between two similars when that difference is not marked out by kind, character and habitat.

"Kind, character, and habitat" (*játi, lakshaṇa, des'a*) are the means of differenciation of things. Sometimes "kind" (*játi*) is the cause of distinction; as this is a cow, this is a buffalo. When the kind is the same, "character" (*lakshaṇa*) may be the cause of distinction; as this is spotted, this is tawny. Where kind and character are alike, the cause of distinction may be "habitat," (*des'a*); thus with two emblic fruits of the same size and colour, one may be of one country and the other of another. There are again cases in which distinction cannot be determined, as particles of white earth of one country. When Sañyama is performed to ascertain distinctions in the last class of cases, a knowledge of distinction is produced, and by its exercise distinctions of even the exceedingly subtile categories may be perceived. What is said is this: When distinctions cannot be ascertained by any other means they, including a knowledge of such

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distinctions in the subtile categories, may be known through this Sañyama.

[This aphorism explains what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Under ordinary circumstances discrimination is made by attention to kind, character and habitat. But this is not possible in the case of the subtile categories which are not amenable to such tests. For them Sañyama is the only means, and it should be brought to bear upon them. When the Sañyama is accomplished, the power of discriminating them is fully acquired, and this is discriminative knowledge.]

To explain the name, object, and nature of the aforesaid knowledge resulting from discrimination, he says.

LIV.

The knowledge resulting from discrimination is emancipating, omni-objective, semper-objective, instantaneous.

The knowledge which results from the power of the aforesaid Sañyama at the last stage is "emancipating" (*Táraka*). That whereby Yogís are ferried over the unfathomable ocean of the world has the significant name of Táraka, (the emancipating). He describes its object; it is a "omni objective" (*sarva-vishaya*); all categories from the Mahat downward are its objects, and therefore it is omni-objective. Its characteristic is its semper-objectivity (*sarvathávishayatva*). That which has for its objects the categories in all conditions, whether gross or subtile, in all their modifications, and existing in all forms, is always semper-objective. Another characteristic of it is "instantaneousness" (*akrama*). Being finally modified it has to make no progress in accepting two, three or one form, hence "instantaneous," *i. e.*, (a Yogí in this stage) perceives everything at once, like an emblic fruit in the palm of one's hand.

[The discriminative knowledge aforesaid is here more fully explained. It grasps all the categories and therefore the whole

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universe. It makes them its object at all times, and its knowledge is never absent. It acts instantaneously, because it has the whole thing before it, and needs no process of observation and retiociation to come to an understanding. And everything being known by it, it effects emancipation, for emancipation means true knowledge.]

He now says what results from this emancipating knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

LV.

On the purification of the quality of goodness and of soul becoming equal, (there results) isolation.

"The quality of goodness and soul" have already been defined. When their purification becomes equal there is isolation. The "purification" (*s'uddhi*) of the quality of goodness of the thinking principle is effected when, on the cessation of the assumption of agency, it merges into its first cause. The purification of soul is the absence of its factitious enjoyment. When the two are equally purified (in this way), isolation is effected with regard to the soul, *i. e.* it is emancipated.

[The thinking principle ordinarily fancies itself to be the agent of all work, *i. e.*, it is conscious of being the actor in all cases, and this is its natural function; but when this feeling is removed by discriminative knowledge, it reverts to its primary original condition, and ceases to cherish any idea of its being the actor, and this is its purification. Similarly soul, though itself devoid of action, is always engaged in an unnatural factitious enjoyment of the fruits of work by its ass ciation with the thinking principle, and when that association is removed it is purified. And this double purification, the cessation of the thinking principle from fancying itself the actor and consequent submersion into its original cause, and the removal of the association between the soul and the thinking principle, effects the isolation or separation of the soul from all attachments, and this is emancipation from the bondage of the world.]

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Thus have been described in this chapter the three principal components of the Yoga, (I—III); their collective name Sañyama, (IV); the merits of that Sañyama, (V—X); the three modifications of things, the antecedent, the middle, the postcedent conditions, (XI—XVI); the Siddhis (XVII); the external perfections giving knowledge of regions (XVIII—XXVIII); the internal perfections, giving knowledge of the organization of the body (XXIX—XLI); the organs (XLI); the stages of controul of matter and organizations (XLI—XLVIII); the means of attaining discriminative knowledge, the emancipating knowledge, the highest Samadhi (XLIX—L); the subsidence of the thinking principle in its primary cause and isolation (L—LIV). These are the subjects described in this chapter on perfections. (Condensed as before.)

This is the end of the third quarter, or the quarter on perfections, of the commentary, entitled Rájamártaṇḍa, on Patañjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

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CHAPTER FOURTH.

I adore that solitary, unborn Is'ána who is made up solely of thinking principle and bliss, and by whose fiat isolation is produced without (the aid of) any special means.

Now the author commences the chapter on Isolation with a view to establish by inferential arguments and by refutation of errors resulting from mistaken convictions, the true nature of Isolation. And by showing that the perfections aforesaid result from birth and various other causes, he demonstrates that they appear with the help of the power resulting from the practice of Samádhi in former births and from causes in this life from the time of birth. Further, with a view to afford assurance that no harm is done to Samádhi which may be acheived in course of many births, and to prove the preeminence of the completion of Samádhi as also for the consummation of the isolating Yoga, he says :—

I.

The Perfections are produced by birth, herb, incantations, austerity, or Samádhi.

Some perfections are caused by birth, as the power of flying in the air and the like in birds, or the perfected qualities of knowledge manifesting themselves immediately after birth, as in the great sage Kapila and others. *Perfections from herbs*—as firmness of the boy, &c. produced by the use of elixirs in Pátála and such like places. *Perfections from incantations*—as ascent in the air by the repetition of particular mantras. *Perfections from austerity*—as in the case of Vis'vámitra and others. *Perfections from Samádhi*—as already described in the preceding chapter.

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These perfections result in those persons who have destroyed pain in previous births; hence, as in the case of perfection by Samádhi, so in the case of others, the real cause is the practice of Samádhi in former births; incantations, &c. are merely instruments.

[The word *Siddhi* comes from the root *sish* 'to accomplish,' and means something accomplished. Transcendental powers attainable by the performance of Sañyama, are perfections accomplished by special means and therefore called Siddhis or perfections; and having used that English equivalent elsewere I have thought fit, for the sake of uniformity, to use it in the above aphorism. It is, however, not fully expressive here. Special powers, or faculties would have been much more expressive and to the point, the purport of the aphorism being that some faculties are derived from birth, some from herbs, some from incantations, some from the practice of austerities, and some from Samádhi. This general principle is laid down with a view to prepare the way to what follows.]

It might be contended that since in Nandís'vara and others the change of kind, &c., were effected in this life, how can you then establish the causality of the practice of Samádhi in previous lives? In reply to this, he says:

II.

Change of kind (results) from transmutation of the material cause.

The "change of kind," &c., in Nandís'vara and others in this life (were produced) by "the transmutation of material causes" (*prakṛityápúrát*). Future materials (or materials which are ordinarily produced in a subsequent life, come up and), produce in this life the transmutations, *i. e.*, they change themselves into other kinds.

[The general principle having been laid down in the first aphorism that special faculties are produced by five causes, the question arises, how does the body, which is produced by birth, change even in this life, the material cause remaining unaltered,

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and the Samádhi performed in a previous life no thaving effected any change at birth? The reply is that Samádhi is not the material but an instrumental cause, and it prepares the way for he selfmutation of the material cause.

Prakṛiti is here used in the sense of material cause, or the materials of which the body is made up. *Ápúraṇa* is to fill up. The two words together mean "the materials fill up," *i. e.*, they undergo the necessary transmutations to change one kind into another. The purport is that even in this life the materials of the body may so change as to convert a Bráhmaṇ's body into a divine one, as in the case of Nandís'vara, or a Kshatríya body into a Bráhmaṇa one, as in the case of Vis'vámitra, and consequently the exception taken to the argument put forth in the first aphorism to the effect that "birth, &c. are causes of perfection" is not tenable. By the use of the word *páśchátya*, 'future', the commentator means that the changes which in ordinary course would take place in a future life, take place in exceptional cases in this life.]

It may be argued that merits, demerits, &c., are in such cases seen to be resulting (in this life when their fruits would not under the theory be liable to manifestation), how can we then attribute to them causality in the transmutation of the material cause in this life? To this the author says:

III.

In the mutation of the material cause merit is non-efficient: from it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.

"Merit" (*nimitta*), virtue, &c. In the transformation of the material cause merit is non-efficient, for a cause cannot be set in motion by an effect. Where then is there the operation of virtue, &c.? To this he says: "From it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman." "From it," from the performance of virtuous acts, &c., proceeds "the piercing" (*bheda*) or destruction of whatever "covering" (*varaṇa*) obstruc-

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tion, such as vice, &c., exists, the two being mutually antagonistic, and the obstruction being destroyed, the material causes themselves become effective in their desiderated work. This he illustrates by an example. "As in the case of a husbandman." Even as a husbandman or farmer, wishing to carry water from one field to another, pierces only the obstacle to the flow of water, and that being pierced, water itself assumes the modification of expansion, without any exertion on the part of the husbandman to the expansion of water, so should be understood to be the case with regard to virtue, &c.

[Following the line of argument adopted in the preceding aphorism, the author shows that virtue, &c., are not the immediate causes of the change which takes place when a Bráhman becomes a god, as in the case of Nandís'vara, but that they serve the subsidiary purpose of removing the obstacles which stand in the way of the change, and the change takes place by itself. The illustration given puts this very clearly. The husbandman does not make the water flow, he only removes the obstacles, and then the water flows by itself from its own inherent tendency to follow the law of gravitation.]

When a Yogí, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles (to vitalize those bodies)? In reply to this question the author, says:

IV.

The created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.

The thinking principles which animate the bodies created by a Yogí, proceed through his will solely from their original cause, *i. e.*, from egoism. They emanate at once as sparks from a fire.

[Among the perfections mentioned in chapter III the power of multiplying one's own body, so as to produce many where there is one, is not mentioned, but here it is taken for granted that

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an accomplished Yogí possesses this power, and that he does produce them to effect quickly his emancipation by simultaneously performing in many bodies those works which promote his end, and the question is raised as to how does a Yogí, who creates many bodies and himself animates them all, provide a thinking principle for each of them? The answer given is that through his will he makes his egoism send forth the needful, even as a fire sends forth sparks from itself. This multiplication of bodies is called *Káyaryúha Yoga* or the Yoga of many bodies.]

Then, how do numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, produce one effect? To this, he replies:

V.

In the diverse tendency of the many the impelling thinking principle is one.

"In the diverse tendency" (*pravṛittibhede*) or multifunctionality of the many thinking principles the one thinking principle of the Yogí is the impelling force or actuator, because it is the ruler, and therefore there is no difference of object. The meaning is—that as in its own body the mind directs the eyes, the hands, &c., according to its will, from its being the ruler, so does it in the other bodies.

[In the preceding aphorism the question having been solved as to how a single individual can provide thinking principles for many bodies, the question arises as to how can many thinking principles act in concert and preserve the unity of the creator? If this unity be not admitted, there would be so many independent individuals, each following the bent of his own mind, and the idea of one individual acting as many without any loss of individuality, would be lost. This doubt is removed by the explanation that the thinking principles provided to the many are in reality one, and entirely controlled by the primary thinking principle, of which they are mere scintillations]

The thinking principle which belongs to the perfections resulting from birth, &c., are produced by the same five causes,

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and yet the thinking principle produced by Samádhi is distinct from the others. To show this he says :

VI.

Thereof the meditation-born one is without any residua.

"The meditation-born" (*dhyánaja*) thinking principle or that which is produced by Samádhi, is, among the five, the one which is "without any residua" (*anáśaya*), *i. e.*, without any residua of (former) work. This is the meaning.

[Thinking principles are said to be of five kinds, because they proceed severally from birth, herbs, incantation, penances, and meditation (A. 1). The word used (*ja*), means "born," but the object is not to imply that the thinking principles are actually born of herbs, incantations, &c., but to indicate the training, habit of thought, disposition or impurities which it acquires under the five different circumstances. The first four are said to depend on the residua of former works, and the last to have nothing to rest upon, it being self-supporting, *i. e.*, not resulting from the residua of any former work.]

To show that the thinking principle of the Yogí is distinct in its work, even as it is distinct from other thinking principles in being devoid of pain, &c., he says :

VII.

The work of a Yogí is neither white nor black : those of others are of three kinds.

That work which produces good fruit, such as sacrifices, &c., is "white" (*śukla*). That which produces a bad result, such as Bráhmaṇicide, is "black" (*kṛishṇa*). That which is mixed up of the two, is white-black (*śukla-kṛishṇa*). Thereof, the white work belongs to wise people, to those who are engaged in charity, asceticism, the study of the Vedas, &c.; the black belongs to the vicious; and the white-black (or mixed kind) to ordinary men. As regards Yogís, who have performed the Sañyama, work is of a

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different character to these: their work produces no fruit, for they undertake it after renouncing all desire for fruition.

[In the first three kinds of work fruition is inseparable. The wise give alms, perform penances, read the Vedas, display their benevolence, &c. &c. and derive the fruits thereof; the vicious commit wicked actions and suffer for the same; ordinary mortals are sometimes engaged in good actions and sometimes in bad ones, and suffer or enjoy accordingly. The Yogís, who renounce the fruits of all actions, can neither suffer nor enjoy from what they do, and hence their work is declared to be distinct from the works of others. They are, in the language of the Bhagavadgítá, like the lotus-leaf which, lying on water or having water on it, is never wetted.]

Now he describes the fruit of such works.

VIII.

Thence proceeds the manifestation of the residua which are suitable to its fruition.

Now, the residua of works produce two sorts of fruits, one sort being memory only, and the other, kind, age, and experience. Thereof, those residua which have for their fruition kind, age, and experience which are derivable in one or many births, have already been described above (p. 69). Of those the only fruit of which is memory, the manifestation proceeds from the same works. Even as work produces a body, whether as a Deva, or a human being, or a lower animal, so does it by its maturity lead to a corresponding manifestation of residua (*vásaní*). The meaning is this. Should a celestial or other body once acquired by a certain work be acquired even after the interposition of a hundred other births the memorial residua of the former state will manifest themselves again. Their memory revives according to circumstances, even when residing in other regions. In the intermediate states, though existing, they remain in a latent condition. Nor do the residua produced in course of existence in hell and other places become evident then.

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[For the sake of verbal fidelity I have used memory as the equivalent of the Sanskrit term *Smṛiti* of the commentary; but the object aimed at is not memory in its ordinary signification, but the remembrance in one life of appetites, desires, and affections of a preceding one. These results manifest themselves in, what in European philosophy is called, instinct. They are remembrances, because they arise without any conscious purpose, though they are not without consciousness. European philosophers, who do not recognise transmigration, finding Instinct to be opposed to Reason, take it to be something distinct from it—a distinct faculty. In its widest signification it extends to living beings in general—to plants as well as to animals,—but for psychological purposes it is limited by Dugald Stewart to Appetites, Desires, and Affections. Butler changes Desires into Passions, but without any material change of purport. Dr. Bain says "Instinct is untaught ability," (*Mental and Moral Science*, Bk. III, *c.* IV), and this is amplified by Hamilton into "an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge." (Reid's *Works*, p. 761*a*.) Paley has "a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction." Milton calls it "Reason discursive or intuitive." These definitions have been summed up into "untaught ability," "untaught propensity," "unconscious purpose." It is opposed to Habit, which is the result of tuition and exercise, and distinct from Reason, which presupposes argumentation and deliberation. The memory of our text is Instinct as defined above; but our author does not recognise spontaneity in anything, nor purpose independent of Reason. He attributes the eteology of Instinct to residua left in the thinking principle by rational action, and the said residua lie dormant till they are made vivid in a subsequent life. Habits leave their residua exactly in the same way as other actions, and they not only become manifest in the next life, but also in the progeny, as in the cases of pointers and other animals. In short, according to our author, Reason is one and the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certain-

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ty, and it manifests itself as Reason or Instinct differently under different circumstance. Anyhow, the meaning of our author will be best understood by replacing his Memory by Instinct.

The aphorism under notice explains the fruit of work as manifested by Instinct. Having already described that work leads to two kinds of fruit, Instinct and deserts, or in his language memory and kind, age and experience, he now says that Instinct does not manifest itself uniformly at every successive birth, but according to circumstances when it is needed in subsequent lives, even after many interruptions, the residua for it remaining dormant during such interruption. Thus, a man born in the next life as a dog having no occasion for his human instincts, acts as a dog, but twenty or more generations after, when he is again born as a man, his early instincts revive, and he acts according to them. This is the theory which the aphorism explains by saying that residua manifest themselves in conformity to the fruition of work. When a work entails existence as a serpent, those residua become manifest which are appropriate to such an existence, but not those which are appropriate for other forms of life. In other words, residua remain dormant or in a potential state until the necessary excitants are in operation. The *S. P. Bhâshya*, explains this by saying, "when a celestial work is in fruition, it does not become the cause of manifestation of the residua of infernal, brutal or human states; it then enlivens only those residua which are conformable to a celestial existence." *(Na hi daivam karma vipachyamánam náraka-tiryañ-manushya-vásanábhivyakti-nimittam bhavati kintu daivánuguná evásya vásaná vyajante)*. The purport is that each kind of existence brings to light its own appropriate residua.]

Doubt having been produced of there existing any causal relation in these residua, he establishes it by saying:

IX.

From the uniformity of memory and residua there is uninterruptibility of relation, even after breaks by caste, locality and time.

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Of worldly beings transmigrating in diverse forms, when one, after experiencing one form, attains that form again after an interruption of a thousand other births, the residua of impressions appropriate to that state, which had been formed at the first birth and had become latent from want of the necessary conditions, become manifest on the attainment of that suitable state. Thus, there is, notwithstanding breaks caused by caste, locality and time, an "uninterruptibility" (*ánantarya*) or continuity in producing their own necessary fruit of memory. How so? "From the uniformity of memory and residua." Thus, on the performance of a work there is produced a deposit of residuum on the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, and that is the germ of the fruits of heaven, hell, &c.; or it is the residua of works such as sacrifices &c. It exists as a latent power, or as a power of the actor in relation to experience and experiencer. From these residua proceeds memory, from memory the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and from that experience again come residua, memory, &c. It is true that where memory and residua are different there is, from want of uninterruptibility, a difficulty in producing a relation of cause and effect; but in our case here, where impressions become residua, and residua merge into memory, and they reside in concord in one thinking principle, the relation of cause and effect is not difficult or hard of effectuation.

[According to the preceding aphorism the residua of former births are the causes of manifestation of certain effects; but, since concomitancy is necessary between cause and effect while the intervention of many dissimilar births between two similars causes an interruption, it may be argued that residua are not the causes of memory, as alleged. This objection is met by saying that the memory remains, and therefore sequence is obviously not broken. The memory of sucking the teats on the part of an infant returns after many births, whenever that infant is again born as a human being, though it does not manifest itself when the same infant is born as a bird or a serpent, and it shows

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that the memory is not lost. Hence the relation of cause and effect is not broken.]

Admitting the uninterruptibility of residua, and their relation as cause and effect, it may be asked when an impression first takes place is it caused by residua, or without a cause? To solve this doubt, he says:

X.

There is no beginning about them, because of the eternity of desire.

"About them," *i. e.*, about or in regard to residua. "No beginning" (*anáditva*), that which has no commencement. The meaning is, these have no beginning. How? "Because of the eternity of desire." This "desire" (*áśisha*) or longing of an intensely delusive character—(manifesting itself in such wishes as) 'may the means of effecting my pleasure be always mine; may there never be a separation between me and them'—is the cause of residua, and that being eternal there is no beginning. This is the meaning. What is meant is this: From the proximity of the cause the tendency of the functions of impressions and residua cannot be checked, and the thinking principle, from its expansible and contractile character, pierced by the impressions, residua and the like, modifies itself when it attains each appropriate existence.

[The theory of Instincts being the result of action in former lives is open to the grave objection that it does not account for Instinct in the first instance. A being born for the first time should have, according to the theory, no Instinct. The initial impression must therefore be causeless, and so there is no reason to admit that residua are the causes of effect, *i. e.*, of birth, age and experience. This objection is met in this aphorism by saying that Desire is eternal, and therefore there is no necessity for a beginning. Desire is essential to existence; there would be no existence if there was no Desire; and that Desire produces residua, and so there is no break in the course of eternity. The

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opponent wished to expose the fallacy of the argument regarding residua being the cause of Intuition by showing that there could be no residua at the first start, and the author accepts a *regressus in infinitum* to surmount the difficulty. According to him the universe had no beginning and will never end, and therefore there is no occasion to seek a beginning.]

From their infinity it being doubtful that the residua can ever be destroyed, he points out the means of destroying them.

XI.

Since they are agglomerated by cause, effect, substratum and support, their absence would produce the absence of the others.

Conception (*anubhava*) is the cause of residua; desire, &c., are the causes of conceptions; and of them the cause is ignorance. Thus is (ignorance) both the immediate and the mediate "cause" (*hetu*). "Effect" (*phala*) is body, memory, &c. "Substratum" (*áśraya*) is the intellectual principle. "Support" (*álambana* or object of desire) is the same for both conceptions and residua. Now, since these infinite residua are collected by these cause, effect, substratum and support, when they are absent, *i. e.*, when they may be likened to roasted seeds, on their being burnt by knowledge and Yoga, there being no root left, the residua cannot sprout, nor lead to action, and thus they are destroyed.

[Now the question is raised, how can one undo that which is eternal? and the answer given is—since desires proceed from, or are the sum total of, cause, effect, substratum and support, one has to remove those conditions which produce desires, and that removal *ipso facto* removes desires. The removal is effected by the aid of Yoga. Yoga knowledge parches cause, effect, substratum, and support by exposing their real nature, and when so parched, they become, like roasted seeds, unfit for germination, and their destruction follows as a matter of course. Of course this is limited to the individual who effects the parching, and does not extend to the world at large.]

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It may be questioned, that since the thinking principle is being constantly destroyed, and there is a difference in their relation as cause and effect from their want of simultaneity between residua and their effects, how can there be a unity? To prove the unity, he says:

XII.

(The thinking principle) exists in its proper nature; the past and the future (result) from differences in the condition of qualities.

The (possibility of) production of things which are absolutely non-existent is unreasonable, from their want of relation to existence. Nowhere has there been any relation to existence in the horns of a hare.

In the case of a nonentity as an effect, with what design can causes proceed to act? None enters into action for a false object, and it being opposed to entity there is no relation of nonentity to it. When truth attains its own identity, how can it become baseless and untrue? The meaning is, it cannot accept an antagonistic form. Hence from there being no possibility of the destruction of existence, and from the impossibility of the origin of non-existence, the qualified, convertible by qualities, always remains in one form. The qualities, alone, change into their threefold conditions. Attaining each condition, the qualified forsakes its original form, and, remaining in the present condition, attains the state of objects of enjoyment. Hence in this science are established the distinctions of the past and future conditions of qualities, and of their relation to each other as cause and effect. Hence, too, the same thinking principle is made to exist as the qualified until isolation, and none can prevent it.

[The removal suggested in the preceding aphorism suggests the idea of destruction; but that is not possible. Nothing can proceed from non-existence, and no existence can be absolute non-existence, and the difficulty is solved by referring to the

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doctrine explained in A. 14 C. III which recognizes a threefold condition of existence, the antecedent, the postcedent, and the present. Matter is eternal, and remains always an existence; but its conditions vary; accordingly when the present condition of a thing is destroyed, the thing reverts to one or other of its two other conditions, and the parching of the seeds implies their resolution into the antecedent condition. This is the theory of Moderate Nominalism or Conceptualism with its threefold condition of *Universalia ante rem*, as thoughts in the mind of God; *Universalia in re*, as the essence (quiddity) of things; and *Universalia post rem*, as concepts. The text looks to thoughts or ideas or plastic types without reference to God.]

He now describes of what forms these qualified and the qualities are.

XIII.

They are individualised or subtile, and consist of qualities.

The qualities and the qualified described above are divided into the individualised and the subtile. The "qualities" (*gunáh*) are of the forms of goodness, foulness, and darkness. "To consist of" (*tadátmánah*) is to be of that nature, or to be modified to that form: this is the meaning. Since there is seen a concomitance in all persons, both externally and internally, through goodness, foulness, and darkness in the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion, of individuals and conceptions, and since it is found that which is concomitant is also its modified form, as in the case of jars which are concomitants of earth are also modified forms of earth, therefore the modification of qualities is evident.

[The simple proposition in this aphorism is that all attributes are mere modifications of the three primary qualities. Circumstances may make them subtile or gross, but, whether one or the other, they consist of nothing but the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness modified in some one form or another. They are mere modes of being, but not radically different beings.]

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Apprehending the doubt that if all these three qualities be the chief causes everywhere, how can we talk of one qualified (or one substratum of quality) ? he says :

XIV.

From unity of modification (results) unity of a thing.

Although there are three qualities, yet their modification into the member and the membered, (in some cases goodness becoming the membered, in some cases foulness, and in others darkness,) being one, "unity" (*tattva*) or oneness is admitted. Thus, in the examples this is the earth, this is the air, &c., (in which unity is observed, for earth is a modification of darkness, and air of foulness.)

[The purport is that as only one modification can take place of the thinking principle at a time, the unity of a thing is never disturbed. The thinking principle under similar circumstances changes exactly in the same way, and no difference can possibly result. In other words, as the three qualities can be only separately ascendant, one at a time, the simultaneous perception of the effects of all the three cannot be effected ; and this meets the objection raised in the preamble.]

Had objects existed distinct from cognition it would be proper to talk of the unity or multiplicity of objects, but when cognition itself from the influence of residua existing in the relation of cause and effect, appears in different shapes, how can you say so? In reply to this question, he says :

XV.

Even in the sameness of object, the course of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle.

"Of the two," of the cognition and the cognizable, the course is distinct, follow different or separate roads. How so? From diversity of thinking principles even in the sameness of object.

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Even in similar things, as the attainment of women and the like, differences of thinking are noticeable in different observers from the resulting sensations of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus, on beholding a beautiful and attractive woman, pleasure is felt by an amorous person, enmity by her rival, and disgust by an ascetic. And since these different kinds of feeling arise from one object there can be no agency in the thing itself. If it be said that object is the effect of our thinking principle only, the object would appear in one form only. Also, if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle then there would be no other thing extant when that thinking principle would be occupied with one thing. (If it be said) be it so, we deny it. For how could that thing then be beheld by many others? And since it is so beheld, it cannot be an effect of the thinking principle. If it be said that it is created by many at the same time, the reply would be that there would be a difference between a work produced by many, and a work produced by one. And if the difference be not admitted, then there being difference of cause without a difference of effect, the universe would be either causeless, or uniform. What is said is this: should there be no difference of effect when the causes are different, then the whole universe resulting from many causes would either be of one form, or not following the different causes, be causeless from its independence (of the causes). And if it is so (it may be asked) why does it not, being made of the three qualities, produce in the same percipient the sensations (simultaneously) of pleasure, pain and delusion? The case is not so. Even as the object consists of three qualities, so is the thinking principle made up of three qualities, and in its perception of objects, merits and demerits are accessory causes, and from their prevalence or depression results the manifestation of the thinking principle in such and such (varying) forms. Thus in the presence of a woman near an amorous person, his thinking principle, disposed towards merit through the influence of the quality of goodness, becomes full of pleasure. From the co-operation of the quality of foulness, which is auxiliary to vice,

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for all rival wives, it becomes painful. Similarly from the co-operation of the quality of darkness, which is attended by ardent vice, it becomes to angry rival wives the cause of delusion. Hence the cognizable object is independent of cognition, and consequently cognizable and cognition, being contradictory in their natures, cannot bear the relation of cause and effect. Thus it being possible without any difference in the cause for the existence of a difference in effect from their relation, the independence of cognition from the object is established.

[The question discussed in the preceding aphorism raises a doubt as to whether perception is due to objects or to the cognitive power. It cannot be said that objects produce perception, for in that case a given object would always and everywhere produce the same sensation, as a given cause cannot produce dissimilar effects. A handsome woman should be a handsome woman to all beholders, without a distinction. In the world this is, however, not the case. A woman produces very dissimilar feelings in different beholders, and she, as the object, cannot therefore be said to be the cause of perception. On the other hand, the thinking principle cannot be the cause, for if you accept it to be one in all persons, it, as a cause, cannot produce different effects; and if you accept it to be different in different individuals, dissimilar causes would lead to one uniform result, which is impossible. The solution offered is that thinking principle and object are different, but inasmuch as both are governed by the three qualities, the prevalence of a particular quality at a particular time in the thinking principle produces a difference in the perception of an object. The "diversity of the thinking principle" in the text implies a diversity in its condition as regards the state of the qualities working within it. The argument here is the same which European philosophers discuss with reference to sensations and sensibles; and the optional use of *jn̄ána* and *vijn̄ána* by our author shows that he means cognition or sensation and perception, and not the higher knowledge elsewhere indicated by the

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word *jn̄ána*. I have used for it cognition after Mr. Jardine, who defines it as "a general name which we may apply to all those mental states in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object." ('The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition,' p. 1). The object to which this *jn̄ána* or cognition is applied is *jn̄eya* or cognizable, which is just the same with *idea* as used by Locke, who says, "it is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phenomena, notion, species*, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Idea, however, has been used in so many varying senses by European metaphysicians that I have thought it safe to confine myself to *cognizable* or *object*, as least likely to cause misconceptions. The theory of eternity of matter is here made the basis of the argument.]

Since a cognition, being an illuminator, is by nature perceptive, and the object, being susceptible of illumination, is by nature perceivable, why should cognition not perceive and recollect all things simultaneously? With a view to remove such doubt, he says:

XVI.

A thing is known or unknown from its dependence on its change of form in the thinking principle.

"Its" of the object. "From its change of form" (*uparágát*). From its producing forms in the thinking principle, an external object becomes known or unknown. The meaning is this: in the attainment of their production all things depend on the conjunction of their causes. The production of the cognition of a blue or other colour depends on the accessory cause of the form being brought forward as an object through the passage of the organs of sensation; perception being impossible without the object, since there is no correlation. Hence, by whatever object is the form of cognition modified, that object is brought

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into cognition, *i. e.*, that object becomes known. That which does not give its shape (to the thinking principle) is held to be unknown. Similarly, recollection is produced of that object which, having been known before, has left residua in the mind, and which residua, excited by a similar object, acting as the accessory cause, brings it to our knowledge. Hence, neither cognition, nor memory is constant everywhere, nor is there any inconsistency.

[The argument mooted in the last aphorism is further developed by saying that the effect of the qualities is transmitted to the thinking prineiple through the object seen, and the thinking principle is thereby modified differently under different circumstances. The qualities act from two different directions, first in the thinking principle apart from the object, and next in the object, and through it in the thinking principle. A man in a passion has the quality of foulness prevalent in him, and then that foulness affects everything he sees, though it is not foul; and when all the qualities are calm in him, he sees a foul action, and the foulness of that action enters within him and tinges his thinking principle from without.]

To remove the doubt that since the perceiving soul does not perceive a yellow colour when it perceives a blue, there is liability of its assuming, like the thinking principle, different shapes, or being modified from its being at times the perceiver, he says:

XVII.

The functions of the thinking principle are always known, for its presiding soul is unmodifiable.

All the functions of the thinking principle—characterised as they are by proofs, misconceptions, &c.,—are "always," *i. e.*, at all times, known to its percipient soul, since it is unmodifiable, or wanting in liability to change from its being of the form of the intellect (*chidrúpa*). Were it mutable, the constant perceptibility of those functions would not follow, the mutability

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being (necessarily) occasional. The meaning is this. The soul of the form of intellect always remaining as the presiding principle, and its intimate associate, the pure element, the thinking principle, being also always present, by whatever object it (the latter) is modified in shape there is the probability of that object being always brought into contact with the shadow of the former (soul, *chit*); and such being the case it is established that there is constant perceptibility, and never can there be any apprehension of change.

[Having explained the relation of cognition to cognizables, and the *rationale* of the process by which things become known or unknown, the author proceeds to explain how it is that the thinking principle, which, under the circumstances alleged, is always changing and assuming new forms, should still be able to know different objects, or have the power of understanding. The thinking principle is admitted to be *in se* unconscious, and is itself undergoing constant modifications, and cannot therefore exercise intelligence, and be itself the cause of knowledge. But, says the author, its presiding soul is constant and immutable, and associated with that soul it derives reflected intelligence, and by its aid it is always able to know whatever external object casts its shadow on it. In other words, though the thinking principle is itself unconscious, it derives intelligence from the soul which is pure intelligence and absolutely immutable. The *P. Bháshya* explains the aphorism by saying, "had the presiding soul been liable, like the thinking principle, to constant mutation, then objects or the functions of the thinking principle would have become, like sounds and other objects, sometimes known and sometimes unknown to it; but constant consciousness (*lit.* perceptibility) of the mind is indicated by the immutability of its presiding soul." (*Yadi chittavat prabhurapi purushah pariṇameta tatastadvishayá chittavṛittayah śabdádivishayavat jṇátájṇátáh syuh, sadájṇátatvantu manasastatprabhoh purushasyápariṇámitvamanumápayati.*) This idea is further developed in other commentaries.]

Now it may be said that since the thinking principle itself,

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from excess of the quality of goodness, is the illuminant, it can from its self-illumination, illuminate both itself and the object, and the act of perception can thereby be completed, what is the use of the assumption of a separate percipient? To allay this doubt, he says:

XVIII.

It is not self-illuminative, since it is perceptible.

"It," the thinking principle, is not "self-illuminative" (*svábhása*), expositor of itself, but it is perceptible by the soul. How so? Because it is "perceptible." A perceptible is known by a percipient, as in the case of a water-jar or the like. The thinking principle is an object of perception, and therefore it is not self-illuminative.

[The argument in the next preceding aphorism would suggest the idea that the thinking principle, whether directly or indirectly, was itself the perceiver, and that being the case there is no necessity for assuming a separate perceiver. Where one assumption is sufficient, two are not needed. This objection of the opponent is refuted in the aphorism under notice, by saying that the thinking principle cannot be the percipient, or self-illuminattve, because it is itself an object of perception. That which is an object of perception cannot itself be percipient; and the commentator illustrates this by citing the example of a water-jar, which, as an object of perception, cannot know itself. The *P. Bháshya* elaborates the argument by saying, "Even as the other organs and their objects, such as audition, &c., cannot be self-illuminative from the circumstance of their being perceivables, the mind should be so known. Nor can fire be an example in this instance; for even fire cannot make its own hidden identity visible. Manifestation is seen to result from the conjunction of a manifestator with a manifestable, and such conjunction cannot take place with one's own identity. Besides if the theory of self-illuminativeness of the thinking principle be admitted, it would not be perceptible to any body else." (*Yathetaráṇíndriyá-*

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ni śabdádayaścha dṛiśyatvánna svábhásáni tathá manopi pratyetavyam. Na chágniratra dṛishṭántam. Nahyagnirátmasvarúpamaprakáśam prakáśayati. Prakáśaścháyam prakáśya-prakáśaka sañyoge dṛishṭah, na cha svarúpamátresti sañyoyah kiṇcha svábhásam chittamityagráhyameva kasyachiditi.) The illustration of fire becomes appropriate on the assumption that it owes its luminosity to itself. But the luminosity contemplated by the term *svábhása* is knowledge, and not light. In fact, the *light* of the text can be understood only by substituting for it the word *knowledge,* throughout the discussion.]

It may be said that the argument here has accepted the proposition, (*i. e.*, it involves a *petitio principii*), for the perceptibility of the thinking principle has not yet been established. Besides, in men the functions of accepting that which is good and rejecting that which is injurious are made manifest through the consciousness of one's own intellect; and such feelings as "I am angry," "I am afraid," "I have no desire," cannot be produced without the consciousness of the intellect (and since they are, the agency of the soul is not needed.) To meet this argument, he says:

XIX.

Attention cannot be directed to both at the same time.

The understanding of an object is the establishment of its usefulness by (knowing it to be) this—this is the object which is the cause of pleasure or pain. The understanding of the intellect is the establishment of the use of that object through pleasure or pain in the form of I (or the ego). In the perception of an object two such kinds of understanding cannot be effected at the same time, for there is a contradiction. There is no possibility of effecting two contradictory actions simultaneously, and therefore it is not possible to perceive "both," *i. e.*, cognition and cognizable at the same time. Hence, it is laid down that the thinking principle is not self-illuminative. Further, even if

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two such actions could be accomplished, their fruits could not result, for there cannot be an apprehension of the two fruits, because the thinking principle being directed outwards to grasp an object cannot know itself. The result is confined only to the object, and not to itself. This is the meaning.

[The opponent again comes to the charge, and says that the intellect or understanding may supply the place of the soul, for the thinking principle may see, and the intellect may decide about the nature of the sight. The author demurs to this by saying two such functions cannot take place simultaneously, or the thinking principle cannot see and argue at the same time. The sensation of hunger is first felt, and then its nature discussed. The thinking principle must undergo two modifications, once to feel, and then to consider, and these it cannot undergo at once; so these two acts can never take place simultaneously, and consequently it cannot be said that the thinking principle is alone sufficient to account for consciousness and knowledge: a separate cause must be assigned for these two feelings, and that cause is the soul. The *P. Bhâshya* pithily disposes of the question by saying, "It is not possible to behold one's own self and another at the same time, for it leads to the theory of the momentarists who hold action, effect and cause to be the same." (*Na chaikasmin kshaṇe svapararûpávadhâraṇam yuktam, kshaṇikavâdino yad bhavanam saiva kriyâ tadeva cha kârakamityabhyupagamah.*) The meaning of the aphorism is simply that the thinking principle cannot perform the two acts of perception and self-knowing at the same time, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot by itself be the cause of intelligence.]

Let it be admitted that a cognition cannot be self-perceptive, still may it not be perceived by another cognition? Assuming such a question, he says:

XX.

If one cognition be the perceptible of another, there would be an excessiveness of cognitions to

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cognitions, and also a confusion of memory.

If one cognition could cognize another, then that cognition being itself unintelligent and unable to illuminate another, we must assume a third cognition and for it another, and so on and a thing could not be perceived in the whole lifetime of a man. Nor can an object be known when the cognition remains unknown.

It leads also to "confusion of memory." On a particular colour or a taste being produced in a cognition there would arise an endless series of cognitions to perceive it, and when the residua left by a former cognition would attempt to recall it to memory there would arise, from there being no break in the ideas of cognitions and objects, cognitions and memories simultaneously, and hence, it being impossible to make out with reference to what object the recollection has arisen, there would be a confusion of memory, *i. e.*, it would not be known that this is the memory of colour and this is the memory of taste.

[The explanation above given leaves the door open to the assumption that one cognition may perceive another, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming the agency of the soul, *i. e.*, each individual may have many cognitions which co-operate with each other in producing knowledge of a particular object. To preclude this theory, the author brings forward the argument of *regressus in infinitum*. If one cognition could perceive another, we would require a third to perceive the second, and so on, and there would be no end to the chain. It would, he urges, also lead to a confusion of memory, for on one idea being called to memory all its attendant ideas would arise to infinity, and it would be impossible to determine which is the particular idea that has been revived.]

The question may then be asked, if, in the absence of self-perceptive power in cognitions *(buddhi)*, one cognition cannot be known by another, how do we use the idea this is the perception of an object? To remove this doubt, he expounds his conclusion.

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XXI.

The intellection of its own cognition takes place when it takes its form through the non-transitional soul.

"Soul" (*purusha*), being of the form of intelligence, is called *chiti* (intellect). It is "non-transitional" (*apratisaṅkramá*), that which has no transition or passing into another place is so called: by this is meant that it does not mix with anything. In the modification of the member and the membered, the (three) qualities, (as members) in passing into the qualified or membered, assume their forms, and in the world atoms, moving on, produce the forms of objects; but the power of intellection (*i. e.*, soul) does not do so, because it always retains its own form, inasmuch as it exists in itself. Hence when the thinking principle, being near it, assumes its shape, intellection takes place; and when the soul, by its contact with the function of the thinking principle being endowed with understanding, cognizes, then the knowing of the thinking principle of its own self takes place.

[The soul never undergoes any modification, but by its reflection on the thinking principle that principle derives its intelligence, and that intelligent state is therefore said to be attained through the non-transitional soul. It is then *chiti* or intelligence, because for the time being it has intelligence in it, and this is explained by the commentator. When the thinking principle in its intelligent state assumes the form of an object, it is able to know its own notions. The *P. Bhâshya* explains the text by saying, "unmodifiable is the power of experiencing; it is also non-transitional. On its reflection falling on the excessibly modifiable (the thinking principle) the functions of the latter reflect on it. Thereupon people call it the function of understanding from its imitating the function of the thinking principle enlivened by intelligence, though it is devoid of the function of understanding." (The force of the argument here depends upon the distinction made between intelligence and the function of understanding, for the soul, though intelligence itself, does not exercise any

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function.) (*Aparińáminí hi bhoktŕiśaktirapratisańkramá cha pariņáminyatyarthe pratisańkránteva tadvŕittimanupatati, tasyáścha práptachaitanyopagraharupáyá buddhivŕitteranukárimátratayá buddhivŕityavišishṭá hi jńánavŕittirákhgáyate*).

Paṇḍit Govindadeva Śástrí, following some later commentators, explains the text so as to mean that the soul itself undergoes the modification. The earlier and more reliable commentators, however, do not accept that meaning, and as the sequel shows them to be right I have accepted their interpretation.]

To show that thus the self-perceptive thinking principle, being able to perceive all objects, becomes fit for all purposes, he says:

XXII.

The thinking principle, modified by the knower and the knowable, is (able to perceive) all objects.

"The knower" (*drashṭá*) is soul. To be modified by it is to seem to be of its form from its propinquity. To be modified by the knowable, is to undergo the modification of assuming the form of the (object) perceived. When this (double modification) takes place, then it becomes able to perceive all objects. Even as a transparent crystal, or a mirror, or the like is fit to receive the reflection of all images, so the quality of goodness, unstained by foulness and darkness, is able, from its purity, to receive the reflection of the soul (*chit*). Not so foulness and darkness, owing to their want of purity. The quality of goodness, divested of all association with foulness and darkness, from its being liable to only one modification, and being able to receive the reflection of the intelligent soul, remains like a steady lamp-flame till the attainment of emancipation (*mokśa*). Even as in the vicinity of a loadstone motion is produced in iron, so in the vicinity of the intelligent soul manifestible intelligence is reflected on the quality of goodness. Accordingly, in this system of philosophy two powers of intelligence are recognized, the eternally present (*nityoditá*) and the manifestible (*abhivyańgá*). The eternally

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present power of intelligence is soul. The manifestible power of intelligence is the quality of goodness, which derives its power by its contiguity to the former. From extreme propinquity, it, as an intimate friend, effectuates the experiencership of the soul. And as that quality is the resting place of *Purusha*, the supreme soul, the Sáñkhyas, who recognise an actionless Brahma, attribute to it the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion. (The epithets "supreme" and "Brahma" are meaningless here, for the human soul is all that is meant: God as Brahma is not indicated).

Now, though from the extreme abeyance of some one quality and of its prevalence at certain times and in some cases, all the three qualities are constantly modifying in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and the thinking principle is not pure, yet when that principle modifies its form into that pure quality of goodness, which is the essence of work, it attains its perceptibility. The pure primary quality of goodness of the thinking principle, on the one side reflected upon by intelligence or the soul, and on the other covered by the thinking principle modified into the forms of external objects, and becoming conscious from the effect of the reflection of the soul, becomes able to feel pleasure, pain and delusion, though it is devoid of intelligence. Thus the experience, from its extreme propinquity to soul and from want of due discrimination, is said to be of soul, though it is unexperiencing. To this effect has Vindhyavásí said: "the sufferingness of the quality of goodness is the sufferingness of soul." Elsewhere it is said. "Even as an image produced by the reflection of a reflected image on a mirror is called a reflection, so the manifestation of the shadow of intelligence, like the intelligence of soul, is implied by the word *pratisañkránti* or contact."

It might be argued that, though the reflection of the ever-modifying may be seen in a transparent body, as a human face in a looking-glass, how can there arise the reflection of the absolutely transparent, all-pervading, unmodifying soul in the comparatively untransparent quality of goodness? To this the reply is—Not knowing the true nature of reflection you

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have said this. The display of the manifestible power of intelligence in the quality of goodness, by the propinquity of the soul, is called reflection. Even as is that sentient power, abiding in the soul, so does its reflection appear in the quality of goodness.

Again, since it has been said that soul is absolutely pure, how can it be in contact with the (comparatively) untransparent quality of goodness? This argument is not correct, for the contact of the sun and the like (which are highly transparent) is seen in water and the like which are less transparent. If it be said that there can be no contact of that which is undefined, that too would be inconsistent, because we see the all-pervading sky (*ákáśa*) reflected in a looking-glass, or the like. And such being the case, there can be no objection to the effectuation of the reflection (under notice).

It may be argued that what has been said about there being an apparent or external contact by propinquity of the sentient power with the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, there should be the experience of pain and pleasure on the part of soul, is inconsistent, for how can the quality of goodness of the thinking principle be produced without a modification of Prakṛiti? and for what object should there be a modification of Prakṛiti? To this it is replied, that Prakṛiti has to effectuate soul's experience of the objects of mundane existence, and, its duty being to effectuate the object of soul, the modification is proper.

It may be urged that this is not proved, for the effectuation of the soul's object is impossible. The duty of effectuating soul's object implies the consciousness on the part of Prakṛiti that "it is my duty to effectuate soul's object;" but how can there be such a consciousness on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti? If you admit the consciousness, how will you maintain its unsentience or inertness? The reply to this is that in the two forms of progressive and regressive modification there are the two natural powers (of progression and regression), and they are called the duty of effectuating soul's purpose. Those powers are natural to the unsentient Prakṛiti. Its progressive modification (*anu-*

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loma-pariṇáma) is the outward one, extending from the intellect to gross matter; while entering through its cause and ending with the annihilation of egoism is its regressive modification, (*pratiloma pariṇáma*). Hence on the completion of soul's experience, the two natural powers being destroyed, Prakṛiti, having achieved its object, ceases to modify. In performing such duty for soul on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti, there is no inconsistency.

Again, it may be argued, if there be two such powers naturally possessed by Prakṛiti, then why is exertion made for salvation (*moksha*) by those who long for it? and if salvation be no object the science of those who advise it is worthless. The answer is, the relation of soul and Prakṛiti as experiencer and experience is from time without a beginning, and that being the case, when pain is felt on the part of Prakṛiti in action, from the assumption of its being the agent or actor, there arises the desire—"how can there be absolute stoppage of my suffering?" and hence there is a necessity on the part of Prakṛiti for the advice of the science which points out the means of stopping the pain. The substance of the advice of the science is the quality of goodness of the thinking principle as governed by work. In other works on philosophy this has been accepted to be the nature of ignorance (*avidyá*.) That nature, exerting for salvation, relying on the help of the advice of such sciences, obtain the reward called salvation. All works influenced by the (necessary) conjunction of causes attain their own selves, and it is established by proof that of the work called *moksha*, which is acquired by regressive modification, this is the conjunction of causes, because it cannot be attained by any other method. Hence without that cause how can it be effected? It follows, therefore, that the quality of goodness of the thinking principle modified by worldly objects in contact and enlightened by the shadow of soul, conducts, through the conviction of (the reality of) those objects, all worldly affairs. Deluded people, looking at such thinking principle, imagine it and all such thinking principles to be the world. They should be enlightened.

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[Having met all the principal objections to the theory of the thinking principle being sensitized into intelligence by a reflection of soul which is intelligence, the author enunciates that the thinking principle, modified on the one hand by the soul and on the other by external objects, is brought into play in every case of sensation. The word used in the text for the double transformation is *uparakta*, which is a compound of *upa* 'excess' and *ranja* 'to colour' or 'tinge,' meaning that the thinking principle is doubly tinged or influenced; and this conveys the true meaning of the text. The *P. Bhâshya* accordingly cites the example of the crystal vase tinged by the coloured object put in it. Inasmuch as the theory, however, is that the thinking principle assumes the shape of the object in every instance of cognition, and the same epithet is used for the double tinging, it is necessary, for the sake of consistency, to adopt the same phraseology everywhere; I have accordingly used the word modified.

Bhoja, after explaining the text, enters into a long dissertation on the various objections that may be started to the doctrine, and refutes them *seriatim*. The first and most obvious objection is—how can a shadow of soul produce in an object on which it falls the quality of the original? Soul may be intelligence, but its shadow cannot reasonably be said to convey that intelligence on the object on which it falls. The commentator sees no harm in this, for, says he, such action is manifest in the motion produced in iron by the propinquity of a loadstone. He describes soul's intelligence to be two-fold; one is *Nityoditâ* or always and eternally present, and the other *Abhivyañgâ* or manifestible, and it is the latter that sensitizes the thinking principle.

The next argument is, if it be the thinking principle that is sensitized, how can soul be said to be the experiencer? The reply is—that soul is really not the experiencer, but since experience is felt by the agency of its shadow it is in an indiscriminate way called experiencer.

Then the question arises how can reflection take place of

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a perfectly transparent object like soul, on a comparatively untransparent object like the thinking principle with the quality of goodness prevalent in it? This is met by saying that the word reflection here simply is the technical name of the influence of soul on the thinking principle.

An argument like the last is raised with reference to the contact of the absolutely pure soul with a comparatively impure thinking principle. This, however, is held possible, as we see the sun reflected in foul water. The contact of that which is illimitable with a finite object is also possible, as in the case of the sky reflected in a mirror.

The objection next urged is that why should Prakṛiti or nature change to produce effects? The answer is, it subserves the purposes of soul. This answer is, however, not enough, for Prakṛiti or nature being unintelligent, cannot have such a consciousness of duty, and act up to it. The reply is that Prakṛiti has two inherent powers in it, that of progression and of regression, and acting under their impulses it subserves the purposes of soul, and therefore there is no inconsistency.

The admission of the two powers aforesaid suggests the objection that, if they be natural they will run their course of their own accord, and there is no use in controlling them. The effect of the regressive action is salvation, and that must come of itself; none needs try for it, and, if so, what is the use of Yoga as a means of salvation? This is met by saying that it is Prakṛiti when in action that feels pain and, wishing to put a stop to that pain, wants to know how to do so, and hence arises the desire for salvation, and the Yoga points out the means of doing so. Without such advice Prakṛiti would go on working for ever.

The *P. Bhâshya* has not mooted these discussions.]

Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.

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XXIII.

It exists for another's purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

"It," the thinking principle, "coloured," *i. e.*, assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of "residua" (*vásaná*) (existing in it), effectuates for "another's," *i. e.*, a master's, "purpose" (*artha*) the work of experience and final reward. How so? "Because it operates by association." "Association" (*sañhatya*), *i. e.*, by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The co-operators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that "another" is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied "another," and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given: Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness, because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs

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are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then there arise this conjunction? (*i. e.*, there is no actual conjunction but a mere shadow).

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make the soul the experiencer of worldly joys and sorrows? To this question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of former works, it nevertheless acts for another's purpose, and not for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it, they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no power of action *suo motu*. It is unconscious too, so that it can have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked upon, and this is indicated by the phrase "operates by association." Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, *i. e.*, for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed in the Sáṅkhya-káriká by the verse "generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities," (LX). It should be noticed, however, that the functions which are usually attributed to nature or Prakṛiti in the Sáṅkhya are invariably assigned to the thinking principle (*chitta*) in the Yoga of Patanjali. In fact, in the Yoga system, chitta plays a more important part than the Buddhi of Kapila, and appertains to itself the character both of Buddhi and Prakṛiti, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In

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his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakṛiti where Patañjali confines himself to Chitta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another's purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, subserves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.]

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.

XXIV.

For the knower of the difference there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle.

Thus the quality of goodness and soul being proved to be distinct, whatever idea exists of his self being the thinking principle, in him who knows them to be distinct, that is the one is different from the other, the same surceases, *i. e.*, the idea ceases of the thinking principle being the actor, knower, and experiencer.

[Having disposed of all metaphysical questions bearing on the subject-matter of his work, the author now reverts to the thesis, how isolation is effected. The metaphysical questions above set forth, when thoroughly understood, enable a person to divest himself of the idea that his self or ego is his thinking principle, and to believe that his soul is the real self. He knows that the thinking principle is unconscious and not his self. The idea, in fact, is altogether set at rest, and his soul is so far freed from the natural wrong belief that the thinking principle is the ego.]

(To the question) what happens when this takes place, he says:

XXV.

Then the thinking principle is turned towards discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation.

The thinking principle, which was turned outwards by igno-

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rance, to derive the fruit of experiencing worldly objects, deflects now towards "discriminative knowledge," (*viveka*) *i. e.*, turns inward towards the path of discriminative knowledge, and is "bowed down by the weight of coming isolation," (*kaivalya-prágbhára*) *i. e.*, the fruit of isolation, or the commencement of isolation.

[When the belief aforesaid is effected, the thinking principle drops the cosmos, and turns inward to the cultivation of discriminative knowledge, and is overpowered by the sense of isolation which begins to sprout in him.]

Now, by describing the causes of the impediments which occur in the thinking principle flowing towards discrimination, he points out the means of overcoming them.

XXVI.

In the intervals thereof other impressions arise from residua.

"Thereof," *i. e.*, of the thinking principle engaged in meditation. In the "intervals" (*chhidreshu*), in the void spaces of the thinking principle, whatever "impressions" (*jñánáni*) or ideas of the waking (or worldly) state arise, the same proceed from the now-fading residua of the former waking state, in the forms of "I," "mine," and the like. What is said is that by means of extirpating the internal organ their avoidance should be effected.

[While isolation is progressing there are opportunities when a person is not actually engaged in meditation, *i. e.*, during the breaks in his meditation, for worldly ideas to sprout from the residua of former existences still clinging to the mind. These are calculated to disturb the process of isolation, and are so far impediments, which should be destroyed.]

He now says that the means of avoidance has already been explained.

XXVII.

The avoidance of these should be (the same) as already described in the case of afflictions.

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The avoidance of these should be effected in the same way in which the avoidance of afflictions, ignorance, &c., has been already pointed out (C. II. x—xi). Even as they, scorched by the fire of knowledge, do not, like roasted seeds, sprout in the field of the thinking principle, so are the residua, (rendered infructuose).

[The ideas should be destroyed in the same way as afflictions, for which provision has been made in a previous part of the work, (C. II. x—xi).]

He now describes the means by which a Yogí, on his meditation becoming steady by the non-production of other thoughts in the way aforesaid, may attain excellence.

XXVIII.

On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation (called) the Cloud of Virtue, even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination.

"On the completion of the series" (*prasaṅkhyáne*), *i. e.*, after careful contemplation of the nature and respective peculiarities of all the categories arranged in due order. On that being accomplished even in the case of the "non-aspirant" (*akusída*), or one who does not wish for any fruition, there is produced from the appearance of constant discrimination, on the cessation of all foreign thoughts in his thinking principle, the meditation called the Cloud of Virtue. That which showers (*mehati*) or irrigates profusely the virtue (*dharma*) which is neither black nor white, (*cf.* IV, vii,) and which is subservient to the attainment of the *summum bonum* is the "Cloud of Virtue" (*Dharmamegha*) By this is shown that the highest virtue is the cause of knowledge.

[When the series of works enjoined above for the perfection of Yoga meditation have been completed, then there arises in the mind of the performer a meditation called Cloud of Virtue, which means that all virtues are showered on it, even when

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it does not wish for them. The sense is that though the Yogi may not wish for any reward, still the reward comes. The word in the text is *akusída*, from *a* meaning negation and *kusída* interest, that is disinterestedly. The theory is that the perfection of virtue results spontaneously in a person who completes his Yoga duties as described in the text.]

He explains next what results from that Cloud of Virtue.

XXIX.

Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works.

The meaning is, that on the manifestation of knowledge, their antecedent causes being removed, there is a cessation of the afflictions resulting from ignorance, and of all the works which are, according as they are white, &c., of three kinds. (VII).

[The object of the cloud is now described. On its appearance there results a complete cessation of all afflictions and all works; there is no longer any sense of affliction left in the mind of the Yogí, and he has neither any desire for work, nor any residua of former works left in his mind.]

He next explains what happens on this cessation.

XXX.

Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities.

"Coverings" (*ávaraṇáni*), are those whereby the thinking principle is covered; they are the afflictions; they are also impurities. Free from them, means devoid of them. From the knowledge (*jṉána*) becoming free, like the sky bereft of cloud, and "from its infiniteness" (*ánantyát*), *i. e.*, from its being without a break, or all-pervading, "the knowable" (*jṉeya*) becomes "small" (*alpa*), or fit to be counted or grasped. The meaning is, that the Yogí can easily know everything.

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[The next advantage is that the objects of sense are reduced to a minimum. Knowledge then becomes limitless and free from all impurities and coverings or interruptions; and placed against such knowledge, knowables or cognizables become insignificant, *i. e.*, that knowledge which can grasp everything, finds no difficulty in understanding small matters. Not that there is a reduction in the number or quantity of cognizables, but, placed besides limitless knowledge, they, by comparison, become insignificant.]

He then states what takes place after this:

XXXI.

Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their end.

Those which have "accomplished" (*kṛita*), completed, soul's purpose or object in the form of experience and emancipation are called *kritárthâḥ*, or those which have accomplished their end. The "qualities" (*guṇáḥ*) are goodness, foulness, and darkness. "Their modifications" (*pariṇáma*) are their conditions of existence in relation to each other as members and membered, in a progressive or a regressive state to the time of the completion of the purpose of soul. Their "succession" (*krama*) is to be presently described. Its "termination" (*parisamápti*) is its finality, *i. e.*, it does not arise or happen again.

[Proceeding onwards, the next effect of the Yoga is a cessation of the tendency on the part of the qualities to undergo change. The qualities are the most active agents in worldly life, and it is their modifications that produce the various impressions of life, and when they cease to change, there is *ipso facto* a cessation of worldly impressions. It is the duty of Prakṛiti to minister to the purposes of soul, and as the qualities are inherent in Prakṛiti, the qualities may be taken as synonymous with Prakṛiti, and those qualities, having done their work, cease

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from labour. The work of the qualities is said to be two-fold; they have to minister to soul's experience of the world, and then to bring on its emancipation; and when the state above described is attained, the qualities have already accomplished both these works, and, having nothing else left to do, stop work *in re* the soul concerned.]

He now describes the succession above referred to.

XXXII.

The succession is the counterpart of the moment perceptible at the end of the modification.

"Moment" (*kshaṇa*) is a short amount of time. Its "counterpart" (*pratiyogi*) is another distinct moment. "Perceptible at the end of the modification" means that which is accepted as the totality after perceiving a number of moments, and this is called the "succession" of moments, for no succession can be perceived in unperceived succession of moments.

[The word "succession" (*krama*) used in A. XXXI, is explained in this aphorism to mean the following of one moment after another. The object is to say that the lapse of time is reckoned by the succession of one moment after another, though there is no break between them; one totality is divided into many parts only for facility of reckoning.]

He now defines the specific nature of isolation, which is the result.

XXXIII.

Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

"The regression" (*pratiprasava*) or the non-production of change on the completion of the regressive (or refluent) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul's (two-fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called "isolation" (*kaivalya*); or, it is the abidance of the thinking

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power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is *kaivalya*, and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word *kaivalya*. The *P. Bháshya*, suggests its meaning by saying "when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is *kaivalya*," (*chiti-śaktireva kevalá tasyáḥ sadá tathaivávasthánam kaivalamiti*). It is the same goal which the Sáṅkhya assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of *kaivalya*, the word *apavarga* which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The *Sáṅkhya-káriká* adopts the term *kaivalya*, and says, "when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final *kaivalya* accomplished," (v. LXVIII). Gauḍapáda contents himself by saying, "*kaivalya* is the abstract form of *kevala*," (*kevalabhávát kaivalyam*). Váchaspati Mis'ra and Náráyaṇa take it to mean "exemption from the three kinds of pain," (*duhkhatraya-vigamam duhkhavinásam*). The lexicographical meaning of *kevala* is 'one,' 'alone,' 'only,' and in the derivative form it means, 'oneness,' 'singleness,' 'solitariness,' 'exclusiveness,' or 'individuality,' *i. e.*, deliverance from the association of nature. Colebrooke translates it into 'deliverance,' and Wilson adds 'liberation.' Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers 'abstraction.' All these may be resolved into *isolation*, the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.

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The epithets 'absolute' (*aikántika*) and 'final' (*átyantika*) used in the *Sáṅkhya-káriká*, and the word 'always,' (*sadá*) in *P. Bháshya* show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, "the soul's perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever."

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to "nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;" but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the Yoga, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (*cf.* Sáṅkhya-sútra I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian exegetes, more correctly explains the case by saying, "it is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." Professor Weber, in his 'History of Indian literature,' (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, "one very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine—and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on—is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavadgítá, and Puráṇic and Tántric modifications of Yoga.

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Patañjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offerred by the Puráṇics to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the Yoga with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.]

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now, in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experiencership, and inquisitiveness; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (*i. e.*, believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (*i. e.*, no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the S'ástras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments; (*i. e.*, the

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moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is "this" (*ayam*), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is "I" (*aham*). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refluent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipiency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between Prakṛiti and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (*cf.* IV, XXII), all modifications in the form of Mahat and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and that of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with Mahat), and since the consciousness of agency and experiencership of the intellect proceeds from the influence of sentience on the intellect, and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomeration of fallacies?

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the

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Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Mádhyamíkas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (*cf.* Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-saṅgraha*, p. 15). It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.]

Again, if, rejecting this course, it be accepted that agency is soul's essential attribute, then arises the admission of its being subject to modifications, and as modifications are non-eternal or temporal, its character as soul is destroyed. Nor can perception of mutually different conditions be effected in one form at the same time; and accordingly, in the condition in which soul is perceived associated with some produced pleasure, can the condition of pain be perceived. Thus the conditions being various, the conditioned must likewise be various, and from variety and modificability there can be neither spirituality nor eternity, (*i. e.*, that which is modifiable cannot also be eternal or spiritual, and eternity and spirituality are essential attributes of soul). Hence it is that those Sáṅkhyas who believe in a peaceful Brahma, acknowledge soul to remain in the same form both in the mundane and the liberated conditions.

[This is apparently the theory of the Vaiśeṣ'ikas, who believe

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soul to be the real actor. The objection to this theory is that action implies change, and if soul be the real actor, it would be subject to change. The idea of change, however, is, in the opinion of Patañjali, incompatible with the spirituality and eternity of soul; it would cease to be soul if it were changeable like material objects, and therefore this theory is not tenable.]

The theory of the Vedantists, who believe liberation to be that condition of soul in which it is solely sentience and joy, is not correct. Joy being the identity of pleasure, and pleasure being manifested by perceptables, and perceptibility not being produced without perception, the doctrine of unity is destroyed by the admission of the two, the perceptible and the perception. Again, their saying of cognition itself being the joyous soul would be prejudiced by the incompatibility of two antagonistic qualities abiding together. Perception and perceptable cannot fitly be called one. Again, soul is said by the non-dualists to be of two kinds, the working or conditioned and the unconditioned or supreme. But if you admit that form in which the working soul becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain, to be also the form in which it exists as the supreme soul, then the supreme soul becomes, like the working soul, subject to modifications, and pertain, the nature of ignorance. If it be said that the experiencership is not direct, but accepted as a present (by the soul) while remaining as a neutral superior, the case would be the same as in our system of philosophy.

The assumption about the joyous form (of soul) has already been refuted. It may be added that if soul be admitted to be of the character of ignorance, there would be no seperate existence left for working souls, and which should then be the object of philosophy? Certainly not the unconditioned soul, for it is eternally free; nor the working soul, for it is (admitted to be) of the character of ignorance, and thus will result the falsification of all systems of philosophy. If the creation be admitted to consist of ignorance, the question would arise, whose ignorance is it? It cannot be that of the supreme soul, for it is

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eternally free, and of the form of knowledge. It cannot be of the working soul, for that being without a seperate existence, how can it be connected with ignorance? It would be like the admission of horns of a hare (a mere fiction). It might be said that the ignorance of ignorance consists in its not being the subject of demonstration by argument. It may, like the dew on the earth with the rays of the sun (playing on it), melt away under ratiocination, and yet it may be ignorance. This, however, cannot be. Whatever does something must be distinct from, or identical with, something else, and since the agency of ignorance in the development of the universe must be admitted, and admitting it, if ignorance be indeterminate, then nothing whatever will be determinate; even Brahma itself will be liable to be put down as indeterminate, (but if it be described to be determinate, it will cease to be ignorance). It follows then that the form of soul cannot be other than that of a supervisor. This supervisorship is mere sentience only, for there is no evidence of its having any other quality.

[The Vedantic doctrine is refuted on two grounds; 1st, because it involves a duality which the Vedantists themselves repudiate; 2nd, it makes soul liable to be affected by ignorance, thereby destroying its absolute purity, and if we admit that soul may be involved in ignorance then it will become indeterminate, and there would be no certainty about anything.]

It is alleged by the Naiyáyikas and others that soul is sentient, because it becomes so by contact with sentience, and that sentience is produced by the union of soul with its mind. They say that desire, knowledge, exertion and other attributes are produced by the contact of soul during its working condition with mind, and through those qualities, the soul knows itself to be the knower, the agent, and the experiencer. In the state of liberation (*moksha*), when false notions are suppressed on the suppression of the residua (*dosha*) which are produced by them, there results an absolute annihilation of the specific attributes, know-

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ledge, &c., and soul is acknowledged to reside in its own essential form. This, however, is not a correct assumption, for what would you accept to be the peculiar soulness of the soul in that condition? (You cannot urge that pervasion, immensity, and eternity are its constituents, for) the qualities of pervasion and the rest pertain to ether and others, and to differentiate it from them, some determinate form must have to be admitted. You may say that the specific character of soul is its own speciality (or kind to which it belongs). But this cannot be urged, for such speciality exists in all things, (*i. e.*, everything has its specific distinction as a particular kind). It is necessary, therefore, to admit some other differentiation of the soul, apart from speciality, and this can be effected by admitting its supervisorship, from its being of the form of sentience, and in no other way.

As to what is believed by the Mímáñsakas about soul being both worker and work, the position is not tenable. They believe that soul is indicated by the use of the word I, and by the use of I, both the agency and the objectivity of soul are included, (*i. e.*, soul is the ego, and nothing else can be ego, and the soul being the ego, the ego must include both soul and work, for in knowing the soul work must appear to be soul and no other). But this cannot result, because they are of contradictory natures. Agency implies him who measures, while work means that which is to be measured or proved, and the assumption of these two antagonistic qualities cannot be effected in one at the same time. When two antagonistic qualities are assumed, then there can be no unity, as positive and negative, and so are agency and objectivity antagonistic. Should it be said there is no antagonism between agency and objectivity, but there is between agency and instrumentality, we deny it, because the assumption of antagonistic qualities is the same (in either case). Rejecting then the theory of perceivable by the use of I, we hold the soul's supervisorship as proved, and thence its sentienceness.

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The theory of those who hold soul to be finite, defined by the body, and mutable, because it is reckoned among matter, tumbles down as soon as it is started. By the admission of mutability, the sentience form of soul is destroyed, and in the absence of its sentience form, how can there be any spirituality in soul? Hence those who desire to uphold the spirituality of soul must admit its sentience form, and that is its supervisorship.

[This is the theory of the Arhatas or Jains. (*Cf.* Cowell and Gough's *Sarvadarsana-saṅgraha.*]

Some fancy soul to be of the form of the actor. They believe that the action of knowing, which results in the presence of a perceptible object, has for its fruit the cognition of that object; and in that cognition as the fruit, the true form of soul, being of the form of illumination, becomes manifest; and objects being perceptible, the soul becomes the perceptor; for it is produced in some such form as "I know the pot," (in which "I" is the perceptor, "know" is the cognition of the form of illumination, and the "pot" is the perceptible object). The cause of action is for certain the actor, and therefore actorship and experiencership constitute the form of soul. This, however, is inconsistent. (If cognitions be the root),—the question arises, Does the actorship of those cognitions arise simultaneously, or successively? If you say, that the actorship is simultaneous, then its actorship shall cease a moment after. If you say, it happens successively, it cannot be predicated of that which is uniform, (*i. e.*, soul). If you say the actorship of soul is effected always in one or the same form, then that one form being always present, all fruits would become of one form. If the actorship be multiform, then there would be mutability, and there being mutability, there can be no form of sentienceness. It follows that those who believe in soul's sentienceness, should not maintain its direct actorship. The way in which the actorship of the uniform, eternal, sentient soul is proved by us, is the most consistent.

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Those who by such arguments maintain that the self-manifest soul becomes the perceptor through the cognition of objects, will find their refutation by the same line of argument.

Some hold that the reasoning (*vimarsa*) form of soul is its sentience form, (*i. e.*, its sentience is no other than its reasoning power). They say that the sentience form of soul cannot be ascertained without reasoning; the sentience form is said to be distinct from the inert, and without reasoning it cannot be defined, and without reasoning, there is nothing left behind. This is, however, untenable. Reasoning is the discussion which has the form of "this, thus, and so," (*i. e.*, every process of ratiocination involves the assumption of something like this, this is, this is not, thus it is, thus it is not, it is so, it is not so, and without them there can be no reasoning,) and that cannot arise without egoism (or consciousness), and when reasoning is brought to bear on soul it is brought into cognition in the form "I am of this form," and thus the soul, the subject of discussion, being brought to light by the word I, no advance is made beyond a fancy, and fancy is a form of conviction, which is the function of the intellect, and not of sentience. But as sentience, uniform and eternal, remains always in one shape, there can be no entrance of egotism into it. It follows then, that this assumption of reasoning in the soul is a mistaken assumption of the intellect for soul, and not a knowledge of the identity of the self-manifest soul, the great soul.

Thus in no system of philosophy can the form of soul be ascertained by any means, without admitting its supervisorship. Supervisorship implies sentience form, which is distinct from inertness. Because it exists supervising in the form of sentience, therefore it derives the quality of experience (in objects), and that which is supervised by sentience becomes fit for worldly usage. And such being the case, other systems of philosophy, if they decline to accept what we have said about the isolation of soul as resulting on the cessation of the functions of Prakṛiti after it has accomplished its duty have no

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resource. It has, therefore, rightly been said that isolation is the abidance of the sentient power in its own form after withdrawing its shadow from all functions.

The sources of perfections, (I); the manner in which the transmutation of material causes are effected, (II); the mode in which merit cooperates in this process, (III); the origin of created thinking principles, (IV); their relation to their original source, (V); the superiority of Samádhi-born thinking principle, (VI); the nature of various kinds of work, (VII); the conformity of works to residua, (VIII); their invariable relation, (IX); the eternity of desires, (X); their nature and susceptibility to destruction, (XI); the relation of the thinking principle to works, (XII); the natures of the qualities and the qualified, (XIII); unity of things proceeding from unity of modification, (XIV); the relation of cognition to cognizables, (XV); the process of cognition, (XVI); its permanence, (XVII); thinking principle not self-illuminative, (XVIII); it cannot be directed to two things at the same time, (XIX); multiplicity of cognitive power not admissable, (XX); how it perceives its self, (XXI); how it is made fit for all purposes, (XXII); its subserviency to another's purpose, (XXIII); progress of isolation, (XXIV—XXXII); nature of isolation, (XXXIII)—these are the subjects treated of in this chapter on isolation. [Only the substance of the commentary has been given here, for reasons explained before.]

He, who is the asylum of fame and majesty, whose orders are received on the crowns of their diadems, by kings prostrate at his feet in acts of service and salutation, the lotus of whose mouth having been attained by the goddess of speech, she became uncommonly proud, even he, the auspicious Bhoja, lord of the earth, composed these notes on the aphorisms of the lord of serpents.

This is the end of the fourth quarter, or the quarter on isolation, of the commentary entitled Rájamártaṇḍa, on Patañjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.

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APPENDIX.

A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF WORKS EXTANT ON THE YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Abbreviations.

B. G. C.	Bühler's Guzarat Catalogue.
Bh. D. M. C.	Catalogue of the Bháü Dájí Memorial.
Bh. R.	Bhandárkar's Report, 1881-2.
H. C.	Hall's Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems.
K. C. P. C.	Kielhorn's Central Provinces Catalogue.
K. P. R.	Kunte's Punjab Report, 1881.
M. N.	Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS.
N. W. P. C.	North Western Provinces Catalogue.
N. W. P. & O. C.	„ „ „ and Oudh Catalogue.
O. C.	Oudh Catalogue.
Op. C.	Oppert's Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in Southern India.

1. A'chárapaddhati. Duties and exercises of Yogís. By Basudevendra. B. G. C. IV.

2. Ajapágáyatrí-puráscharaṇa-paddhati. Use of the Gáyatrí in Yoga meditation. By Śáṅkara A'chárya. H. C.

3. Amanaska. On steadfastness of the mind. N. W. P. C. V.

4. Ásanádhyáya. On postures appropriate for Yogís. Op. C. I.

5. Ashṭáṅga-hṛidaya-saṅhitá. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. B. G. C. IV.

6. Ashṭáṅga-yoga. Meditation on eight particular parts of the body. By Śaṅkara Áchárya. B. G. C. IV.

7. Cháyápurushávabodhana. Knowledge of souls. Op. C. I.

8. Dattátreya saṅhitá *alias* Dattátreya-yoga, or Dattátreya Śástra. A Tantra on the performance of Yoga. By Dattátreya. M. N. I, Op. C. I., B. G. C. IV.

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9. Gheraṇḍa Saṅhitá. A Tantra on the mode of performing the Yoga form of S'ákta worship. By Gheraṇḍa. M. N. I., N. W. P. C. I., N. W. P. C. IV.

10. Goraksha-s'ataka *alias* Jṇána-s'ataka. A century of verses on the performance of Yoga. By Gorakshanátha. N. W. P. C. I., M. N. I., H. C., B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.

11. Goraksha-s'ataka-ṭíká. A commentary on the Goraksha-s'ataka. By S'aṅkara. N. W. P. C. I.

12. Goraksha-s'ataka-ṭippana. Notes on the Goraksha-s'ataka. By Mathuránátha S'ukla. N. W. P. C. I.

13. Haṭha-dípiká *alias* Haṭha-pradípiká. On Haṭha and Rája Yogas. by S'átmáráma *alias* Atmáráma. M. N. I and II., N. W. P. C. I., H. C., K. C. P. C.

14. Haṭha-pradípiká. On Haṭha-yoga. By Chintámaṇi. B. G. C. IV.

15. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-pradípiká which treats on the Ashṭáṅga-yoga. By Vrajabhúshaṇa. N. W. P. C. I.

16. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-pradípiká. By Mahádeva. N. W. P. C. I.

17. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-pradípiká No. 13. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C. I.

18. Haṭha-pradípiká-ṭippana. Notes on Haṭha-pradípiká, describing, Yama, Niyama, Dháraṇá, Dhyána, and Samádhi. By Umápati. N. W. P. C. I.

19. Haṭha-ratnávalí. On the suppression of the breath as a Yoga exercise. N. W. P. C. V.

20. Haṭha-saṅketa-chandriká. On the performance of the Haṭha-yoga. By Sundaradeva. N. W. P. C. V., H. C.

21. Haṭha-yoga. On the performance of Haṭha-yoga. By Ádinátha. B. G. C. IV., K. C. P. C.

22. Haṭha-yoga-dhirája. On the exercises necessary for Haṭha-yoga. By S'iva. N. W. P. C. I.

23. Haṭha-yoga-dhirája-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-yoga-dhirája. By Rámánanda Tírtha. N. W. P. C I.

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24. Haṭha-yoga-viveka. On the performance of the Haṭha-yoga. By Vámadeva. N. W. P. C. I.

25. Haṭha-yoga-saṅgraha. The elements of the Haṭha-yoga. By Mathuránátha Śukla. N. W. P. C. I.

26. Jṉánámṛita. A poem on the duties of Yogís. By Gorakshanátha, disciple of Mínanátha. H. C.

27. Jṉánámṛita-ṭippana. Notes on the Jṉánámṛita. By Sadánanda. N. W. P. C. I.

28. Jṉána-yoga-khaṇḍa. Knowledge as an element of Yoga exercise. Op. C. I.

29. Jívanmukti-viveka *alias* Jívanmukti-prakaraṇa. Emancipation during terrestrial existence. By Vidyáraṇya Svámí. M. N. IV.

30. Jyotsná *alias* Haṭha-dípiká-ṭíká. A commentary on the Haṭha-dípiká of Svátmáráma. By Brahmánanda. M. N. IV.

31. Kapila-gitá. Dissertations on the importance of Yoga meditations and the mode of performing them. by Kapila. M. N. IV.

32. Kedára-kalpa. Yoga practices. K. C. P. C.

33. Khechari-vidyá. Yoga exercises for attaining occult powers. By Śiva. B. G. C. IV.

34. Laya-yoga. Yoga emancipation. B. G. C. IV.

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